




Cultural Hegemony, Identity, and Resistance  
in Colonial Indonesia
•
Arnout van der Meer
Southeast Asia Progr a m Publications
an impr int of Cor nell University Pr ess
Ithaca and London
Southeast Asia Progr am Publications Editor ial Boar d
Copyright © 2020 by Cornell University
e text of this book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License:  
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
To use this book, or parts of this book, in any way not covered by the license,  
please contact Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street,  
Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu.
First published 2020 by Cornell University Press
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Meer, Arnout van der, 1980– author.
Title: Performing power: cultural hegemony, identity, and resistance in colonial 
Indonesia / Arnout van der Meer.
Description: Ithaca, [New York]: Southeast Asia Program Publications, an imprint of 
Cornell University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identi­ers: LCCN 2020046264 (print) | LCCN 2020046265 (ebook) | 
ISBN 9781501758577 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501758584 (paperback) | 
ISBN 9781501758591 (epub) | ISBN 9781501758607 (pdf)
Subjects: LCSH: Politics and culture—Indonesia—Java—History—19th 
century. | Politics and culture—Indonesia—Java—History—20th century. 
| Group identity—Indonesia—Java—History—19th century. | Group 
identity—Indonesia—Java—History—20th century. | Indonesia—Politics and 
government—1798–1942. | Java (Indonesia)—Social life and customs—19th 
century. | Java (Indonesia)—Social life and customs—20th century.
Classi­cation: LCC DS625.M44 2020 (print) | LCC DS625 (ebook) | 
DDC 959.8/20223—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020046264
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020046265
Cover image: Resident P. Sijtho of Semarang with his servant  
holding his gilded payung, 1904. Source: Leiden University Library,  
Royal Netherlands Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies 2603.
Mahinder K ingra  
(ex of f icio)  
Thak Chaloemtiarana  
Chiara Formichi  
Tamara Loos  
Andrew Wil lford
is book is published as part of the Sustainable History 
Monograph Pilot. With the generous support of the  
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Pilot uses cutting-edge 
publishing technology to produce open access digital editions 
of high-quality, peer-reviewed monographs from leading  
university presses. Free digital editions can be downloaded 
from: Books at JSTOR, EBSCO, Hathi Trust, Internet 
Archive, OAPEN, Project MUSE, and many other open 
repositories. 
While the digital edition is free to download, read, and share, 
the book is under copyright and covered by the following  
Creative Commons License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Please  
consult www.creativecommons.org if you have questions 
about your rights to reuse the material in this book. 
When you cite the book, please include the following  
URL for its Digital Object Identi­er (DOI): 
https://doi.org/10.7298/h0cn-4s91
More information about the Sustainable History Monograph 
Pilot can be found at https://www.longleafservices.org. 
We are eager to learn more about how you discovered this 
title and how you are using it. We hope you will spend a few 
minutes answering a couple of questions at this url:
https://www.longleafservices.org/shmp-survey/







A Note on Spelling and Terms xvii
Introduction
e Performance of Power 1
Chapter 1
Setting the Stage:  
e Javanization of Colonial Authority in the Nineteenth Century 19
Chapter 2
“Sweet was the Dream, Bitter the Awakening”:  
e Contested Implementation of the Ethical Policy, 1901 –1913 48
Chapter 3
Disrupting the Colonial Performance:  
e Hormat Circular of 1913 and the National Awakening 77
Chapter 4
Contesting Sartorial Hierarchies:  
From Ethnic Stereotypes to National Dress 111
Chapter 5
East Is East, and West Is West:  
Forging Modern Identities 145
Chapter 6
Staging Colonial Modernity:  
Hegemony, Fairs, and the Indonesian Middle Classes 175
Epilogue





1. Map of Java 8
2. Meeting of the Native Court in Pati, Central Java, ca. 1865 45
3. Founding meeting of the Sarekat Islam in Blitar, 1914 88
4. Advertisement for a Sundanese language course 100
5. Opinion ballot on “sembah djongkok” 108
6. “e past and the present!” 133
7. “Don’t forget where you come from!” 162
8. “e Modernized Javanese” 176
9. Camel cigarettes at the Pasar Gambir, 1930 191




e process of writing a ­rst book is like a play. It consists of distinct acts, 
beginning with formulating a research topic and question in graduate school, 
conducting research in libraries and archives, working through challenges, 
and honing the narrative and arguments until it ­nally all comes together in 
published form. Unlike a play, however, the reader only sees the result of this 
laborious journey. I am therefore excited for the opportunity to recognize and 
thank the many people who have oered me instruction, support, friendship, 
and insightful feedback along the way. Without their help, this book simply 
could not have been written.
is book began at Rutgers University, where I was lucky to work with some 
of the most amazing scholars and teachers I know. I am especially grateful for 
the enduring guidance and friendship of Michael Adas, whose questions about 
photographs depicting Dutch colonial ocials surrounded by Javanese status 
symbols prompted my interest in the interplay between culture and power many 
years ago. I treasure our conversations over coee on cultural hegemony, agency, 
and material culture just as much as those on contemporary politics, baseball, 
and life. Bonnie Smith is among the most inspiring people I have ever met. She 
taught me numerous invaluable skills, but her most important lesson is one that 
I consistently convey to my own students: when writing, make sure it is inter-
esting. I also pro­ted tremendously from my conversations with Matt Matsuda 
about culture and power and am forever inspired by his exemplary energy in 
the classroom. To this day, I feel privileged to have had Eric Tagliacozzo as my 
outside reader, as he encouraged me to expand the scope of my project and always 
provided me with invaluable advice.
roughout researching and writing the manuscript, I received vital support 
from friends I made in graduate school, especially Kris Alexanderson, Stephen 
Allen, Alejandro Gomez-del Moral, Annie Kinkel-De Vries, Kathryn Mahaney, 
Elizabeth Churchich, and Adam Zalma. During my research trips and confer-
ences, I met many inspiring people who each in their own way helped me to de-
velop my project, including Tom van den Berge, Marieke Bloembergen, Kees van 
Dijk, Liesbeth Ouwehand, Remco Raben, Pauline K. M. van Roosmalen, and 
xiv Acknowledgments
Abdul Wahid. I bene­ted from the help and friendship of Hazel Hahn, whose 
invitation to participate in a project on cultural exchange between Southeast 
Asia and Europe and her insightful commentary on my writing positively shaped 
my project. Similarly, Henk Schulte Nordholt’s challenge to develop a collabo-
rative study with Tom Hoogervorst and Dafna Ruppin signi­cantly impacted 
my own understanding of my research. No less inspiring was my teamwork with 
Bart Luttikhuis, whose sharp mind and pen were a great help in articulating 
social change in colonial Indonesia. And ­nally, I’d like to thank my colleagues 
at Colby College, who made me feel right at home and were always supportive 
of my research agenda. I especially appreciate the support and feedback provided 
by Sarah Du, Noa Gutow-Ellis, Elizabeth LaCouture, Mary Beth Mills, and 
John Turner.
roughout my years of work on this project, I have received generous ­-
nancial support that enabled research trips in Europe and Indonesia, language 
instruction, editing services, and much-needed time for writing. I am especially 
grateful for my Fulbright Fellowship from the Netherlands America Commis-
sion for Educational Exchange; the substantial support of the Department of 
History, School of Graduate Studies, and the Rutgers Center for Historical 
Analysis at Rutgers University; various fellowships and grants from the An-
drew W. Mellon Foundation; an Aliated Fellowship at the Royal Institute 
for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV); and my Colby College 
Start-Up Funds as well as several Colby College Social Science Division Grants. 
Without a doubt, the help and guidance of librarians and archivists enhanced 
my research tremendously, especially at the former library and collections of the 
KITLV, Leiden University Library’s Special Collections, and the National Ar-
chives in e Hague.
My editor, Sarah Elizabeth Mary Grossman, has been supportive of—and pa-
tient with—my book project since I ­rst pitched it at the Association for Asian 
Studies’ annual meeting in Toronto in 2017. I thank her for her encouragement 
and persistence in seeing this project come together. I am also very much obliged 
to the two anonymous readers whose thoughtful suggestions have undoubtedly 
improved this book. And I owe special thanks to Alix Genter, my fellow Rut-
gers graduate, whose assistance in editing my manuscript was essential in hon-
ing my writing and clarifying my thoughts. Finally, I am truly grateful for the 
generous support of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation’s Sustainable History 
Monograph Pilot program, which greatly expands the reach of my scholarship.
My own understanding of this project developed as I sharpened my thoughts 
and approach through research fellowships, talks, conference presentations, and 
Acknowledgments xv 
of course publications. All of these experiences come together in this book. Parts 
of chapters 2 and 3 originally appeared in “Rituals and Power: Cross-Cultural 
Exchange and the Contestation of Colonial Hegemony in Indonesia,” in 
Cross-Cultural Exchange and the Colonial Imaginary: Global Encounters via 
Southeast Asia, edited by Hazel Hahn (Singapore: NUS Press, 2019), 75–103; 
and “Igniting Change in Colonial Indonesia: Soemarsono’s Contestation of 
Colonial Hegemony in a Global Context,” Journal of World History 30, no. 4 
(2019): 501–32. Small portions of chapters 3 and 4 can be found in an article I 
wrote with Bart Luttikhuis: “1913 in Indonesian History: Demanding Equality, 
Changing Mentality,” TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of South-
east Asia 8, no. 2 (2020): 115–33. A version of chapter 6 was ­rst published as 
“Performing Colonial Modernity: Fairs, Consumerism, and the Emergence of 
the Indonesian Middle Classes,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde
173, no. 4 (2017): 503–38.
It was my mother’s fascination with colonial literature that introduced me 
to the history of Indonesia, although my parents always encouraged an interest 
in the past more broadly. eir greatest accomplishment is creating a warm and 
supportive family that allowed my sisters and me to chase our dreams, knowing 
that we could always count on one another. e ful­llment of this particular 
dream of mine is therefore also their achievement. Joke, my wife, has supported 
this project from the very beginning and is thrilled with its completion. Her 
kindness, courage in life, and ceaseless passion for academic work and our family 
inspire me every day. And ­nally, I thank our daughters, Amelie and So­e. is 
project has been intertwined with their whole lives, and these last few months 
they have been increasingly asking if it is ­nally ­nished. To my great joy and 
relief, the next time they ask I can tell them that yes, it is done. is is for them.

xvii
A Note on Spelling and Ter ms
is book deals with a dynamic period in Indonesian history during which 
identities and languages were in constant ux. My decisions about language 
reect my hope to assist in further research, to honor the ethnic and national 
identities of the indigenous peoples of colonial Indonesia, and to make the text 
as clear and comprehensible as possible.
To enable others to locate and identify people, associations, unions, and polit-
ical parties in the historical record, these names appear in their original spelling 
as found in archives and publications. For instance, I use Soemarsono instead 
of Sumarsono and Boedi Oetomo instead of Budi Utomo. Place names, however, 
appear in their contemporary spelling to make it easier for readers to identify 
and locate these places on a map (see ­gure 1). us, I use Purwakarta instead of 
Poerwakarta. e exception to this rule is when a particular place had a Dutch 
name in the colonial era, like Batavia, which was renamed Jakarta following 
Indonesian independence. In addition, both historians and contemporaries have 
referred to the former Dutch colonial empire in the Indonesian archipelago by a 
great diversity of names, the most common being the Dutch East Indies, Dutch 
Indies, Netherlands East Indies, and the Netherlands Indies. In this study I use 
Netherlands Indies and also employ the term colonial Indonesia to emphasize 
the colonial character of the state and identify it as the precursor to modern 
Indonesia.
Since the Dutch referred to themselves as both Dutch and European inter-
changeably in publications and ocial and private documents, I do the same. In 
addition, this book is primarily focused on Java, which is home to several large 
ethnic groups, the primary ones being the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and 
Betawi (Malay). e term Javanese can refer to inhabitants of the island of Java as 
well as ethnic Javanese. Moreover, this volume documents a period during which 
people from throughout the archipelago developed a national consciousness and 
created a collective Indonesian identity. rough this process, oen referred to 
as the national awakening, Javanese, Sundanese, Sumatrans, Balinese, and many 
others began to also consider themselves Indonesians. In other words, a person 
could be ethnically Sundanese, an inhabitant of Java (Javanese), and identify as 
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Indonesian. I have tried to make these dierent designators as straightforward 
and context-dependent as possible.
Finally, I have included Indonesian terms in their modern spellings, espe-
cially those for which there is not a satisfactory translation; for example, hor-
mat (customary ways of showing respect) and sembah (a gesture of respect in 
which a person brings their hands together in front of their face). Similarly, I 
have maintained modern spellings for Indonesian classi­cations and titles, i.e., 
bupati (regency head) instead of boepati. Unless otherwise indicated, all English 





e Performance of Power
F ollowing a successful period working in the colonial capital of Batavia (Jakarta), Prawiradinata, a young and ambitious clerk in the indigenous civil service, was transferred to a new post in Purwakarta, 
a small town in Java’s interior. His enthusiasm about his career advancement 
quickly evaporated when he discovered that beyond the capital, conservative 
attitudes pervaded the colonial administration. In December 1912, Prawiradi-
nata was summoned by his Dutch superior, Assistant Subdistrict Administrator 
A. A. C. Linck, who, in a confrontational tone, accused the clerk of not submit-
ting his paperwork on time. Startled by the rebuke, Prawiradinata responded in 
Dutch rather than Javanese—a signal that he was not only Western-educated 
but also unwilling to oer traditional deference to his supervisor. At the time, 
it was still customary for Javanese subordinates to adhere to a strict colonial 
language hierarchy, addressing superiors in high Javanese while they in turn 
answered in a lower form of the language. is deviation from bureaucratic prac-
tice infuriated Linck, who bellowed that he would “not be lied to by a native.” 
Declaring that everyone in the civil service complained about Prawiradinata’s 
sluggish work ethic, Linck clearly attempted to reassert his authority over an 
insolent colonial subject by invoking the trope of the lazy native.1 In the ensuing 
battle of wills, Prawiradinata persisted and vowed—still in Dutch—that he was 
neither lazy nor a liar. Linck dismissed Prawiradinata but immediately 
led an 
o	cial complaint with the local bupati, the Javanese district head. Tellingly, 
when Prawiradinata later appeared before the bupati, he was not questioned 
about the missing paperwork but rather about his alleged impolite and boorish 
behavior in addressing his superior.
is seemingly minor encounter illustrates the importance of the everyday 
staging and performance of power in colonial Indonesia and in colonial societies 
more broadly. e palpable anxiety surrounding Linck and Prawiradinata’s con-
frontation stemmed from competing assumptions about the proper social and 
cultural norms that structured all interactions between colonizer and colonized. 
e Dutch administrator expected to receive traditional Javanese deference as 
validation of his authority, whereas the Javanese clerk adopted Western etiquette 
to signify his education and modernity. Linck’s attitude and expectations of how 
2 Introduction
the encounter and its aermath would unfold reveal the manner in which colo-
nial hegemony was communicated through language, manners, material status 
symbols, and even physical gestures and posture. rough this scripted perfor-
mance of power, authorities sought to a	rm, uphold, and strengthen colonial 
hierarchies of race, class, and gender, which the Dutch overlords proclaimed 
were natural and enduring. But as Prawiradinata’s actions show, the colonized 
were not merely extras in the colonial play. By the early twentieth century, re-
liance on these nineteenth-century tropes was starting to give way, and many 
Javanese began to assert their agency through subversive responses to the script. 
eir actions enabled them to negotiate and contest colonial hegemony, which, 
as Prawiradinata and Linck’s confrontation reects, resulted in mounting ten-
sions between proponents of tradition and modernity in colonial society.
Encounters like the one between Prawiradinata and Linck are central to this 
book, which focuses on the changing history of colonial hegemony and its con-
testation through everyday interactions in nineteenth-and early-twentieth-cen-
tury colonial Indonesia. ough histories of economic exploitation and political 
movements provide essential context for studying systems of hegemonic control, 
my analysis focuses on culture, the performance of power, everyday experiences, 
and the steady development of Indonesian agency. e study of the performance 
of power in colonial Indonesia reveals a new understanding of the Indonesian 
national awakening, one rooted not in the founding of political movements and 
organizations but in the proliferation of everyday discursive acts that challenged 
colonial hegemony and strategies of domination.
Javanization, Hegemony, and Resistance
In the seventeenth century, the lucrative spice trade drew the Dutch to the In-
donesian archipelago, where they established a colonial foothold on the island 
of Java that lasted until Indonesian independence in 1949.2 By the nineteenth 
century, the Dutch had created a colonial state that oversaw the production of 
cash crops, labor exploitation, and resource extraction through a combination of 
ruthless subjugation and cunning diplomacy and trade. As with many coloniz-
ing powers, rather than relying solely on the “right of conquest,” the legitimacy 
of Dutch authority on Java depended on preserving the traditional indigenous 
elite—in this case, the priyayi, a class of Javanese nobles and aristo-bureaucrats. 
While the institution of indirect rule in colonial Indonesia, including Dutch 
colonizers’ essential collaboration with the priyayi, has been the subject of excel-
lent historiographical studies, the actual exercise of colonial power has received 
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scant scholarly attention.3 is is surprising because their collaboration required 
signi
cant cultural accommodations, and the Dutch adopted Javanese deference 
etiquette, symbols of power, sartorial hierarchies, lifestyles, and architecture to 
legitimize their colonial authority. In historical scholarship, this process of ac-
culturation is oen treated as a byproduct of centuries of cultural and racial 
mixing due to the immigration and conjugal policies of the Dutch East India 
Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC).4 Benedict Anderson, 
for example, describes the “Javanization” of the Dutch as a cultural osmosis re-
sulting from the inuences exerted by Europeans’ Asian wives or concubines.5
Such an interpretation obfuscates the deliberate nature of Dutch institutions 
designed to maintain control over increasing numbers of colonial subjects. In 
this book, I employ the term “Javanization” to designate a conscious policy of 
cultural appropriation to legitimize colonial rule.
e Javanization of colonial power in the nineteenth century can be 
traced back to cultural practices and concepts of authority in the Javanese 
Hindu-Buddhist past. It was as part of the so-called Indianization of South-
east Asia that complex bureaucracies and increased social strati
cation 
rst 
emerged in Java from the eighth century onward. ese early precolonial states 
were characterized by low population-to-land ratios, weak administrative orga-
nization, and interelite rivalries. As a consequence, a powerful ruler was some-
one who could gather and retain the largest following, not the largest territory. 
To that end, rulers relied on devotional state cults inspired by Indic cosmology 
that emphasized their prowess and elaborate networks of patron-client relations 
to maintain social and political order. ese vertical relationships, extending 
throughout social rankings from the court to the village, were expressed through 
appearance, etiquette, language, and status symbols.6 ese outward forms of 
social communication developed in conjunction with a traditional Javanese po-
litical philosophy that emphasized, in Anderson’s words, “the signs of Power’s 
concentration, not the demonstration of its exercise or use.”7 us, Java’s pre-
colonial states were prime examples of what Cliord Geertz famously dubbed 
“theatre states,” polities where displays of power—through spectacle, ceremo-
nies, and rituals—were essential in upholding authority. According to Geertz, 
“Power served pomp, not pomp power.”8
e Dutch adoption of Javanese deference rituals and symbols alongside the 
construction of the colonial state did not, however, result in a theatre state. On 
the contrary, I argue that the colonial Javanese state illustrates some of the lim-
itations of this concept, especially for the colonial period. While appealing, the 
idea of a theatre state is rather static and ahistorical, and does not satisfactorily 
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allow for change over time. By prioritizing cultural and symbolic power over 
domination by force, the theory disregards rulers’ need for political and eco-
nomic authority to orchestrate, shape, and direct the theatrical staging of power. 
Similarly, there is little room for agency, as one is le to assume that all play their 
assigned roles without contestation or mediation. Consequently, the framework 
of the theatre state does not explain historical transitions and social transfor-
mations.9 For instance, the Dutch adoption of Javanese symbols of power and 
etiquette during the 
rst decades of the nineteenth century did not result in 
widespread acquiescence to their rule. On the contrary, coercive measures were 
necessary to meet the challenges of large-scale revolts, everyday avoidance pro-
test, and messianic movements.10 ese forms of resistance underscore the fact 
that theatre states require political and coercive power in order to be imposed 
and maintained.
John Pemberton similarly argues that power in colonial and postcolonial In-
donesia was not simply enforced from above but was a pervasive cultural eect 
produced through the performance of tradition. Crucially, he shows that while 
the Dutch assumed Javanese culture was static and enduring, it was precisely 
through the colonial encounter that the Javanese elite articulated a “traditional” 
identity, expressed through language, dress, and etiquette, in contradistinc-
tion to the Dutch. In this way, the colonial encounter itself produced a more 

xed construction of Javanese culture. e Dutch attempt to legitimize power 
through cultural appropriation and the crystallization of Javanese cultural iden-
tity demonstrates that power and tradition are uid and malleable concepts.11
us, a more expansive analysis beyond the theatre state is essential to under-
stand the relationship between culture and power in colonial Indonesia.
e concept of cultural hegemony oers a more dynamic and historical per-
spective that, signi
cantly, emphasizes agency as a key component of the inter-
play between culture and power. Although formulated by the Italian Marxist 
and activist Antonio Gramsci to explain and contest the rise of fascism in ear-
ly-twentieth-century Italy, cultural hegemony oers scholars valuable insights 
into the relationship between culture and power in colonial societies as well. 
Cultural hegemony refers to the continuous process through which a dominant 
group—in this case, the colonizer—tries to attain and maintain the consent 
of the great majority of the people it rules—here, the colonized. is was ac-
complished through the manipulation of cultural values, norms, beliefs, and 
traditions in an attempt to validate the ruling group’s worldview and make it 
appear favorable to all. In this way, the hegemonic discourse of the ruling group 
rationalized the social, racial, political, and economic inequalities of colonial 
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society and sought to inculcate a sense that those inequalities were enduring 
and inevitable. In theory, a successful ruling group could rely less on domina-
tion by force and the coercive apparatus of the state and more on the majority 
of the population’s passive resignation. But hegemony is never static or absolute. 
It is inherently contested, thus enabling subordinate groups to negotiate and 
sometimes defy the terms of hegemonic discourse. Managing such negotiations 
and counterhegemonic challenges requires that the dominant group constantly 
renew and adjust its approach. In other words, hegemony involves continual cul-
tural struggle, as ruling groups seek to legitimize their authority while inevitably 
leaving openings for subordinate groups to contest it.12
Cultural hegemony thus oers an insightful approach to the study of Dutch 
dominance in Indonesia and its contestation at the subaltern level. is is espe-
cially apt given the importance and pervasiveness of ritual display and highly 
re
ned rules for social interaction in Javanese society, particularly in political 
intercourse. Although there are numerous studies on the ways in which cultural 
hegemony has been applied to the colonial context in South Asia in particu-
lar, the concept is conspicuously absent from studies on colonial Indonesia.13
In part this can be explained by the association of colonialism with violence 
and oppression, which is reected in numerous studies on moments of upheaval, 
revolt, and organized political movements. As Jan Breman has shown, this has 
too oen resulted in the problematic assumption that between moments of out-
right confrontation, the endemic oppression and exploitation of colonialism 
were passively endured in everyday life.14 is is where the explanatory value of 
cultural hegemony lies; maintaining hegemony requires a balance of coercion 
and consent, with domination by force at one end of the spectrum and consen-
sus and negotiation at the other.15 Although cultural hegemony was never fully 
attained in the colonial context—Ranajit Guha 
ttingly described colonial rule 
as “dominance without hegemony”—the concept enables historians to explore 
the myriad ways in which power was continuously communicated and contested 
in colonial systems of dominance.16 is approach also illuminates why, when, 
and how colonial power could be made to seem natural and legitimate rather 
than alien and oppressive.
As historical methodology, cultural hegemony oers a way to understand 
how the Dutch, and colonizers in general, were able to impose an exploitative 
socioeconomic and repressive political order that most o	cials could justify as a 
civilizing enterprise. eir alliances with, and ability to incorporate the interests 
of, indigenous elites and bureaucrats were an essential prerequisite to sustained 
control.17 e Dutch partnership with the priyayi, for instance, was based on a 
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notion of parallel elites: Dutch o	cials and Javanese priyayi were supposedly 
equal in administering their own constituencies. In return for their allegiance 
to the Dutch, the priyayi were rewarded with hereditary rights, economic in-
centives, and the retention of their pomp and ceremony.18 In a similar vein, the 
Dutch granted far-reaching economic, legal, and political privileges to Chinese 
merchants, shopkeepers, and moneylenders, who were indispensable as middle-
men in the colonial economy.19 And last but not least, indigenous mercenary 
soldiers 
lled the ranks of the colonial army, which was essential to the coercive 
apparatus of the state.20
Because a large majority of the population consisted of illiterate peasants, 
conveying hegemonic ideas and ideology posed a signi
cant challenge for Dutch 
colonizers. eir strategies made it imperative that my research move beyond 
the realm of o	cial reports, legal proceedings, ordinances, popular periodicals, 
and other written forms of communication that scholars deploying Gramsci’s 
approach to cultural hegemony generally analyze. us, in addition to these 
standard textual sources, I emphasize the ways in which the hegemonic dis-
course was communicated through a complex array of social performances and 
material culture. In what I will refer to throughout this book as the perfor-
mance of power, the Dutch announced their hegemonic discourse through eti-
quette, material symbols, language, clothing, architecture, urban planning, and 
lifestyle. ese sociocultural practices created an experiential reality in which 
colonizers and colonized actively performed power and status during everyday 
encounters. ese encounters took place within the civil service, on plantations, 
in the streets, and in households, trains, stores, and o	ces.21 It was through 
these prescribed interactions that the Dutch and their Javanese allies sought 
to normalize colonial hierarchies and instill a sense of compliance throughout 
the colonized populace. When eective, these modes of imposing hegemony 
bolstered acceptance of foreign domination through the manipulation of indig-
enous culture and rendered it more di	cult—but not impossible—to reject or 
resist the colonizers’ demands. e deliberate Javanization of colonial authority 
is the topic of the 
rst chapter.
e performance of colonial power was, however, like hegemony itself, not a 
one-way imposition of public and social behavior but an interactive encounter 
between colonizer and colonized. Although performance was instrumental in 
expressing the hegemonic discourse, a degree of de
ance was always possible. 
Focusing on this tension, James Scott describes interactions between colonizer 
and colonized as reecting a public transcript—the hegemonic discourse. He 
cautions against overestimating the acquiescence of the colonized and argues 
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that they critiqued the colonial relationship ostage, a practice he characterizes 
as fashioning hidden transcripts.22 According to Scott, it is through these hidden 
transcripts that we can explore the everyday struggles of subordinate groups. In 
this book, however, I focus on encounters and instances in which this everyday 
resistance manifests onstage, in the face of power. Acts of symbolic de
ance 
took various forms, from feigned ignorance to outright insubordination, such 
as Prawiradinata’s refusal to oer traditional deference to his superior. is ap-
proach draws attention to Indonesian agency in everyday colonial encounters, 
as opposed to limiting active resistance to direct political opposition or rebel-
lion. By tracing the development and evolution of the performance of power, a 
dynamic and engaging history emerges that reveals the modes and sites of In-
donesian de
ance as well as the ways in which the Dutch continually worked to 
legitimize their authority.
e primary geographic focus of this book lies on Java (see 
gure 1), but 
the histories it explores more broadly illustrate how the performance of power 
shaped emergent Indonesian cultural narratives and identities. Aer establish-
ing Batavia in 1619 (present-day Jakarta), the island of Java was at the center of 
the Dutch colonial project in Asia. Following the bankruptcy of the VOC at 
the turn of the nineteenth century, the Dutch transformed the trade empire’s 
dispersed possessions into a Java-centered colonial state known as the Nether-
lands Indies. rough a series of brutal wars—such as the infamous Aceh War 
(1873–1904)—and diplomatic coercion, the vast Indonesian archipelago was 
eectively consolidated under Dutch control by the twentieth century. Java 
remained the administrative, political, and economic bedrock of this modern 
colonial state, and the island’s major cities became meeting grounds where peo-
ple from throughout the archipelago discovered, discussed, and contested their 
shared colonial subjecthood. Java was home to the majority of Western-style 
schools, institutions of higher education, political and cultural associations, and 
vernacular newspapers and periodicals. As Robert Elson asserts, “the cities of 
Java were the fulcrum of intellectual life” where the “idea of Indonesia” was not 
only embraced but also began to ourish during the 
nal decades of colonial 
rule.23 Analyzing the performance of power in these locations, this book oers 
an original perspective on the transition from a Javanese identity to an Indo-
nesian one.
Tracing how Indonesians viewed and experienced this cultural hegemonic 
struggle is quite a challenge for historians. e task is complicated by the nature 
of the colonial archives, which reect and con
rm the Dutch colonizer’s hege-
monic worldview. ere are limited sources that shed light on the Indonesian 
8 Introduction
perspective in the nineteenth century, in particular.24 It is possible to read the 
archival record against the grain and decipher modes of hegemonic protest in 
the form of foot-dragging, ight, vandalism, and millenarianism.25 ere is also 
linguistic evidence of such everyday resistance, eternalized, for instance, in the 
nineteenth-century Dutch proverb that someone is “East Indian deaf,” referring 
to situations in which a person pretends not to hear a question or a command. 
Rooted in the colonial trope of the lazy native, the saying is associated with 
indolence to this day but also with colonial o	cials who were indierent to 
the concerns of the colonized.26 However, from the late nineteenth century on-
ward, the Indonesian experience comes more sharply into focus through the 
increasing availability of sources penned by the colonized themselves, such as 
vernacular newspapers and periodicals, pamphlets, correspondence, novels, and 
biographies. By drawing extensively on these sources, I reconstruct and analyze 
the interactive hegemonic struggle between colonizer and colonized.
e private correspondence of Indonesian national heroine Raden Adjeng 
Kartini, an early advocate for women’s rights and education, oers an instructive 
example of how Indonesians perceived the colonial performance of power. In a 
letter to a Dutch friend, Stella Zeehandelaar, in January 1900, Kartini wrote that 
she detested oering traditional Javanese deference to Europeans. She con
ded 
that she could not suppress a smile and had to bite her lips to prevent herself 
from laughing outright at the manner in which Dutch o	cials emphasized their 
prestige over the Javanese. Obviously, Kartini did not buy into the “ridiculous 
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spectacle” that Dutch colonizers maintained was crucial to legitimizing their au-
thority to the Javanese population. She even went so far as to call Dutch prestige 
“imaginary,” in essence undermining the cultural grounds on which colonial rule 
was constructed. Signi
cantly, Kartini also suggested that she was not alone in 
her views. For instance, she described how humble crowds respectfully retreated 
before an assistant resident under the shade of his gilded payung—a Javanese cer-
emonial parasol—only to burst out laughing once he turned his back.27 Although 
Kartini’s letters do not constitute evidence of direct hegemonic contestation, they 
do shed light on the Indonesian mentality in the colonial encounter. Due to her 
privileged position as a woman of noble birth, Kartini was able to critique the 
Dutch as long as her views did not spread too widely throughout the popula-
tion—yet. Although Kartini was ahead of her time, her letters indicate that the 
times were changing. Only a few years later, the colonized would increasingly de-
clare and perform such private sentiments of resistance directly to Dutch o	cials.
e turn of the twentieth century was a tumultuous period of social and cul-
tural change in colonial Indonesia and the world more broadly.28 Characterized 
by rapid technological innovation, demographic growth, and urbanization, the 
era saw the increased mobility of people, goods, and ideas. e nature of colo-
nialism itself was also changing, due to the social application of evolutionary 
science as well as the privatization of the colonial economy and its incorpora-
tion into global trade networks. In addition, the rise of imperial Japan and the 
American colonization of the Philippines shied the regional balance of power 
and created a growing self-awareness among the colonized.29 Under these cir-
cumstances, it became increasingly di	cult to legitimize the Dutch colonial 
project through the Javanization of power. e inevitable adjustment to these 
transformations occurred in 1901 with the proclamation of the Ethical Policy. 
e Dutch equivalent of the civilizing mission, the Ethical Policy was based on 
the premise that Dutch superiority, rooted in scienti
c and technological prow-
ess, created a moral obligation to “civilize” the supposedly backward colonized 
peoples. e new policy resulted in educational, agricultural, and administra-
tive reforms—all topics of previous historical inquiry—and, crucially, in a new 
hegemonic script for the performance of colonial power.30 As representatives of 
European civilization and modernity, the Dutch could no longer rely on cultural 
accommodation without losing their credibility. Colonial o	cials and civil ser-
vants were thus instructed to replace Javanese deference traditions with modern 
Western etiquette. ese instructions set the tone for a comprehensive overhaul 
of the appearance of colonial power reected in language, social norms, archi-
tecture, public spaces, and consumer culture.
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e implementation of this ethical discourse was far from straightforward, 
however. Like all civilizing ideologies, the Ethical Policy was based on a con-
tradictory premise. While the Dutch publicly proclaimed a moral responsibil-
ity to civilize the indigenous population, Social Darwinist beliefs about racial 
dierence suggested that the colonized could never be civilized; that is, could 
never match the colonizer’s level of evolutionary development.31 Predictably, 
the Ethical Policy divided colonial o	cials, administrators, and civil servants 
with regards to its feasibility and desirability. Policymakers and o	cials in the 
colonial government sought to employ Dutch tutelage and Western examples 
to advance Java and its inhabitants toward limited political participation. How-
ever, the majority of Dutch colonial civil servants maintained that due to in-
trinsic dierences between colonizer and colonized, it would be more eective 
to uphold Javanese traditions as the basis of colonial rule. In their opposition 
to the Ethical Policy, Dutch civil servants found support among conservative 
members of the priyayi, who similarly feared a loss of power and prestige with 
the implementation of “ethical” protocol. I explore this discrepancy between 
emancipatory theory and conservative practice in the performance of colonial 
power in chapter 2.
1913: From Everyday Resistance to National Awakening
Where colonial authorities were unable to bridge the gap between discursive 
theory and practice during the 
rst decade of the twentieth century, an emerg-
ing generation of Indonesians succeeded in 1913. As civil servants like Assistant 
Resident Linck continued to insist on receiving Javanese deference, young In-
donesians like Prawiradinata grew more outspoken, self-con
dent, and vocal. It 
was this modern, educated generation that eventually demanded equality and 
respect by disturbing the colonial performance. In April 1914, the o	cial news-
paper of the Sarekat Islam, Indonesia’s 
rst political movement, published an 
article titled “Freedom” (kemerdekaan).32 Contrary to what the modern reader 
might expect, the author did not refer to a desire for political or national inde-
pendence but rather to the struggle for freedom from the oppressive, humil-
iating, and belittling attitude of Dutch o	cials within colonial society. e 
article described how in previous months, many young Indonesians changed 
their attitudes and behaviors in the colonial encounter by refusing to cower for 
the colonizer, demanding to sit on chairs instead of on the oor, withholding 
traditional gestures of respect, ignoring the Javanese language hierarchy, and 
addressing o	cials by their position rather than by an undeserving aristocratic 
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title. rough these disturbances of the colonial performance, the author ar-
gued, the colonized could force colonial o	cials to treat them with more respect 
and dignity and 
nally live up to their so-called ethical promises. He therefore 
implored readers to follow this example. is article was not the only call to 
action. From mid-1913 onward, the vernacular press was 
lled with articles that 
describe how, through acts of de
ance in the face of power, a new generation 
of Indonesians subverted Dutch expectations and demanded to be treated as 
human beings and as equals. eir actions drastically altered the performance 
of power in the everyday colonial encounter.
e sudden proliferation in 1913 of everyday discursive challenges to the colo-
nial performance of power signaled a broad social transformation and change in 
mentality that has been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature. Historians 
of the Indonesian national awakening have primarily focused on explicit polit-
ical de
ance and protest—such as associations, political parties, rallies, unions, 
strikes, and a critical press—as indicators and drivers of broad social change. 
is preoccupation with political resistance obscures everyday forms of resis-
tance that were not overtly political, ideological, or organized, and yet sought to 
negotiate and alleviate colonial inequalities. I suggest that instead of focusing on 
political events as hinges of historical change, everyday discursive acts—changes 
in language, attitude, and appearance—reveal a more pervasive moment of social 
transformation.
Evidence of everyday forms of resistance is hard to 
nd in the archives, which 
reect colonial authorities’ 
xation on political resistance. However, by critically 
examining a series of Dutch circulars that prescribed the etiquette of the colonial 
encounter—speci
cally, those addressing attire and hormat (customary ways of 
showing respect)—I am able to trace the growth and pervasiveness of everyday 
discursive acts in the early twentieth century. is history challenges the prevail-
ing notion that this was an era of relative “peace and order” (to use a deceptive 
colonial catchphrase) without much anticolonial resistance. It also suggests that 
a broader and more conscious challenge to the colonial order of things grew out 
of these everyday struggles. is book therefore oers an important revision 
to the prevailing narrative of the Indonesian national awakening, demonstrat-
ing that it was not just a movement that a small political elite incited from the 
top-down but also one that grew out of a large social transformation from below.
As I have argued with Bart Luttikhuis, the manifestation of everyday resis-
tance and demands for equality indicate a broad change in mentality in 1913 
that constitute a turning point in Indonesian history.33 ese events are best 
understood as the outcome of long-term developments that converged in 1913 
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to decisively move Indonesian society in a new direction. My focus on every-
day forms of resistance as indicators of social change complements and contex-
tualizes more familiar benchmarks in colonial Indonesian history. Many have 
been the subject of previous studies, such as the impact of the Ethical Policy, the 
growing availability of Western education, and young Indonesians’ subsequent 
embrace of modernity, speci
cally science, technology, and consumerism.34 In 
addition, Indonesians increasingly displayed a new global consciousness inspired 
by the rise of Japan as an imperial power, the British Indian nationalist move-
ment, Chinese nationalists’ victory in 1911, and the international Islamic mod-
ernist movement, originating in Egypt.35 In part encouraged by these crusades, 
this new political consciousness was reected in the creation of Indonesia’s 
rst 
cultural, religious, and political organizations, foremost among them Boedi 
Oetomo and Sarekat Islam, founded in 1908 and 1911, respectively.36 Finally, 
there was the development of a critical vernacular press in which Indonesians 
expressed themselves and debated their place in the world.37 On their own, these 
events did not amount to instantaneous and broad social change, but their for-
tuitous culmination in 1913 created the circumstances under which Indone-
sians began to actively demand respect and dignity by challenging the colonial 
performance.
Chapter 3 examines this moment in 1913, detailing the ways in which a gener-
ation of assertive, educated, professionally employed, and well-informed young 
Indonesians contested Dutch colonial hegemony. It demonstrates how minor 
confrontations over appropriate etiquette quickly ballooned into more pervasive 
social activism. Of pivotal importance to this history is the release of a hormat 
circular in August 1913, a government decree prohibiting colonial o	cials from 
demanding traditional deference from the colonized.38 e circular was written 
in response to the escalation of a conict between a Javanese public prosecutor 
who refused to sit on the oor and wear traditional Javanese clothing and his 
European superior who insisted on submissive behavior from a colonial sub-
ject. What set this particular confrontation apart was both actors’ persistence in 
their respective performances of power, which eventually brought the incident 
to the attention of high colonial o	cials in Batavia. Fearing that civil servants’ 
loy attitudes alienated young Indonesians and undermined colonial peace and 
order, the government issued the hormat circular to forcibly align its perfor-
mance of authority with the ethical discourse it espoused. is was a remarkable 
piece of colonial legislation, as it recognized that traditional deference rituals 
were humiliating for the colonized, publicly condemned the attitude of colonial 
civil servants, and pledged betterment on the part of the colonizer. e circular 
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also led the colonial government to increasingly support the nascent nationalist 
movement. is seemingly contradictory consequence illustrates that times were 
indeed changing.39
e hormat circular of 1913 played an important but oen overlooked role in 
energizing the Indonesian nationalist movement. e vernacular press widely 
and publicly reviewed the implications of the circular, and the Sarekat Islam, 
with the colonial government’s support, publicized and interpreted it at rallies 
and meetings. ese discussions instilled in the colonized an increased sense 
of con
dence and justice that encouraged them to perform truth to power by 
refusing to submit to traditional deference customs. Decisions about how to 
present oneself became empowering acts of hegemonic contestation. In response 
to these challenges, conservative colonial o	cials as well as Javanese aristocrats 
condemned young Indonesians and Dutch supporters of ethical ideals, accusing 
the progressive coalition of destabilizing colonial society and destroying indige-
nous culture. is resulted in a 
erce public debate over the nature and form of 
the colonial encounter. Although the reactionary conservatives regained control 
over the government in the 1920s, Pandora’s box had been opened. It proved 
impossible to reimpose nineteenth-century colonial hegemony, as discussions 
about what constituted proper etiquette expanded into larger conversations 
about Indonesian culture and identity.
e social transformations of 1913 were reinforced by a deliberate change in 
attire. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at this particular aspect of indigenous de-
mands for equality and respect, demonstrating that clothes were an important 
instrument and site of hegemonic contestation. e timing of what eectively 
constituted a sartorial revolution was certainly no coincidence. Beginning in 
September 1913, in the wake of the hormat circular, many young Indonesian pro-
fessionals, such as teachers, clerks, and railroad personnel, suddenly and swily 
replaced their traditional sarong and headscarf with trousers, a jacket, and tie. 
By donning Western attire, Indonesians visually expressed that they considered 
themselves modern and equal to Europeans. In the process, they asserted that 
they would no longer cower and humiliate themselves in front of colonial of-

cials. While this was not a political revolution, the sartorial transformation 
was an unmistakable statement directed toward both European colonizers and 
the conservative Javanese priyayi. e new generation’s abrupt change in clothes 
reverberated throughout colonial society, visually signifying the dawn of a new 
era in the colonial encounter.
Indonesians’ adoption of Western clothing undermined nineteenth-cen-
tury sartorial regulations that prescribed ethnic dress for all inhabitants of the 
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Netherlands Indies—policies that enabled the colonizer to create and maintain 
ethnic stereotypes. e only group to transgress this imposed sartorial hierarchy 
was the Dutch themselves, who donned indigenously inspired clothing, like the 
sarong, batik trousers, and kebaya (a long-sleeved blouse) as leisure wear in the 
semiprivate spheres of their homes and neighborhoods. When Indonesians put 
on trousers to signal their modernity in the early twentieth century, the Dutch, 
suddenly at risk of appearing unre
ned themselves, could no longer wear what 
seemed like indigenous garb. In an attempt to reassert their dominance in co-
lonial society, the Dutch increased their own sense of sartorial correctness by 
dressing “up” in the latest European fashions while simultaneously ridiculing 
Javanese attempts to appear modern and civilized. For Indonesians, the sartorial 
revolution was both empowering and disruptive, as it raised questions about 
how one’s appearance reected one’s ethnic, religious, and national identities. 
us, through changes in appearance, both colonizer and colonized actively ex-
perimented with and performed new identities in the early twentieth century. 
ese experiments and discussions ultimately led to the emergence of an explicit 
Indonesian national costume and identity.40
Competing Modern Identities:  
e Final Act in the Colonial Performance
In 1929, the Dutch Kuyck family visited Batavia’s annual Pasar Gambir (Gambir 
Fair) with their young son, whom they took to a popular attraction: a wooden 
submarine with a periscope. When it was their turn to peek through the peri-
scope, one of the Indonesians in line suggested—in uent Dutch—that Mrs. 
Kuyck li up her son, as he was not tall enough to reach the device. While pro-
tecting her son’s face with a handkerchief, another Indonesian complimented 
her wisdom in presuming that the periscope’s glass was probably dirty from con-
tinuous usage. Mrs. Kuyck was initially taken aback; in the not so distant past 
“it would not have crossed the mind of a native to address a European woman.” 
In spite of this, rather than appearing hostile or rude, the Indonesians at the 
Pasar Gambir struck her as neat and civilized. Seemingly for the 
rst time, she 
realized that “many of them consider themselves completely equal to the Euro-
peans.”41 At 
rst glance, the encounter Mrs. Kuyck described was rather dierent 
from the one discussed at the beginning of this introduction, but in both cases, 
identity and status were communicated and performed through language, ap-
pearance, and etiquette. Mrs. Kuyck’s prejudicial assumptions about Indonesian 
behavior exemplify the ways in which Indonesians subverted expectations by 
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speaking a dierent language, taking liberties where they previously had not, 
changing their attire, and sharing modern concerns—in this case, regarding hy-
giene. It was through these sorts of performances that Indonesians successfully 
contested and negotiated colonial hegemony, signaled their equality, and created 
new and distinct identities.
In response to the profound social transformations around 1913, the colonial 
performance of power changed in character and appearance. No longer was co-
lonial authority supported by the Javanization of power, but gradually—and be-
grudgingly, in the case of some o	cials—it became rooted in a notion of Dutch 
or even global modernity.42 e script of this new performance reected the 
Dutch belief that they were harbingers of progress and could claim any Indone-
sian enactment of modernity as their own.43 e Dutch had, according to this 
hegemonic narrative, introduced modernity to colonial Indonesia, evidenced by 
trains, cars, steamships, electricity, engineering projects, department stores, cin-
emas, and fairs, as well as medical science, education, and the modern state. e 
narrative juxtaposed this Dutch sense of being modern with local customs and 
practices that allegedly illustrated the backwardness of the colonized, for whom 
modernity was to be aspirational but always out of reach. However, as Mrs. Kuy-
ck’s experience shows, the colonized did not passively accept the roles assigned to 
them; they created their own modern identities and imaginings.44 is encoun-
ter reveals the importance of colonial modernity as a discursive site in colonial 
society, especially in light of the repressive turn in colonial policy following the 
national awakening.45 By the end of the 1910s and into the 1920s, authorities im-
plemented strict censorship guidelines and began interning political dissidents.46
While these measures stymied outright political protests—especially following 
failed communist uprisings in 1926 and 1927—the everyday performance of new 
modern identities continued to challenge the colonial hegemonic worldview.
ese new modern identities were not just imagined conceptually but com-
municated and experienced in the everyday colonial encounter, as both colonizer 
and colonized continued to perform and negotiate colonial hierarchies of race, 
class, and gender. Although Europeans and Indonesians increasingly distin-
guished themselves from one another and even began to reject racial and cultural 
mixing, their reinterpretations of their identities were very much interdepen-
dent, constructed in conversation with and against each other. e apparent 
omnipresence of the modern colonial state played an important part in instilling 
a sense of shared subjecthood among the colonized. is consciousness sprouted 
from Batavia’s classrooms, where students from throughout the archipelago dis-
covered that they faced a similar predicament. is became the foundation for 
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the articulation of a new Indonesian identity.47 However, as there was no consen-
sus among the colonized over what it meant to be Indonesian beyond rejecting 
Dutch colonial subjecthood, this identity was not homogenous. Colonizer and 
colonized alike thus questioned what it meant to be modern, resulting in elabo-
rate discussions about lifestyle, morality, and identity. As a consequence, modes 
of individual comportment and social interaction—including changes in social 
customs, sexual norms, culinary preferences, and consumer behavior—became 
sites in which to contest and negotiate the colonial hegemonic project.
As Indonesians increasingly demanded respect and expressed their own mo-
dernity through new clothes, language, manners, and attitudes, the inevitable 
question arose: did being modern require mimicking Western ways? At stake 
was whether westernization was a necessary means to an end in the hegemonic 
struggle, or on the contrary, an undesirable development that would result in 
an irreparable loss of self. Discussions about the merits and dangers of western-
ization led many Indonesians, depending on their political, religious, and social 
outlook, to reject what they viewed as the negative inuences of Western moder-
nity. is was oen expressed in eorts to fashion modern lifestyles according to 
what they considered to be more respectable indigenous practices. While there 
was certainly no consensus among Indonesians as to what was virtuous, there 
was a clear understanding that unbridled Western modernity—free interaction 
between the sexes, dancing, and consumerism, for example—was not. As chap-
ter 5 shows, these concerns came to the fore in discussions over mixed marriages, 
a topic that has not previously been considered from the Indonesian perspec-
tive.48 During the last decades of colonial rule, Indonesians came to consider 
mixed unions as dangerous and degenerative, eventually invoking the same racist 
rhetoric espoused by the colonizer. In the process, conversations ensued about 
ethnic identities, such as Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese, as well as about 
what it meant to be a colonial subject, and Indonesians began to articulate local, 
modern identities that were speci
cally non-Western and non-Dutch.
e colonial Dutch were largely taken aback by these sudden and widespread 
changes. Having relied on the Javanization of colonial authority and indigenous 
inuences on their everyday lifestyles, they were now unexpectedly faced with 
colonial subjects who embraced modernity. In response, the Dutch forcefully 
asserted their own European modernity, contrasting their approach with the 
alleged backwardness of the colonized in an attempt to maintain their authority. 
Although it was Indonesian emancipation that prompted the Dutch to rede
ne 
their colonial identity, they rooted this transformation 
rmly within the civiliz-
ing mission discourse and developments in Western science, especially the 
elds 
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of evolutionary biology and climatology. Whereas nineteenth-century theories 
of acclimatization suggested that Europeans could adjust to tropical environ-
ments through cultural accommodation and even racial mixing, in the twenti-
eth century these solutions were thought to cause racial and cultural degenera-
tion.49 In an eort to purify colonial culture from such degenerative inuences, 
colonial society saw increased attempts at Europeanization. is disentangling 
of Eastern and Western culture was the cause of much anxiety, especially given 
the large Eurasian population in the colony. e Dutch suddenly considered the 
tropical climate, indigenous culture, and the colonized themselves to be danger-
ous. is was reected in the propagation of a more European lifestyle, facili-
tated by the immigration of European women, advances in transportation and 
communication technologies, medical developments, and the creation of leisure 
spaces , like mountain resorts, where Europeans could seek protection from the 
tropical heat. But perhaps most importantly, these pseudoscienti
c beliefs about 
degeneration meant that the Dutch sought to minimize close contact with the 
allegedly less-developed indigenous population, especially household servants, 
and to no longer conform to Javanese hygienic practices, social customs, and 
diet.50 Chapter 5 argues that all of these ideas inuenced the colonial encounter 
dramatically—in ways that exclusively political narratives do not capture.
As a consequence of increased European immigration and the emergence 
of an Indonesian middle class and larger educated elite, the colonial encounter 
became more frequent in the early twentieth century. ese meetings between 
colonized and colonizer were especially pervasive and visible in spaces associated 
with modernity, such as o	ces, train stations, stores, restaurants, movie theatres, 
and public streets, squares, and parks. It was in public spaces like these that the 
performance of new identities accrued meaning; they were the stages of the he-
gemonic struggle.51 Perhaps the most illustrative space of the modern colonial 
encounter was the fairground. Late-colonial Indonesia witnessed the prolifer-
ation of annual fairs and exhibitions that attracted hundreds of thousands of 
visitors from all ethnic backgrounds and walks of life.52 Chapter 6 argues that 
Dutch colonizers organized these fairs as part of a larger hegemonic attempt to 
legitimize colonial authority within a new cultural context. At the fairgrounds, 
special exhibits demonstrated the benevolence of colonial governance, while 
staging modernity to emphasize Western cultural, technological, and scienti
c 
superiority. Visitors were invited to consume Western products and associated 
lifestyles and worldviews. ese fairs were mainly directed toward the nascent 
Indonesian middle classes, which became increasingly central to maintaining co-
lonial rule. However, I demonstrate that fairs were sites of interaction, discursive 
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spaces where the middle classes did not simply buy into colonial discourse but 
negotiated and challenged Western modernity to create a distinctly Indonesian 
middle-class lifestyle and culture. Moreover, the fairs were sites in which they 
could perform their new identities through the way they dressed, consumed, 
socialized, and engaged in entertainment. Colonial fairgrounds thus oer an 
intriguing case study of the late-colonial encounter, as Indonesians critically em-
braced modernity, subverted colonial stereotypes, and created new identities as 
they moved toward emancipation from Dutch rule.53
During the 
nal decades of Dutch colonial rule, but especially aer 1913, 
Indonesians took center stage in the colonial performance of power. As they 
became more assertive in articulating their desires and experimented with new 
modern identities, the colonial discourse that legitimized Dutch authority be-
came less eective. As a result, the colonial government increasingly resorted to 
repression and coercion to maintain its hold on power, censoring and exiling 
those it deemed political extremists. However, everyday resistance persisted in 
the form of performing new identities, and Indonesians steadily subverted the 
colonial worldview and its associated hierarchies. In the process, they created 
space for the articulation of a modern Indonesian identity. at identity remains 
the most enduring legacy of the performance of power. When the Japanese con-
quest of colonial Indonesia de
nitively closed the curtain on the colonial per-
formance in 1942, most of the audience had already le.
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Ch a pter 1
Setting the Stage
e Javanization of Colonial Authority in the Nineteenth Century
I n January of 1900, Raden Adjeng Kartini, a vocal Indonesian advocate for women’s rights, wrote an elaborate response to Stella Zeehandelaar, a Dutch friend who questioned whether the general “condition” of the Java-
nese people had improved since the abolition of the Cultivation System. e 
repressive forced cultivation of cash crops had characterized colonial Indonesia 
from 1830 to 1870. Kartini replied that while there were many indications that 
the government now cared for the welfare of the Javanese, colonial ocials, 
who acted as Javanese aristocrats, maintained their sense of superiority. As 
an example, Kartini related the experience of a young Indonesian man who 
attended a European high school and graduated 
rst in his class. At school, 
he was accustomed to conversing in Dutch and interacting freely with Euro-
peans. On returning to his parents’ hometown to join the colonial civil ser-
vice, he therefore assumed that he could address the local resident (colonial 
administrator) in Dutch. is was a crucial mistake, Kartini wrote, as the next 
morning he was assigned the position of clerk to a lowly European ocial in 
a mountain town. To make matters worse, his Dutch superior was eventually 
replaced by one of the man’s former classmates—a European of inferior intel-
lectual capacity for whom he had to crouch, sit on the 	oor, and address solely 
in high Javanese. According to Kartini, the young ocial learned a life lesson 
in Java’s mountains: the best way to serve European ocials was by groveling in 
the dust and never speaking Dutch. For good measure, Kartini oered several 
additional examples of Dutch mimicry of the Javanese elite, such as demand-
ing to be addressed as “great lord” (kanjeng), to receive a knee kiss (sungkem), 
and the right to walk under a gilded parasol (payung). She sarcastically added 
that she had always thought only the “backward Javanese” loved all this pomp 
and circumstance but learned that “civilized and educated” Westerners craved 
it, as well.1
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Kartini sketches an intriguing portrait of the late-nineteenth-century Dutch 
performance of colonial authority. Although her letter conveys that the colonial 
appropriation of Javanese forms of etiquette and deference was adopted during 
the Cultivation System, the Dutch had been experimenting with employing 
local rituals and symbolism as a means of regulating contact between colonizer 
and colonized for much longer. is approach can be traced back to the seven-
teenth century, when the Dutch East India Company (VOC) 
rst established a 
permanent presence in Java. However, Kartini was correct in that it was during 
the nineteenth century that the Javanization of colonial authority was institu-
tionalized and made into a pillar of colonial rule.2 is was not a straightfor-
ward process, but it was a deliberate policy of cultural appropriation through 
which the Dutch tried to communicate and justify their dominance in recog-
nizable terms. e Dutch thus created hegemonic standards of public conduct 
that provided at least the outward impression of conformity to racial and social 
hierarchies and helped reify dierence in colonial society. is chapter explores 
in detail the conscious development of a Javanized colonial performance, en-
capsulated in meticulous regulations regarding etiquette, dress, status symbols, 
architecture, and even culinary culture, and acted out according to a hegemonic 
script. Crucially, the Dutch were more than the directors of this colonial perfor-
mance; they played the leading roles.
e Javanization of the performance of colonial authority has received scant 
attention in the historiography of colonial Indonesia. Most studies dealing with 
nineteenth-century Java have focused on the political economy, primarily the 
material exploitation of the Javanese, and discourses justifying colonialism, in-
cluding analyses of race and gender. In these studies, cultural appropriation is 
oen considered a byproduct of these other aspects of colonialism.3 What has 
been published on culture and power is oen limited to speci
c cultural ele-
ments in isolation, such as dress, rather than as signi
cant parts of a larger system 
of cultural domination.4 is is a missed opportunity, as hegemonic discourse 
was communicated through everyday cultural performances to rationalize co-
lonial inequality and exploitation. It is therefore necessary to consider the regu-
lation of etiquette, classi
catory schemes, rituals, and the appearance of power 
as integral components of the system of colonial governance. Doing so oers a 
cultural layer to scholarship about the institution of indirect rule, its reliance 
on a dualistic civil service, the comprehensive system of racial strati
cation, and 
the politics of sex.5
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e Dutch East India Company:  
Pro
tability and Cultural Exchange
e Dutch East India Company established a foothold on the northwest coast 
of Java in an attempt to control the seventeenth-century spice trade. In 1619, 
the VOC destroyed the town of Jayakarta and constructed Batavia (present-day 
Jakarta) on its ruins, creating the center of its Asian maritime trade empire. 
While the company had operated trading posts in Java since 1603, it was estab-
lishing Batavia that marked the Dutch’s permanent presence on the island, thus 
requiring the formulation of settlement and colonization policies. As the 
rst 
multinational corporation in world history, these policies were informed by cost 
eciency and pro
t maximization but had signi
cant eects on the intricacies 
of Dutch colonial culture in Java for centuries. In a way, it was the VOC’s obses-
sion with the bottom line that created the circumstances out of which colonial 
ocials in Kartini’s time emerged.6
In order to transform Batavia into a dominant center of intra-Asian trade, the 
VOC sought to create a stable settlement population as the basis of its strength. 
Rather than relying on settler colonialism (unlikely in a densely populated area 
resistant to European diseases—instead Europeans were at risk of tropical dis-
eases), the company enforced strict regulations on immigration and conjugal 
relations. Only high-ranking ocials were allowed to bring European wives to 
Batavia, while lower ocials and company personnel were actively encouraged 
to cohabitate with or marry local women. As Jean Gelman Taylor meticulously 
shows, the Eurasian ospring from these unions quickly became the bedrock of 
Batavia’s social world, where they grew up in predominantly Asian households, 
conversed in Malay, consumed indigenous cuisine, and wore locally inspired 
clothing. Cultural exchanges in these Eurasian households further shaped gender 
relations, spiritual beliefs, deference behavior, hierarchical rituals, and material 
markers of social status. e VOC had intended that their settlement policies 
restrict private trading interests while at the same time create a small settler com-
munity to supply cheap Eurasian manpower for lower rank positions. But by the 
mid-seventeenth century, their regulations had also resulted in an autonomous 
colonial society with a culture that could no longer be characterized as either 
Dutch or Asian but as Eurasian. rough this particular colonial society, the 
Dutch gleaned valuable knowledge about local culture that would become in-
strumental for the Javanization of colonial authority in the nineteenth century.7
e Dutch East India Company initially had no intention of pursuing a 
land-based empire in Java, content with its settlement in Batavia and its status 
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as a vassal of the largest kingdom on the island. However, to protect and ex-
pand its mercantile interests, the company was gradually drawn into internal 
Javanese politics. Between 1677 and 1749, the VOC increasingly gained sover-
eignty beyond Batavia by exploiting the indigenous kingdoms’ rivalries and in-
ternal weaknesses. is process culminated in 1755–57 with the division of the 
once-powerful sultanate of Mataram into three princely states, of which Sura-
karta and Yogyakarta were the largest and most important.8 Within a century, 
the VOC thus acquired control over most of the island save the newly formed 
principalities. On paper the Javanese rulers retained sovereignty over their 
much-reduced territories, although the company exercised signi
cant in	uence 
at the princely courts through company representatives. e resulting situation 
le room for competing views on the relationship between the Dutch and the 
Javanese rulers.9
e VOC’s territorial expansion from its base in Batavia forced the trading 
company to consider how to rule its colonial possessions. Due to a preference 
for an indirect system of governance, also informed by economic concerns, the 
company’s administrative structure was predominantly Javanese in personnel, 
organization, and ideology. e VOC relied on collaborations with the Javanese 
bureaucratic elite, the priyayi, a social group consisting of nobility, ocials, and 
administrators. In practice, this meant that the highest members of the priyayi, 
the traditional Javanese regency heads known as bupati, were allowed a large 
degree of independence as long as they remained loyal to the VOC, abstained 
from relations with foreign powers, guaranteed peace within their districts, and 
promptly collected and delivered the required tribute.10 Oen their power even 
increased from their service to Javanese courts, since supporting the Dutch al-
lowed them to transgress the norms of the indigenous social system.11 A notice-
able exception to this rule was the administration of the Priangan, the moun-
tainous region immediately south of Batavia, where in the latter decades of the 
eighteenth century the VOC made the bupati subservient to company ocials 
in order to directly oversee the forced cultivation of coee beans.12 is incor-
poration of bupati into the colonial administration of the Priangan provided the 
company, according to Heather Sutherland, with “the methods of establishing, 
maintaining, and legitimizing authority which had developed in Java over the 
centuries.”13
As they extended their control over Java, the Dutch acquainted themselves 
with the intricacies of a Javanese system of social and political organization. 
With origins in the Hindu-Buddhist period of the island’s history (between the 
eighth and 
eenth centuries), a distinctly Javanese political order developed, 
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characterized by bureaucratization, social strati
cation, and a style of rulership 
inspired by Indic cosmology. An abstract concept of social hierarchy known 
as kawula-gusti (servant-master or patron-client) outlined the relationship be-
tween the king and his subjects, and also applied more generally to relation-
ships between social superiors and inferiors. is hierarchy governed chains of 
patron-client clusters that extended from the royal courts to local ocials and 
beyond. In theory, the kawula-gusti relationship was based on mutual respect 
and reciprocal responsibility through which the master protects and the servant 
pledges devotion in return. is vertical relationship was intricately expressed 
in sartorial etiquette, language hierarchies, demonstrations of social deference, 
status symbols, and cultural performances, such as wayang, a form of (shadow) 
puppet theatre, and gamelan, a traditional Javanese percussion ensemble.14 ese 
forms of social communication were more than just trappings of power; they 
were theatrical rituals that, according to Cliord Geertz, “were not mere aes-
thetic embellishments, celebrations of a domination independently existing: 
they were the thing itself.”15 ese theatrical displays of power would become 
essential to legitimizing and preserving Dutch colonial authority in Java.
e Dutch East India Company’s colonization policies—limited immigra-
tion, unions between European men and Asian women, and indirect rule—cre-
ated a colonial society that was highly attuned to Javanese social and cultural 
traditions. By the late seventeenth century, Javanese status symbols and defer-
ence rituals were employed to dierentiate between various social classes and 
ethno-religious groups living within Batavia, as well as between company of-

cials and the Javanese priyayi who facilitated the system of indirect rule. e 
Dutch preoccupation with these Javanese manifestations of power even inspired 
the promulgation of various sumptuary laws and deference regulations. For in-
stance, in 1719 it was decided that on encountering the governor general on the 
road, Europeans and Eurasians were required to dismount their horses or car-
riages and bow, whereas a Javanese was expected to squat on the spot as a gesture 
of deference. is squatting as well as the custom to approach a superior in a 
crouching-walk were known as jongkok and were an appropriation of customs 
previously reserved for Javanese royalty and aristocrats.16
One of the colonial Dutch’s more intriguing and popular adoptions was that 
of the Javanese payung, a ceremonial parasol that, through its colors, bore the 
distinctions of its owner’s rank. Most likely introduced in Java as a status symbol 
during the Hindu-Buddhist period, the payung was one of the most revered 
symbols among the Javanese aristocracy. A servant carried the payung while fol-
lowing the bearer of authority either on foot or in his carriage, or while sitting 
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close to him on the ground.17 Both in precolonial and colonial Java, there were 
two elite hierarchies: that of the noble families who had the right to carry a 
payung from birth, and that of the Javanese priyayi who had the right to carry 
the payung by virtue of their oce.
Europeans and Eurasians living under the auspices of the VOC were quick to 
adopt the payung as a status symbol. Its growing popularity in the seventeenth 
century warranted clear regulations on who had the right to a servant with a 
payung and who had to carry his own parasol. ese regulations were 
rst intro-
duced in 1647 and somewhat relaxed in 1729, 1733, and 1754, but still only junior 
merchants and those higher up in the company’s hierarchy were allowed the 
privilege of having a servant carry their payung. However, the payung employed 
by Dutch merchants were not part of an institutionalized payung hierarchy with 
designated color schemes, as was the case in Javanese society. ey were simply 
copies of Javanese status symbols detached from their traditional usage.18
Such experiments with Javanese semiotics and rituals were central compo-
nents of VOC governance with lasting impact on Dutch colonial rule in Java. 
Although the many sumptuary and deference laws were retracted in 1795 when 
the company went bankrupt, that did not mean that these symbols and rituals 
were forgotten.19 e ensuing period, characterized by political unrest and shi-
ing colonial regimes, would nonetheless preserve elements of Javanese cultural 
appropriation to justify colonial power.
e Birth of the Colonial State
e decline of the Dutch East India Company marked the beginning of a pro-
longed transition period in Java during which a trade empire was transformed 
into a colonial state.20 It took considerable time for the Dutch state to establish 
sovereignty over the VOC’s former possessions and implement new ideas about 
how to govern a colonial empire. e process of colonial state formation was 
complicated by the loss of Dutch independence in Europe, as the small nation 
was caught between France and Britain during the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic Wars. is new geopolitical reality was re	ected in consecutive 
regime changes in Java accompanied by ongoing political instability. Nominal 
control of the island passed from the merchant company to the Batavian Re-
public (1795–1806), the French puppet state the Kingdom of Holland (1806–11), 
England (1811–14), and 
nally the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814–1942). 
Even so, this tumultuous period laid the foundations for the eventual formation 
of the Dutch colonial state.
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Following the demise of the VOC, it took over a decade, due to the global 
war triggered by the French Revolution, before colonial governance in Java 
could be resumed and reinvented. In 1808, King Louis Napoléon Bonaparte 
of Holland ordered Dutch politician Herman Willem Daendels to assume 
sovereign control over Java and reorganize its administration. Daendels was 
tasked with breaking through a British blockade, protecting Java from Brit-
ish invasion, and establishing Franco-Dutch sovereignty over the island. Al-
though the VOC had gained de facto dominion over Java in 1749 with the fall 
of Mataram, in practice the company’s relationship with Mataram’s succes-
sor states, Yogyakarta and Surakarta, had continued as one between equals. 
is inconsistency was an issue that required Daendels’s immediate attention. 
Rather than resorting to outright force to impose Dutch control, he issued 
the Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette in July 1808—a statute altering the 
symbolic display of colonial power.21 As predicted, Daendels’s edict shocked 
the Javanese principalities, as it directly challenged the Javanese hierarchical 
worldview, and, in the words of historian Peter Carey, “struck at the heart of 
the Javanese understanding of the Dutch presence in Java.”22 Reactions to the 
Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette ultimately became so contentious that they 
resulted in an attempted Javanese rebellion in 1810, instigated by an ocial 
in Sultan Hamengkubuwana II’s court in Yogyakarta. Daendels squashed the 
attempt with a show of force, returning with three thousand soldiers and coerc-
ing the sultan to abdicate the throne in favor of his son. One of the new sultan’s 

rst acts was to accept Daendels’s Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette and with 
it, Franco-Dutch sovereignty.23
Daendels could not revel in his victory for long, however, as he was soon re-
called to Europe right before a British invasion terminated Franco-Dutch rule 
over Java in 1811. For Hamengkubuwana II, the arrival of a competing European 
colonial power provided a window of opportunity during which he overturned 
Daendels’s edict and reinstated himself as sultan of Yogyakarta. But his return 
to power was short-lived. British statesman omas Stamford Raes assumed 
leadership in Java and, like Daendels before him, responded to the sultan’s claims 
to authority with force. On June 20, 1812, Raes arrived in Yogyakarta with 
a small army, and sacked, burned, and looted the palace (kraton) in an event 
that contemporaries likened to the British victory at Plassey in 1757. As with 
Daendels’s triumph in 1810, Raes’s assault was an utterly humiliating expe-
rience that instilled a broad sense of discontent and frustration among the Ja-
vanese elite.24 Moreover, the skirmish solidi
ed an unmistakable new order in 
Java—one characterized by colonial sovereignty.
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State Formation, Colonial Power, and Culture Wars
Javanese dissatisfaction had been mounting since the VOC’s exit from the is-
land, with colonial policies and performances regarding issues like etiquette and 
status symbols driving the con	icts outlined above. While the aforementioned 
succession of regimes made it dicult for either Daendels or Raes to execute 
a coherent and sustained colonial policy, the main objective of these compet-
ing regimes was remarkably similar: to establish sovereignty over the island and 
concurrently create a modern state with 
xed territorial boundaries, a central-
ized bureaucracy, the right to levy taxes, and an economic relationship with the 
metropolis that was characterized by free trade and labor instead of mercantilist 
monopolies and systems of forced cultivation of cash crops. Ostensibly inspired 
by European enlightened idealism, they sought to break with the illiberal and 
oppressive VOC-era and its reliance on and maintenance of traditional, or as 
they saw it “feudal,” Javanese administrators. In order to achieve these goals, a 
more direct form of colonial administration was considered necessary, resulting 
in the formation of a European colonial civil service.25 Simultaneously, and as 
part of this process, the power and in	uence of Javanese administrators, fore-
most the bupati, was signi
cantly reduced. As hereditary prestige and other aris-
tocratic privileges were revoked, members of the Javanese elite were transformed 
into salaried ocials of the colonial state. Crucially, this new colonial reality was 
communicated through changes in the hegemonic appearance of colonial au-
thority, captured in detailed regulations regarding deference rituals, dress codes, 
and the right to status symbols. ese disruptions to Javanese social and cultural 
order caused substantial tension with colonial authorities during Daendels’s and 
Raes’s tenures on the island.26
Daendels’s 1808 Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette—the 
rst colonial policy 
enacted aer the fall of the VOC—directly addressed questions of etiquette 
and displays of power, as its title implies. At that time, colonial representatives 
still performed VOC-era ceremonial functions at the Javanese courts, which 
Daendels viewed as inappropriate and degrading. For instance, residents, as the 
company’s representatives were called, participated in court ceremonies with-
out a payung to signal their status and with their heads uncovered. ey were 
expected to bow three times when greeting Javanese rulers, and to serve them 
in a menial fashion, oering wine, betel nuts, and cleansing water.27 To com-
municate colonial ocials’ freshly elevated status as representatives of the king 
of Holland, Daendels decorated them with the title of “minister,” a new ocial 
costume of state, a considerable military escort, and most importantly, a large 
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gilded and light blue payung emblazoned with the arms of Louis Napoléon. e 
edict further dictated that a minister not remove his hat when approaching a 
Javanese monarch but instead wait for the ruler to rise, welcome him, and oer 
him a seat at the le-hand side of the throne, at the monarch’s level. In addition, 
the edict explicitly prohibited ministers from serving the ruler wine or betel 
nuts. Ministers were further instructed to escort Javanese rulers during public 
ceremonies, walking arm-in-arm in a highly gendered manner that implied a 
feminine reliance on a colonial paternal 
gure. e edict even dealt with proper 
forms of salutation outside the kraton (palace). For instance, when riding in his 
carriage, a minister was no longer expected to yield to Javanese monarchs when 
crossing paths on public roads.28 e edict thus signi
ed the beginning of Dutch 
attempts to control the appearance and performance of colonial authority as a 
means of legitimizing its power.
Such stipulations in the Edict of Ceremonial and Etiquette were directly re-
sponsible for ongoing con	icts between Daendels and the Javanese monarchs. 
While the sunan of Surakarta begrudgingly accepted Daendels’s proposed 
changes, the more outspoken sultan of Yogyakarta protested them 
ercely. 
Sultan Hamengkubuwana II was particularly bothered by the Dutch appropri-
ation of deferential honors that he believed were the sole privilege of the Ja-
vanese courts, such as a gilded payung, which, as Daendels was acutely aware, 
symbolically placed Dutch ministers on equal footing with the sultan and his 
family.29 Sultan Hamengkubuwana II ocially objected to the edict in a letter to 
Daendels, clearly signaling that he did not accept colonial sovereignty within his 
court or over the whole of Java. In addition to addressing the oensive payung, 
the sultan asserted that he would prohibit any Dutch ocial from sitting at his 
level at court and would send his travel itineraries to Daendels’s oce in advance 
in order to avoid any situation in which he would be required to yield to the 
minister’s coach in public.30
e Edict of Ceremonial and Etiquette and ensuing clashes over court pro-
tocols grew so contentious that they ultimately prompted the 1810 rebellion, 
Daendels’s decision to forcibly remove Hamengkubuwana II, and the coerced 
acceptance of Dutch rule.31 Although Raes and the British soon replaced 
Daendels and the Dutch on the island, perceived breaches in etiquette continued 
to generate con	ict over power and hierarchy. In an attempt to reestablish his 
authority, Hamengkubuwana II repeatedly snubbed British colonial ocials at 
court through seating practices, placing his throne on a wooden bench to ensure 
that he sat higher than them. Like Daendels before him, Raes grew tired of 
the old sultan’s behavior and led an attack on the palace (kraton) so brutal that 
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British sovereignty over Java was unmistakable. As both violent responses to 
these con	icts demonstrate, the performance of colonial power was ultimately 
enhanced by its forceful execution.32
Just as Daendels and Raes compelled the central Javanese courts to ac-
knowledge colonial sovereignty, they sought to exert greater control over the 
priyayi. During the VOC’s tenure on the island, Company representatives were 
diplomats rather than administrators, partaking in a system of indirect rule. 
But following instructions to reorganize the system of colonial administration, 
Daendels and Raes’s combined policies are best characterized as attempts at 
direct colonial rule, at the Javanese aristocracy’s expense. e two governors con-
verted residents into powerful provincial administrators who supervised the bu-
pati and lower-ranking indigenous civil servants.33 For the bupati, this was a clear 
demotion, as they were reduced from aristocratic lords to the highest-ranking 
indigenous ocials in the newly created colonial civil service. For instance, in 
August 1808, Daendels informed the bupati on Java’s northern coast that they 
would now receive a 
xed salary, lose their right to demand labor services and 
crop deliveries as well as their appanage holdings, and that their position would 
no longer be hereditary. ese were considerable changes from VOC policies, 
ultimately centralizing all power in the governor general’s oce.
Analogous to his issuance of the Edict on Ceremonial and Etiquette to com-
municate a changing colonial relationship with Javanese monarchs, Daendels 
issued new regulations on retinue and status to signal the bupati’s demotion 
within the colonial administration. In the eighteenth century, the bupati mus-
tered substantial retinues as evidence of their rank and status. ese entourages 
consisted of hundreds of servants carrying symbols of power, such as payung, 
lances, guns, kris (spiritual daggers), and golden betel boxes, with countless 
household workers in tow. In 1808, Daendels meticulously limited and prescribed 
the size of these retinues. For instance, high-ranking bupati on Java’s northern 
coast were allowed to gather retinues of “only” 168 servants, while lower-ranking 
bupati were allotted retinues of 134 or even a mere 70 servants.34 In a letter to 
the minister of commerce and colonial aairs, he explained that while he had 
“suciently preserved the outward authority of the indigenous bupati in the eyes 
of the ordinary Javanese,” they nonetheless had become “completely subservient 
to the objectives of the government.”35 In other words, Daendels transferred ad-
ministrative and executive control to European civil servants, while leaving the 
Javanese aristocracy with some symbolic vestiges of authority.36
Raes went much further than Daendels in his assault on the status of the 
traditional Javanese elite, stripping the bupati of administrative and executive 
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authority and leaving them with very little real power.37 He also focused much 
of his eorts on modifying cultural rituals. On his arrival in Java, Raes was 
struck by the extreme deference and respect that the Javanese showed toward 
their superiors. Acquainting himself with Javanese culture and society (which 
eventually resulted in his famous two-volume work, e History of Java), he 
learned that in Java, “each delegated authority exacts the same marks of obei-
sance so that no one dares to stand in the presence of a superior.”38 To his sur-
prise, the Javanese always squatted in front of their superiors, approached them 
while “closing his hands and raising them to his forehead, in token of respect” 
(sembah), and never addressed them in the same language.39 Raes viewed 
these customs as incredibly humiliating for the Javanese. While Daendels had 
curtailed such customs to an extent, Raes prohibited many deference rituals 
in order “to raise the lower orders, as much as was prudent, from the state of 
degradation to which their chiefs, aided by the Dutch authority, had subjected 
them.”40 Yet out of political expediency, Raes did not dare cut the Javanese 
bureaucratic elite entirely out of the colonial administration. Maintaining the 
bupati, he reasoned, was a “political mode of employing many persons of in	u-
ence” who would otherwise be disgruntled over their removal from oce. He 
therefore opted to profoundly restrict but not “abolish the rank, title, or state of 
the present native chiefs.”41
For now, the Javanese aristocracy, and the bupati in particular, were incorpo-
rated into the hierarchy of the colonial civil service, albeit with much-reduced 
power and status. Although the Dutch and British believed that maintaining 
this sort of shared authority, even super
cially, was a vestige of feudal power, 
they reasoned that doing so would be temporary, lasting only until a complete 
transition to a system of direct rule could be implemented. However, the ongoing 
manipulation of Javanese cultural traditions had irrevocably soured relations be-
tween colonial rulers and their indigenous subjects. Java passed back into Dutch 
possession in 1814, but Daendels’s and Raes’s legacy of cultural approaches to 
governance would continue to in	uence diplomatic aairs on the island.
Colonial Experiments with Cultural Accommodation
e end of the Napoleonic Wars initiated, much to Raes’s chagrin, a transfer 
of most of the VOC’s former Southeast Asian colonies to the newly established 
United Kingdom of the Netherlands.42 Although the agreement was signed 
in 1814, it was not until 1816 that a three-person commission, including new 
Governor General Baron van der Capellen, arrived in Java to resume Dutch 
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governance. e main challenge for the commissioners was how to handle 
Daendels’s and Raes’s legacies; should the colony be governed directly by a 
centralized European civil service, or indirectly through either a modernized or 
a traditional Javanese bureaucracy? Initially, the commissioners decided to con-
tinue their predecessors’ work, further strengthening the residents’ position and 
reducing the bupati and priyayi’s in	uence. However, rising discontent among 
the Javanese aristocracy, a shortage of European civil servants, and a lack of co-
ercive force would lead Van der Capellen to reconsider these policies within a 
few years.43
During a tour of Java in 1819, Governor General Van der Capellen was con-
fronted with the unforeseen consequences of Daendels and Raes’s preparation 
for direct colonial rule. In a letter to the minister of public education, national 
industry, and colonial aairs, he related his distress on witnessing his residents’ 
“most detrimental” attitude toward the bupati. e colonial civil servants treated 
Javanese administrators with contempt, excluded them almost completely from 
governance, and seemed to regard them as redundant cogs in the colonial ad-
ministration’s modern machinery. Considering that the bupati’s administrative 
and judicial powers had been transferred to the residents, this attitude was not 
entirely illogical. Van der Capellen observed that the bupati appeared disgrun-
tled and humiliated; the residents’ behavior had clearly alienated them from the 
colonial administration. is worried him tremendously, as the general populace 
was not susceptible to direct rule by outsiders and the depth of the government’s 
coercive apparatus was limited. Maintaining the support of the bupati, who still 
exerted great in	uence over the ordinary Javanese, was essential.44 European 
civil servants lacked precisely what the bupati had to oer, namely, in Van der 
Capellen’s words:
[A] powerful and honored in	uence, which with the utterance of a single 
word, and without the use of force, moves or halts thousands, and steers 
their labor in the public’s interest [which is that of the colonial govern-
ment], and can only be obtained and maintained by a perfect symmetry in 
language, religion, color, virtues and customs, and appears therefore never 
to become the exclusive domain of the European civil servant, who governs 
a district, to which he has no ties other than his temporary appointment.45
Van der Capellen’s observations during his tour of Java instilled a certain prag-
matism in his policies. He realized that a stable, eective, and pro
table colonial 
regime was impossible without the support of the Javanese bureaucratic elite. He 
therefore resolved to appease the bupati by restoring some of their administrative 
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authority and responsibilities as well as some of the traditional distinctions of 
power that they had lost in previous years. But Van der Capellen did more than 
simply overturn a number of Daendels’s and Raes’s policies. Signi
cantly, he 
also proposed the systematic and calculated implementation of the bupati’s tra-
ditional status and in	uence to legitimize Dutch colonial authority.
Inspired by his 
rsthand observations, Van der Capellen initiated policies 
to more fully incorporate the bupati, and the priyayi in general, into the colo-
nial administration. In 1820, he issued new regulations that modi
ed the bu-
pati’s position within the colonial government as well as their titles and ranks, 
designated symbols of power, and the size of their retinues.46 e regulations 
described the bupati as the “
rst persons” among the indigenous population, 
only subservient to European residents, whom they were expected to provide 
with counsel. In return, residents should treat the bupati as “younger brothers.” 
is designation was a colonial reinterpretation of the kawula-gusti relationship 
essential in Javanese social hierarchies. e term priyayi itself denotes “younger 
brother of the king,” a clear reference to the Javanese bureaucratic hierarchy 
before the arrival of the Dutch. Under Van der Capellen, this familiar social 
structure was applied to the colonial administration. He also strengthened the 
bupati’s position by restoring some of the oce’s traditional responsibilities, 
such as overseeing the cultivation of cash crops, the maintenance and construc-
tion of infrastructure, local police, administration, education, religious matters, 
and corvée labor. ey were not, however, allowed to be involved in tax collec-
tion or the management of government warehouses nor were they permitted to 
engage in any kind of trade or industry. Van der Capellen’s regulations can be 
regarded as the foundation of a dual civil service consisting of two branches: one 
European and one Javanese.47
Perhaps the most signi
cant insight that Van der Capellen gained during his 
tour of the island was the extent of the bupati’s “honored authority” in the eyes 
of the ordinary Javanese, communicated through language, etiquette, deference, 
dress, and status symbols. It was this realization that prompted Van der Capel-
len to ocially appropriate these outward representations of power to legiti-
mize colonial authority. is strategy contrasted with his predecessors’ policies. 
Daendels had initiated an incremental reduction of the right to deference and 
retinues to signal the Javanese bureaucratic elite’s subservient position to his gov-
ernment. Both he and Raes sought to decrease these “feudal” representations 
of power over time to create a truly modern bureaucracy. Van der Capellen, how-
ever, was convinced that colonial rule actually bene
ted from retaining these 
in	uences. He believed that reinstating some of the bupati’s former pomp would 
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assuage fears of further social decline and lead them to encourage the Javanese 
to accept Dutch colonial rule.48
Van der Capellen used his knowledge of Javanese symbols and rituals to o-
cially integrate the Javanese bureaucratic elite into the colonial administration. 
In 1824, he declared the bupati and all other indigenous administrators above 
the village level to be civil servants of the colonial administration, and, in accor-
dance with the strict social hierarchies within Javanese culture, assigned each 
of them a distinct title, rank, and right to traditional insignia of power. is 
was best illustrated, 
guratively and literally, in an elaborate payung hierarchy 
that mimicked those of the Javanese principalities.49 But in contrast to the prin-
cipalities’ aristocracies, which had separate payung hierarchies for members of 
the royal family and civil servants, the colonial government’s payung hierarchy 
was primarily a bureaucratic one. Under Van der Capellen, each payung’s colors 
and decorations re	ected the rank and oce of its owner. In descending order, 
the most prestige was associated with the colors gold, yellow, white, green, blue, 
dark brown, gray-black, and light red. For instance, a public prosecutor ( jaksa) 
received a payung with a green top, blue bottom, and three gilded circles, while 
subdistrict administrators (wedana) carried ones with blue tops, dark brown 
bottoms, and three golden circles. is payung hierarchy expanded throughout 
the nineteenth century to incorporate new professions within the civil service, 
such as teachers, doctors, and even pawnshop personnel.50
e decision to embrace rather than phase out Javanese social etiquette, 
deference rituals, and insignias of power also aected European civil servants. 
Daendels and Raes deliberately used status symbols like the payung to provoke 
the Javanese principalities. By asserting the right to assign a gilded payung to 
their representatives, they signi
ed in unmistakable terms the colonial claim 
to sovereignty. Since Daendels assigned a semi-gilded payung to his representa-
tives at the Javanese courts in 1808, colonial ocials came to regard the payung 
as part of their oce insignia. Under Raes’s administration, residents used a 
fully gilded payung to signify their status as representatives of the governor gen-
eral, while assistant residents were given a payung with a white top and gilded 
bottom. For both “enlightened” governor generals, the adoption of the payung, 
which they considered a “feudal” relic, was foremost born out of practical con-
siderations, and once colonial sovereignty was 
rmly established these symbols 
were to be discarded. Van der Capellen, however, decided dierently. He opted 
to allow colonial ocials to claim Javanese deferential practices and institution-
alized the employ of powerful symbols such as the payung. As the representative 
of the king of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Van der Capellen, for 
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instance, claimed the right to a gilded payung, previously the sole privilege of 
Javanese monarchs. is moment marked the beginning of the Javanization of 
colonial authority, as the Dutch government relied more and more on Javanese 
etiquette and symbols of power to legitimize their rule. Within decades, the 
gilded payung was no longer linked with Javanese monarchs and instead strongly 
associated with colonial power.51
In hindsight, Van der Capellen’s reconciliation with the Javanese bureaucratic 
elite was timely, as it occurred on the eve of the outbreak of the Java War (1825–
30). e rebellion was the 
nal act in the struggle over sovereignty between the 
colonial government and the Javanese principalities (especially the court of Yo-
gyakarta) that had begun with Daendels and Raes’s coercive interventions. 
Having experienced forced abdication, new mandatory court etiquette, loss of 
territory, imposed economic reorganization, and the plunder of Yogyakarta’s 
palace, the principalities harbored a great deal of shame and resentment. ese 
grievances, heightened by a cholera epidemic in 1821, the eruption of Mount 
Merapi in 1822, and soaring rice prices, sparked a millenarian movement around 
Prince Diponegoro of Yogyakarta. e June 1825 uprising took the Dutch by sur-
prise, and spread like wild
re over central, east, and northeast Java, developing 
into a serious threat to colonial rule.
For Prince Diponegoro and his followers, the Java War was as much about the 
preservation of Javanese honor and cultural values as it was about economic griev-
ances and millenarian hopes. ey intended to purge the island of detrimental 
European cultural in	uences.52 As the oldest son of Sultan Hamengkubuwana 
III and one of his secondary wives, Diponegoro grew up at the Yogyakarta court 
and witnessed 
rsthand his people’s humiliating subjugation to colonial inter-
ests under Daendels and Raes. He took great pride in Javanese history and my-
thology, valued Javanese court etiquette and deference traditions, and was deeply 
troubled by the growth of European in	uence over court society. It appears that 
the 1823 arrival of Dutch resident Anthonie Hendrik Smissaert set the prince 
on the path toward rebellion. e new colonial representative could only speak 
Malay in court society—an oense to propriety that rendered useless the subtle 
Javanese language hierarchy. To show his discontent, Diponegoro traded insults 
by replying to the Dutch representatives in low Javanese. e prince was also 
bothered by Smissaert’s appropriation of a gilded payung, traditionally imbued 
with deep symbolic and spiritual power.53 ese oensive breaches in etiquette 
prompted Diponegoro to action.
In his masterful study of Diponegoro, Peter Carey argues that the prince’s 
rebellion can be interpreted as the old order’s 
nal stand in defense of Javanese 
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sartorial, linguistic, and cultural codes.54 Indeed, during the Java War, the 
prince’s preoccupation with cultural values manifested in various ways, as he 
employed precisely those symbols and traditions that he felt were most threat-
ened by colonialism to validate his cause. For instance, to demonstrate his royal 
claim to the throne, he adopted a gilded payung and brought it into battle to 
boost morale.55 He even “deployed” his ceremonial parasol to rally his forces in 
distant villages while he was active elsewhere. But while Diponegoro’s payung 
legitimized his claim in the eyes of his followers, to Dutch observers his use of 
the parasol demonstrated the importance of controlling and employing Javanese 
status symbols and deference rituals to express colonial authority.56
Moreover, and most importantly, throughout the 
ve-year con	ict the colo-
nial authorities were assured of the bupati and priyayi’s support in the territories 
that remained under their control. is was a real testament to Van der Capel-
len’s foresight in incorporating the Javanese bureaucratic elite into the colonial 
administration and assigning them traditional insignias of power. To maintain 
their support and convince the bupati that their interests were best served by 
the Dutch rather than the Javanese courts, the colonial government promised 
them even greater responsibilities and hereditary positions at the end of the con-
	ict. With this goal in mind, Dutch residents were also instructed to treat the 
Javanese bureaucratic elite with respect and distinction.57 In this way, the Java 
War 
rmly cemented an increasingly interdependent partnership between the 
Javanese bureaucratic elite and the Dutch.
Aer 
ve years of suering, colonial forces ended the war by luring Dipone-
goro to the negotiating table and arresting him. It was the last major challenge 
to colonial rule until the Second World War and marks a crucial turning point 
in Indonesian colonial history. e Java War forced the Dutch to reexamine the 
character and appearance of their colonial administration. ey realized that 
attempts to establish direct rule with a European style of colonial governance 
had back
red, as they had generated widespread discontent under Daendels 
and Raes, and ultimately motivated Diponegoro to rebel. e war made it 
clear that, in Van der Capellen’s words, the Dutch lacked the “perfect symme-
try in language, religion, color, virtues and customs” with the local populace 
required to rule them directly.58 Understanding that a pro
table and stable sys-
tem of colonial rule depended on the cooperation of the Javanese bureaucratic 
elite, the colonial government strengthened the bupati’s position politically, 
economically, and symbolically in the years following the Java War. Moreover, 
the Dutch implemented a system of indirect rule that deliberately attempted 
to bridge the social and cultural distance between colonial ocials and their 
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subjects. Appropriating Javanese cultural elements, such as language hierarchies, 
etiquette, deference rituals, symbols of power, architecture, and dress, the Dutch 
sought to legitimize their domination through the “Javanization” of colonial 
authority.59
e Cultivation System and  
the Javanization of Colonial Authority
e Javanization of colonial authority corresponded with the introduction of a 
new system of colonial exploitation known as the Cultivation System. e Cul-
tivation System allowed for the extensive appropriation of Javanese labor, cash 
crops, and services—measures regarded as necessary to make the colonial en-
deavor pro
table. One year prior to the end of the Java War, Van der Capellen’s 
eventual successor, Governor General Johannes van den Bosch, wrote a spirited 
appeal to the Dutch king, Willem I, arguing that the only way for the colony 
to turn a pro
t was through the use of forced labor. He stated that the Javanese 
were “innately lazy” people who without proper direction could barely culti-
vate sucient rice for their own sustenance. He therefore rejected the policies 
of his predecessors, who had sought to create a system of colonial exploitation 
based on relatively free labor, market production, and taxation. Instead, Van 
den Bosch proposed to revert to the VOC’s earlier, more “successful” system of 
forced cultivation of cash crops—a form of colonial exploitation hinging on the 
principle that as the sovereign of Java, the Dutch king had the right to extract 
corvée labor and a portion of the country’s crops. Just as under the VOC, the 
new Cultivation System required the support of the Javanese bureaucratic elite 
and their aristocratic culture.60
Experiences during the Java War had con
rmed the importance and potential 
of having the Javanese priyayi as collaborators in the colonial administration. 
Like Van der Capellen a decade earlier, Van den Bosch believed that the Javanese 
bureaucratic elite was uniquely quali
ed to employ its traditional authority to 
administer and oversee the cultivation of cash crops, and in doing so, help 
ll 
colonial coers. Once in oce, Van den Bosch ful
lled promises made during 
the war and increased the bupati’s stature and power, granting them heredi-
tary succession and reinstating their right to private landholdings. ese and 
other government regulations cemented the bupati’s position as intermediaries 
between the colonial government and the Javanese people.61 In addition, Van 
den Bosch designed a 
nancial incentive for the bupati to collaborate with the 
Dutch, rewarding them with a share of the proceeds (kultuurprocenten) from the 
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cash crops that their regencies delivered to the government. rough these mea-
sures, Van den Bosch reasoned that “the most prominent class among the Java-
nese [can] be tied closer to [the colonial government]. Consequently, they would 
have nothing to gain and everything to lose from a change in circumstances.”62
Moreover, by administering Java through the bupati—and thus according to Ja-
vanese customs and institutions—European civil servants retreated from direct 
interference with the ordinary Javanese. eir main task became to supervise the 
Javanese aristocracy and protect the ordinary man against possible mistreatment 
and abuse by its native chiefs.63
But although the colonial administration encouraged Javanese customs, their 
adoption most certainly did not signify a restoration of the precolonial order 
under the VOC. With the help of the Javanese elite, the colonial government 
executed a process of modern state formation and agro-industrial exploitation 
that made far more extractive demands on the labor and services of the ordinary 
Javanese than ever before. e tension between a traditional façade and modern 
colonial administration was also re	ected in the bupati’s new position. Under 
the Cultivation System, the bupati’s prestige and wealth increased considerably, 
but they gained their new power without retaining much autonomy; as civil 
servants in the colonial administration, they remained under European supervi-
sion. For instance, it was as civil servants that the bupati achieved hereditary suc-
cession, which had eluded them in the precolonial Javanese world.64 ere was 
thus an inherent contradiction within their position as both “native chief ” and
colonial civil servant. As a consequence, the traditional relationship between 
the Javanese bureaucratic elite and the ordinary Javanese changed. e bupati 
no longer derived their power from the traditional kawula-gusti relationship, in 
which devotion for the patron was exchanged for protection of the client. Now 
their power came directly through supporting Dutch rule. is meant that the 
bupati could exploit their subjects without consequence—for instance, increase 
their percentage shares of cash crop cultivation—as long as they enjoyed the 
support and military backing of the Dutch.65 While this was not necessarily 
evident at the time, this practice manipulated and corrupted the principle of 
kawula-gusti, causing tensions between the traditional elite and the ordinary 
Javanese that would simmer under the Cultivation System and eventually boil 
over in the twentieth century.
As part of reconceiving the colonial administration, Dutch authorities sought 
to justify their dominance by appropriating Javanese social customs, deference 
rituals, and etiquette to regulate public interactions with their colonized sub-
jects. In a way, this too was a return to the more pragmatic practices of the VOC 
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rather than the failed attempts at direct European rule in the previous decades. 
e Dutch were well aware of the value of manipulating social etiquette and 
status symbols, as they had already used this tactic to undermine the Javanese 
monarchies and gain the bupati’s support. At Van der Capellen’s behest, colonial 
ocials claimed the right to forms of deference traditionally reserved for the Ja-
vanese royal houses, as representatives of a sovereign power. By continuing to in-
sert themselves, as it were, into traditional Javanese hierarchies, the Dutch’s per-
formance of colonial hegemony became highly—and deliberately—“Javanized.”
As an example of this shi, under the Cultivation System Dutch colonial 
ocials were encouraged to learn and speak vernacular languages, such as Java-
nese and Sundanese, in order to convincingly communicate their elevated social 
position. Since the days of the VOC, most Dutch ocials conversed with their 
colonized subjects in Malay, the mercantile lingua franca of the Indonesian ar-
chipelago. is frequently resulted in tensions between Dutch ocials and the 
Javanese elite (most egregiously with Prince Diponegoro in the years before the 
Java War), as Malay was an egalitarian language that lacked the clear dieren-
tiation and expression of rank and status that was so prevalent in Javanese. To 
address the issue, in an 1841 public lecture in front of King Willem I, preeminent 
Dutch linguistic scholar Taco Roorda advocated for an educational institution 
where prospective colonial civil servants could be taught vernacular languages.66
Roorda argued that colonial civil servants should learn to employ the Javanese 
language hierarchy as a means of asserting their authority: they could then ad-
dress their Javanese partners in low Javanese (ngoko), which required a response 
in high Javanese (krama). Such diglossia of the Javanese language reinforced 
both the prestige and superiority of individual Dutch civil servants and that of 
colonial authorities in general.67
Following up on Roorda’s public call for an educational institution, Dutch 
minister of colonial aairs Jean Chrétien Baud soon composed his own detailed 
proposal to persuade the king to train prospective ocials in Europe. Baud 
suggested that the Royal Academy in Del add colonial studies to its program, 
stressing the importance of linguistic and cultural instruction for the success of 
future civil servants. He argued that it was a “tangible truth that a dominated 
people cannot be held in subjection for long, without violence, if the ruler does 
not make every eort to govern that people with fairness and justice, and above 
all, with respect for the local institutions, customs and prejudices.” e principal 
means of acquiring this kind of knowledge, according to Baud, was “to become 
thoroughly familiar with the language of the country.”68 Clearly in	uenced by 
the recent experience of the Java War, this treatise eectively summarized the 
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guiding principle of Dutch colonial policy for the remainder of the nineteenth 
century: by appropriating—or “respecting,” in Baud’s words—local institutions 
and customs, colonial dominance could be legitimized by consent rather than 
coercion. Baud’s arguments swayed the king and in 1843, the Royal Academy in 
Del accepted its 
rst prospective colonial ocials, supervised by Roorda, the 
institution’s 
rst professor of Javanese.69
e use of vernacular languages was an important component of a larger 
system of deference rituals and etiquette. In Javanese society, it was customary 
for those of lower rank or social standing to sit crossed-legged on the 	oor in a 
posture called sila in the presence of social superiors. When addressed, the social 
inferior would avoid eye contact and accompany each sentence with a gesture 
of respect called the sembah, bringing their palms together with their thumbs 
touching their mouth while their index 
ngers touched their nose. When en-
countering a person of higher social standing, one was expected to squat and 
only approach the superior on one’s heels in an uncomfortable crouching-walk 
known as jongkok. Taken together, these deference rituals were known as hor-
mat, which in Malay means “respect” or “homage.” Under the aegis of men like 
Baud and Roorda, prospective colonial civil servants were instructed on how to 
employ both the vernacular language hierarchy and hormat rituals to legitimize 
colonial authority.70
e Javanization of colonial authority manifested in numerous other ways, 
as well, as Dutch ocials sought to rule and perform like the Javanese elite. Re-
gional administrators like residents and assistant residents were always accom-
panied by their gilded or semi-gilded payung, carried by a servant when touring 
on foot, mounted on their carriages when traveling by coach, or displayed on 
the veranda of their residences. In imitation of the Javanese priyayi, colonial 
ocials also surrounded themselves with countless servants and traveled with a 
great entourage of local ocials when touring their districts. ey even insisted 
on being addressed with honorary titles like kangdjeng tuan—akin to “your 
highness”—and of course demanded observance of the proper language hierar-
chy and hormat customs, which were privileges previously beholden to Javanese 
royalty and nobility.71
Surprisingly, the process of Javanization also permeated less obvious arenas, 
such as food dishes and the manner of their consumption, which were employed 
as additional markers of social, racial, and cultural identities. What mattered was 
not only what was eaten but also how the consumption of a meal was performed. 
From the 1830s onward, the Dutch distinguished themselves as Java’s new rul-
ing class through a gastronomical spectacle known as the rice table (rijsttafel), 
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rooted in Asian and European traditions. From a purely culinary perspective, 
the rice table consisted of a rice centerpiece in combination with a broad assort-
ment of side dishes—vegetables, soups, sauces, meat, and 
sh, among others—
which were to be served over the warm rice. ese side dishes originated in the 
indigenous cultures of the Indonesian archipelago, including that of the Chinese 
diaspora, albeit modi
ed to Dutch tastes. Symbolically, they represented the 
reach of the Dutch empire. e preparation of such a culinary feast was both 
labor and capital intensive, which meant that only the wealthy and powerful 
could oer it to their guests. In the course of the nineteenth century, the rice 
table evolved into a grand spectacle, with servants in procession presenting the 
diners with the side dishes. e larger the procession of servants, the greater the 
host’s prestige. Tellingly, the rice table did not include tempeh—fried soybean 
patties widely consumed by all Javanese—as the Dutch considered them too 
lowly to eat. ey did add beer and fried bananas to the rice table, which in 
turn were scarcely found on Javanese tables. In fact, the ordinary Javanese made 
do with rice and only a single side dish, if any. As this history of the rice table 
demonstrates, the production of colonial authority was extremely detailed and 
pervasive throughout colonial society.72
e Javanization of colonial authority also permeated colonial spaces. On 
arrival to the Indonesian archipelago in the seventeenth century, the Dutch ini-
tially transplanted European architecture to the tropics. ey soon discovered 
that brick walls, small eaves, and few openings for ventilation were at odds with 
the hot and humid climate of Java. Over time, they made accommodations to 
create healthier and more comfortable living conditions, such as overhanging 
eaves to protect against the tropical sun and rain, spacious living quarters, and 
improved ventilation. However, it was not until the nineteenth century that 
vernacular architectural traditions were more fully incorporated into colonial 
spaces. In part, this transition can be attributed to the recognition that Javanese 
construction methods and design carried great climatic, and thus health, bene-

ts. But this cultural adaptation also resulted from Dutch fascination with the 
lifestyle and authority of Java’s elite. By trying to emulate and even outdo the 
priyayi, the Dutch sought to enhance their prestige and distinguish themselves 
as Java’s latest rulers. Colonial architecture thus played a vital part in signaling 
and maintaining colonial hegemony.73
Moreover, implementing the Cultivation System required widespread infra-
structural investment, from the construction of sugar factories, storehouses, port 
facilities, irrigation and drainage systems, roads, and bridges to new oces, res-
idences, and outstations for colonial administrators. is building frenzy was 
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fundamental to exerting and preserving political and economic control over 
the island, and the new structures’ appearance was as crucial as their function-
ality. eir syncretic architectural design, combining Javanese and European 
construction and décor, made these buildings appear familiar yet distinctive in 
the colonial environment. Consequently, they became clear symbols of colonial 
authority to rulers and subjects alike.74
is syncretism was most conspicuous in buildings representing state power, 
such as residences, outstations (passanggrahan), and oces of colonial ocials. 
e nineteenth century colonial mansion in particular was modeled aer the 
houses of Javanese aristocrats, with local architectural traits such as a rectangu-
lar 	oor plan and a hipped roof (in which all sides slope downward) transferred 
to colonial villas.75 As with the Javanese language diglossia, the particular style 
and pitch of the roof re	ected the social status and rank of its inhabitants.76 e 
colonial mansion also mimicked the layout of Javanese houses, with a private 
large interior section for family (dalem), a back porch (gadri), and a public front 
porch (pringgitan). Arguably, the pringgitan was the most important part of 
the colonial mansion, as it was where most public performances occurred. Its 
function was derived from the Javanese pendopo—a square, open pavilion with 
centralized wooden pillars supporting a hipped roof—that served as a location 
for public meetings and celebrations. In contrast with Javanese traditions that 
positioned the pendopo in front of the house, the Dutch expanded their front 
porches in order for them to function as pendopos. us, the Dutch did not 
simply duplicate Javanese traditions, but appropriated what they believed was 
necessary while still maintaining a sense of dierence.77
Such dierentiation was evident in further design decisions made under the 
colonial regime. e Javanization of colonial architecture coincided with the 
widespread adoption of the “Empire style,” a neoclassical style modeled aer 
Greco-Roman designs, resulting in a unique syncretism in colonial architecture. 
It was Daendels who 
rst utilized this style for colonial government buildings, 
and the trend continued during the British interregnum. But it was not until the 
construction frenzy brought on by the Cultivation System that Empire style be-
came prevalent all over the island. For instance, neoclassical colonnades adorned 
the porches of colonial villas, distinguishing them from their inspiration: the 
Javanese pendopo. Moreover, in contrast to Javanese houses, those of the Dutch 
were whitewashed, which was in part to re	ect the tropical sun but also to clearly 
identify colonial buildings. e colonial government even issued construction 
manuals detailing how the residences of colonial ocials (1854), bupati (1870), 
and residents (1879) should be built. ese standards not only ensured that the 
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appearance of colonial authority in Java remained ubiquitous but also visibly 
dierentiated the homes of the ruling class.78
Another essential component of the Javanization of colonial authority was 
regulating dress. Due to a large Eurasian population, skin color alone did not 
distinguish colonizers from colonized. us, outward appearance was a marker 
of social and racial status, crucial in communicating one’s position and ethnicity 
in such a strati
ed culture. As a consequence of the VOC’s conjugal policies, 
colonial households had practiced local sartorial customs since the seventeenth 
century. In the private sphere, Eurasian women adopted the dress of their moth-
ers, wearing a kain—a 	oor-length, uncut, dyed or plaid cloth wound around the 
waist—and a kebaya—a long-sleeved blouse extending to the hips. European 
and Eurasian men wore similar leisure and sleeping attire at home, but in public 
appeared in European dress. While Daendels and especially Raes sought to 
Europeanize colonial ocials’ appearance, the Javanization of colonial author-
ity institutionalized traditional clothing distinctions between an indigenized 
private sphere and a Europeanized public sphere.79
In the wake of the Java War, the Dutch symbolically displayed their rearmed 
control over the island by ending the Javanese elite’s longstanding connection 
with batik fabrics. Since the Hindu-Buddhist period in Javanese history, the bu-
pati were adorned in batik clothing to distinguish themselves from commoners. 
Batik was a perfect status symbol, as it was expensive (due to its time-consuming, 
wax-resistant dyeing technique) and allowed for the display of intricate designs 
reserved for royalty.80 e Dutch appropriation of both batik production and 
usage was an unmistakable sign of a new balance of power. Women with Euro-
pean status adorned themselves in popular batik sarongs—rectangular cloths 
sewn into tubes—which were produced in batik shops owned and operated by 
Eurasian women. ese shops created fabrics with unique designs and colors 
that became known as batik Belanda (Dutch batik), easily discernable from tra-
ditional Javanese batik. e growing importance of batik sarongs as status sym-
bols resulted in shortening the white kebaya to allow onlookers to admire their 
designs.81 European men likewise added batik clothing to their wardrobes, sig-
ni
cantly replacing the traditional kain with a pair of batik trousers. By breaking 
with Javanese unisex attire, Dutch men contrasted their perceived masculinity 
with the appearance of Javanese men, which they deemed feminine. Such choices 
represent additional means by which the colonial regime justi
ed its authority.82
Under the Cultivation System, the Dutch also regulated dress in the public 
sphere to reinforce a new racialized legal form of strati
cation that became the 
cornerstone of the colonial administration. Government regulations adopted 
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in 1854 and 1855 legally categorized inhabitants of colonial Indonesia as either 
“European,” “Native,” or “Foreign Oriental” (primarily referring to people of 
Chinese or Arab descent).83 is legal dierentiation mirrored the Dutch insti-
tution of indirect rule, leaving the Javanese administrative elite to manage the 
colonized according to Javanese laws. However, as skin color was not sucient to 
discern these “legalized ethnic” groups, dress regulations became an indispens-
able means of communicating racial and social dierence. Surabaya’s police reg-
ulations of 1829 were the 
rst to stipulate that it was prohibited for inhabitants 
“to appear on the roads and streets in clothing that deviates from one’s ethnicity 
and social standing.”84 In the next decades, other towns and districts followed 
Surabaya’s example until provisions on ethnic dress were incorporated into po-
lice regulations that applied to the entire island in 1872.85 As a consequence of 
these regulations, “legal” categories became associated with ethnic stereotypes. 
For instance, in public Javanese men were expected to don a kain, Chinese to 
have a queue, Arabs to wear a turban, and Europeans to model a white suit. Eu-
ropeans’ sartorial transgressions in the private sphere, where they wore Eurasian 
batik attire, similarly con
rmed their privileged position in colonial society. But 
in the public sphere, dress and appearance were vital, as they assigned a partic-
ular role and script that would determine other elements that were essential to 
the performance of colonialism, such as the deference etiquette guiding an en-
counter. rough these and other deliberate manipulations of Javanese rituals 
and status symbols, the Dutch asserted their power as colonial rulers.
From the perspective of the colonizer, the Cultivation System, the institution 
of indirect rule, and the Javanization of colonial authority were a rousing success. 
e forced cultivation of cash crops 
nally delivered the 
nancial windfalls the 
Dutch had so desperately desired. In the mid-nineteenth century, Java was the 
envy of the colonial world, as pro
ts enabled the Netherlands to pay o a signi
-
cant part of its national debt, balance its budget, 
nance infrastructural projects 
in the metropolis, compensate Surinam slaveowners for the abolition of slavery, 
and delay the introduction of income taxes.86 However, all of these spoils were 
made possible by the excessive appropriation of labor and cash crops from the 
ordinary Javanese, who, under the Cultivation System, suered abuses not only 
from Dutch colonial ocials, but also from their own administrative elite—the 
bupati. Both worked under a system of rewards that incentivized exploitation 
of the peasantry, as percentages of their district pro
ts augmented their regular 
salaries. is arrangement eectively destroyed the traditional kawula-gusti rela-
tionship—which had imbued the elite and the peasantry with reciprocal respon-
sibilities—and exacerbated the Cultivation System’s impact on Javanese society. 
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e unbridled extraction of labor and resources resulted in the outbreak of ty-
phoid fever (1846–50) and severe famines (1849–50). While most contemporary 
observers agreed that this distress indicated the Cultivation System’s shortcom-
ings, political and 
nancial expediency dictated that the Netherlands could not 
forego it just yet. Instead, the Cultivation System was dismantled in stages until 
1870, when it was 
nally abolished.87
Colonial Puppeteers and the Performance of Hegemony
e end of the forced cultivation of cash crops in 1870 marked the transition to a 
new system of colonial exploitation and administration known in the historiog-
raphy of colonial Indonesia as the Liberal Period. During this time, the colonial 
economy opened to private commercial agents, welcoming Dutch planters and 
businessmen who replaced colonial ocials as the drivers of economic exploita-
tion. Rather than colonial administrators, entrepreneurs were now responsible 
for—and considered better suited for—advancing the colony’s economy. It be-
came colonial ocials’ primary responsibility to facilitate the capitalist devel-
opment of Java while safeguarding the population against excesses like those 
under the Cultivation System. is form of quasi-capitalist exploitation, or so it 
was argued, would bene
t the mother country, economically develop Java, and 
improve the welfare of the colonized.
ese changes necessitated a new role for colonial civil servants. Whereas 
under the Cultivation System, Dutch ocials had been chie	y responsible for 
overseeing agricultural production, the new system transformed them into pow-
erful administrators. As such, they were tasked with maintaining colonial peace 
and order—an assignment that included protecting the ordinary Javanese from 
potential abuses instigated by both private interests and the Javanese aristocracy. 
Ironically, the bupati had acquired an unsavory reputation for exploiting the 
peasantry during the Cultivation System, even though it was the Dutch who had 
facilitated such mistreatment.88 Now, colonial administrators were suddenly ex-
pected to protect the colonized. Moreover, managing the bupati was also under 
their ocial purview. As a result of these updated duties, Dutch bureaucrats 
interacted more directly and frequently with the Javanese, adopting a paternal-
istic attitude in the process. In a sense, the paternalistic turn in colonial ad-
ministration can be interpreted as an attempt to restore a kind of kawula-gusti. 
To that end, the European civil service grew more powerful and in	uential at 
the expense of their Javanese counterparts and continued to rely on traditional 
forms of etiquette and deference to express their authority.
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As the bupati once again lost political and administrative power, the Dutch 
compensated by increasing their symbolic power—a process that began in the 
1860s, before the Cultivation System was completely abolished. In 1866, cul-
tivation percentages—the incentives fostering the abusive exploitation of the 
Javanese peasantry—were eliminated, resulting in a signi
cant loss in income for 
both European and Javanese ocials. e bupati also saw their right to feudal 
services reduced, lost their right to private appanage entirely, and had to accept 
more overt and direct interference from European ocials.89 To compensate for 
their loss of income and decreased political and administrative power, the Dutch 
oered “payment” in the form of status symbols and deference. For instance, in 
1867 the government bestowed on the bupati the right to decorate their yellow 
payung with a gilded circle, a signi
cant status-enhancing gesture.90 In addition, 
the government reassured them that they would maintain the principle of he-
reditary succession for their positions. e ironic consequence of these develop-
ments was that as the bupati became less powerful, they appeared more powerful 
than ever, receiving substantial ritualistic deference and surrounding themselves 
with a plethora of status symbols. e bupati clung to these traditional sources of 
authority in an attempt to maintain their standing and oset their loss of power 
to their European “colleagues.”91
ese seemingly diverging tendencies—a decrease in real power along with an 
increase in symbolic power—were also re	ected in the broad expansion of the 
Javanese priyayi in general. e liberalization of the colonial economy and the 
government’s new role in facilitating it resulted in a growing demand for cheap, 
specialized labor. In 1879, the colonial government sponsored the founding of 
Head Schools (hoofdenscholen) to prepare the children of the Javanese elite to 
work for the government in nontraditional (meaning non-administrative) pro-
fessions, such as teachers, vaccinators, clerks, and irrigation ocers.92 ese 
new and modern professionals were carefully incorporated into the traditional 
Javanese hierarchy and assigned speci
c titles, ranks, status symbols, and cer-
emonial rights. is in itself was nothing new. Forestry service leaders, senior 
heads of waterworks, and employees in the vaccination service, saltworks, and 
warehouses were already added to the ranks of the priyayi in 1824. But following 
the dismantling of the Cultivation System, this expansion accelerated consid-
erably as the following professions were added: government tellers and prison 
guards (1874); teachers (1879); indigenous doctors (1892); veterinarians (1893); 
clerks for the post, telegraph, telephone, and railroad services (1896); conduc-
tors (1897); translators (1898); subdistrict chiefs (1900); forestry personnel (1901); 
and 
nally, pawnshop personnel (1906). As a sign of their priyayi status, all of 
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Figure 2. Meeting of the Native Court in Pati, Central Java, ca. 1865. e 
photograph captures the performance of colonial power in the nineteenth century. 
e Dutch resident is accompanied by his gilded payung (the top of his servant’s 
head is just visible). e court ocials are seated on chairs while lower ocials sit 
on the 	oor, all donning ethnic garb. Source: Leiden University Library, Royal 
Netherlands Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) 3516.
these “modern” professionals were assigned a payung. New color schemes were 
designed to re	ect each branch of government: blue for indigenous administra-
tion and education, blue and green for a legal position, and brown for healthcare 
providers (see 
gure 2). e decision to implement traditional emblems and rit-
uals for the bupati and priyayi was a clear indication that, despite liberalizing 
the economy and modernizing the administration, the Dutch still considered 
Javanese symbols of power to be indispensable within colonial rule.93
But perhaps even more surprising was that European ocials, the purported 
modernizers of the colonial administration, similarly clung to a Javanized ap-
pearance of authority. ey believed that adherence to local customs armed 
and naturalized their power in the eyes of their subjects and justi
ed colonial au-
thority more broadly.94 is was not limited to the European civil service alone 
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but permeated all layers of colonial society, including the growing number of 
European entrepreneurs in Java. Quick to follow the example set by colonial 
ocials, they constructed villas in the hybrid colonial style, communicated with 
their workers according to the strict language hierarchy, expected traditional 
forms of deference, such as jongkok and sembah, and conformed to the sartorial 
order. Interactions within colonial households, where indigenous servants were 
the majority, were regulated by the same social etiquette. In short, the overall 
character of colonial society was profoundly local. is distinctive feature of 
Dutch rule in Java was not lost on outsiders. In the 1890s, a British traveler ob-
served that rather than raising the Javanese to their “level” of civilization, the 
Dutch had sunk to the natives’ level, and feared that they would “soon cease to 
be Europeans in anything but a traditional sense.”95
“A Ridiculous Spectacle”
Dutch colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century invites an analogy to a 
traditional Javanese wayang performance. e beautiful wayang kulit (leather 
shadow puppets)—skillfully carved to the tiniest detail, patiently painted 
with several layers of bright colors, and 
nished with carved handles of bualo 
bone—resemble the Javanese priyayi, clad in ceremonial attire and surrounded 
by various symbols of power and a large entourage. Both look exquisite, extrav-
agant even, but most of all they appear powerful. However, the power is the 
hands of the dalang (puppeteer) who guides both puppets and priyayi. It is the 
dalang who makes the puppet move, who decides on its actions and direction. 
A Javanese bupati described this relationship with the Dutch succinctly: “ey 
have degraded us from powerful chiefs to fancy civil servants with a high sal-
ary, beautiful titles, but in fact diering little from lower police ocers. ey 
(the population) consider us wayang puppets, who are moved by ever changing 
dalang, the European civil servants, without any free will or insight.”96 e bu-
pati and other Javanese ocials may have appeared as decorated and powerful 
as wayang puppets, but in fact they were nothing more than a shadow of their 
former selves. As the Dutch recognized, in the shadow theatre it is the source of 
light—power—and the dalang that makes or breaks the performance.97 In the 
theatre of the colonial state, the Dutch relied on their coercive power to manip-
ulate the appearance and performance of Javanese traditions to legitimize their 
authority. is suggests that the colonial theatre state, and the concept of the 
theatre state more generally, can only be understood by considering coercive and 
symbolic power as complementary.98
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e Dutch were not simply puppeteers, stagehands, or prop-masters, but lead-
ing actors in their own colonial production. eir role in these performances 
visually re	ected the colonial relationship as they imagined it and was meant to 
illustrate and imbue their dominance over their colonized subjects. roughout 
the nineteenth century, the Dutch authored a hegemonic script that, while never 
static, increasingly centered on the Javanization of colonial authority. is was 
not simply the outcome of centuries of cultural and racial mixing due to the 
VOC’s immigration and conjugal policies. Such an interpretation misses the 
deliberate nature of the Javanization of authority. At the opening of the nine-
teenth century, Java’s colonial rulers used their familiarity with local culture to 
communicate their sovereignty to the Javanese courts. When this back
red—in 
the form of the Java War—they adjusted and intentionally embraced Javanese 
etiquette to appease the priyayi and ensure their collaboration. ese policies 
were informed by Orientalist assumptions that Javanese culture was static and 
consensual, presuming that its appropriation would ensure passive acquiesce to 
colonial rule. Ironically, it was the Dutch attempt at ordering culture—through 
regulations on etiquette, entourage, dress, language, and more—that made it 
appear 
xed. is façade created the illusion of colonial peace and order and 
obscured—even to many historians—the considerable coercion needed to stage 
the performance of power.99 e Javanese did not merely comply docilely, but 
without a broad contestation of the hegemonic script, the performance remained 
intact at the end of the nineteenth century.
However, Raden Adjeng Kartini’s observations around 1900, with which this 
chapter opened, demonstrate the existence of subversive interpretations of the 
Dutch hegemonic script. Kartini described the Dutch appropriation of Java-
nese deference rituals as a “ridiculous spectacle” that inspired jest and mockery 
at colonial ocials’ expense.100 Her comments were not made in isolation, as 
a new educated elite began to challenge the colonial discourse the Dutch had 
so carefully craed in the nineteenth century. It is to these challenges that the 
following chapters turn.
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“Sweet Was the Dream, Bitter the Awakening”
e Contested Implementation of the Ethical Policy, 1901–1913
I n June 1905, a young medical student named Goenawan Mangoenkoe-soemo published a pointed opinion piece in a progressive colonial news-paper, Java Bode. He argued that the prevalence of traditional Javanese 
deference customs in colonial society was the primary obstacle to intellectual 
and socioeconomic emancipation among the colonized. He invited his predom-
inantly Dutch readership to see the world through Javanese eyes to help them 
understand that apparent acquiescence to hormat—expressed through defer-
ence, honorics, language, and dress—should not be mistaken for consent, nor 
for an intrinsic respect for allegedly enduring cultural traditions. On the con-
trary, the younger generation of educated Javanese privately considered these 
deferential performances to be prohibitive, time-consuming, and out of place in 
the twentieth century. Goenawan contended that the social customs regulating 
public contact between colonizer and colonized instilled a sense of inferiority in 
the Javanese people, especially since other groups, like Chinese and Arabs, were 
not burdened with similar constraints. He proposed leveling the playing eld 
by replacing Javanese deference traditions with, in his opinion, more egalitarian 
and modern Western customs, and called on high-ranking colonial and Java-
nese ocials to lead by example to accomplish progressive change. According 
to Goenawan, most young Javanese feared insults, public humiliation, or arbi-
trary retribution in the form of a ruined career if they spoke out. But through 
a friendly and benevolent attitude, inuential European and Javanese adminis-
trators could convey that they no longer required excessive deference from their 
subjects. In return, Goenawan assured his readers, the ocials would soon enjoy 
great popularity among the people.1
Goenawan’s eloquent piece—written at age seventeen, no less—was a spirited 
response to the unsuccessful implementation of a colonial government circular 
issued in 1904. Popularly known as the hormat circular (deference circular), the 
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edict prohibited European civil servants from insisting on or accepting tradi-
tional Javanese deference in their interactions with their indigenous counter-
parts and subjects. Young Javanese like Goenawan received the decree with great 
enthusiasm, as they no longer wanted to approach Europeans in a crouching 
walk, sit on the oor in their presence, make gestures of respect a
er speaking, 
and conform to the Javanese language hierarchy. However, conservative Euro-
pean civil servants simply ignored these instructions from the more progressive 
central authorities, as they believed that the Javanization of colonial authority 
was essential for maintaining peace and order. Even when these instructions 
were repeated in additional hormat circulars in 1906 and 1909, conservative re-
sistance persisted. Disillusioned with this protracted change, Goenawan later 
wrote, “Sweet was the dream, bitter the awakening.”2
e hormat circulars were a vital part of the Ethical Policy, the Dutch equiv-
alent of the civilizing mission ideology that from 1901 onward sought to mod-
ernize colonial rule. Like the British “white man’s burden” and French “mis-
sion civilisatrice,” the Ethical Policy was based on the presumption that with 
Western superiority, rooted in scientic and technological prowess, came the 
moral obligation to civilize and improve the welfare of the allegedly stagnant, 
backward, and indolent colonized peoples. is idea was reected in educa-
tional policies, agricultural reforms, and a modernized rationalization of colo-
nial governance. In this context, the hormat circulars were meant to adapt the 
nineteenth-century Javanized performance of colonial authority to this more 
modern civilizing script. However, this civilizing mission ideology contained an 
inherent contradiction: while the Dutch believed they had an ethical responsi-
bility to civilize the colonized, they simultaneously accepted Social Darwinist 
beliefs about race, which precluded the possibility that the colonized could ever 
reach the colonizer’s level of civilization, let alone become truly equal. ese par-
adoxical perspectives divided colonial policy makers, ocials, and civil servants, 
resulting in a discrepancy between more emancipatory theory and conservative 
practice regarding colonial rule.3
Although the hormat circular of 1904 did not lead to an immediate overhaul 
of the outward appearance of colonial authority, it did encourage and facilitate 
a more assertive mentality among Goenawan and his peers. is generation of 
young, educated Javanese came of age attending government schools for indig-
enous doctors, teachers, and administrators.4 In addition to their educational 
training, here they learned that colonial subjecthood was a shared experience. 
For instance, for Goenawan, the reading table at his medical school was the 
cradle of the national awakening. It was there, in their free evening hours, that 
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he and other students read and discussed newspapers providing them a window 
to the world. ey were inspired by the rise of Japan as an imperial power, social 
change in China, and anticolonial movements in British India. During their 
discussions they also realized that regardless of their own backgrounds, they all 
faced humiliating deference expectations and racial prejudice in their everyday 
lives. “In the streetcar, the train, or on the football eld,” Goenawan recalled, 
they were reminded that “the native had no real value other than as an object 
to wipe one’s shoes with.”5 e rapid emancipation of the Chinese in colonial 
Indonesia further exacerbated their distress. As they founded associations and 
schools to advocate for their interests and demanded that Europeans treat them 
with more respect, the Chinese explicitly distanced themselves from the indig-
enous population, some even demanding traditional deference. rough these 
experiences, Goenawan and his peers became increasingly aware that if the col-
onized did not stand up for themselves, nobody would.6
By issuing and supporting the hormat circular, the colonial government cre-
ated a space in which hegemonic public conduct and the colonial relationship in 
general were permissible topics for public discussion. Goenawan’s opinion piece 
illustrates this perfectly, as the hormat circular provided him and his cohort with 
the opportunity to be critical, express their disconte nt, and demand emancipa-
tory change. His writing exuded self-condence, challenging the premise of the 
Javanization of colonial authority and disputing that Javanese compliance with 
traditional deference rituals was tantamount to consent. By revealing the veiled 
mentality of the colonized, Goenawan showed that the Javanese did not regard 
colonial authority with respect, but with fear. In doing so, he exposed what 
James Scott has described as the hidden transcript or the ostage critique of 
hegemonic power, in eect undermining the public transcript or the hegemonic 
display of power and consent.7 e youthful medical student personied the new 
generation of educated colonial subjects who believed in progress, demanded 
respect, sought to break with repressive traditions, and wanted to organize them-
selves to achieve these goals. While not yet ready in 1905, within a decade this 
new generation would drastically disrupt the colonial performance of power.8
e turn of the twentieth century was a transformative period of social and 
cultural change in the history of colonial Indonesia, as these educated young 
Javanese joined progressive European authorities in contesting the enduring 
system of Dutch dominance and attempting to implement the Ethical Policy. 
Opposing their eorts were conservative European civil servants and the Java-
nese priyayi, who argued for the necessity of maintaining the status quo. is 
conict was not merely an ideological struggle for hegemony, but one reected 
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and expressed in material culture and outward appearance. As the ocial ide-
ology justifying colonial domination changed, there emerged an opportunity 
to redene assumptions about social and racial relations as expressed through 
rituals regarding etiquette, dress, and language that regulated public conduct. It 
was under these unique circumstances that the colonized could demand a more 
active role in the colonial performance.
Turn-of-the-Century Transformations
During the nineteenth century, the Dutch rmly embedded themselves in Java-
nese society through a process of cultural appropriation that legitimized their 
authority. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, rapid technological 
innovation, evolutionary thinking, shi
ing demographics, the emergence and 
intensication of a Dutch civilizing mission, and the nascent national awak-
ening began to challenge and nally transform this complex system of domi-
nance. ese developments resulted in greater European control over the col-
ony, increased belief in Western superiority, and a growing emphasis on racial 
segregation in colonial society. e implementation of the Ethical Policy in 1901 
was of particular importance to these outcomes. On the one hand, it provided 
the Dutch with a new discourse to legitimize colonial authority by emphasizing 
their relative modernity and civilization vis-à-vis the indigenous population. 
Consequently, those with this perspective rejected the profound cultural hy-
bridity of the nineteenth century as a form of degeneration. On the other hand, 
the Ethical Policy created the conditions for the development of an indigenous 
nationalist movement, which became highly critical of the feudal aspects of the 
colonial relationship.
During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, technological in-
novations in transportation and communication greatly reduced the relative 
distance between the Netherlands and Java, enhancing colonial control and ex-
ploitation. For instance, the invention of steamships together with the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869 decreased the duration of the voyage from Amster-
dam to Batavia from four months to a mere six weeks. By the mid-1880s, two 
large shipping companies—the Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland and the 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd—succeeded in establishing a weekly connection between 
the metropole and the new deep-sea harbor in Tanjung Priok, near Batavia.9 Al-
most simultaneously, steam engines revolutionized overland travel with the con-
struction of a railroad track between Semarang and Yogyakarta in 1873. Within 
decades, an extensive railroad network connected Java’s large cities and towns 
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and opened up the island’s mountainous interior. Steam power did not remain 
the sole alternative to animal power for long, however; by 1899, the streetcars of 
Batavia operated on electricity, while the introduction of the automobile in 1900 
further enabled European travel throughout its prized colonial possession.10
Technological advances also facilitated a more distinctively Western lifestyle 
in the tropics. Innovations in communications technology, most notably the 
telegraph (1870) and telephone (1929) but also the radio (1919), enabled Euro-
peans to stay connected with friends and family and remain informed about 
developments at home. Technological progress also allowed for the proliferation 
of the latest European fashions, either imported in their nished state or created 
locally from designs and products from the continent. Department stores sprang 
up oering the latest European merchandise, including canned goods and less 
perishable foods such as cheeses, alcoholic beverages, cigars, and cigarettes. e 
rapid acquisition of electrical equipment, such as stoves, fans, lights, and radios, 
created a more hygienic and European household in a tropical environment. For 
many, these technological developments did not just enable the Europeanization 
of colonial society but were presented as evidence of European superiority.11
Developments in the biological and medical sciences were also employed to 
conrm and explain alleged Western superiority. e most obvious example 
was the application of Charles Darwin’s revolutionary concept of evolution to 
human societies, known as Social Darwinism. When discoveries in the eld 
of medical science excluded the possibility that non-Western people belonged 
to a dierent species than Europeans, a variety of evolutionary explanations 
were formulated to explain the West’s supposed cultural, intellectual, and even 
physical dominance over those they had colonized. A popular concept in the 
Netherlands, and among colonial powers in general, was that there were vari-
ous evolutionary stages of societal development and that Europeans had simply 
progressed to a more advanced stage. Indigenous societies were thus perceived as 
distant mirrors of an early, medieval self, passing through an evolutionary phase 
that Europeans had le
 behind centuries ago. A prominent member of Dutch 
parliament summarized this perspective as follows: “What the natives are now, 
we once were; what we are now, they will once become.”12 A strong sense of 
paternalism permeated this evolutionary discourse, characterizing indigenous 
peoples as immature children that required European parental support for their 
own benet.13
Climate was considered the determining factor behind these distinct stages 
of evolutionary development. While the moderate European climate allegedly 
stimulated intellectual and technological advancement, a hot and humid tropical 
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environment was thought to delay civilization’s progress. Although this belief 
was largely discredited by the end of the nineteenth century, in part by Dutch 
Nobel Prize winner Christiaan Eijkman, climatologic factors were still thought 
to produce lazy, uncreative, and superstitious people. Such climatic determinism 
implied that Europeans who tried to acclimatize to the tropics would inevitably 
adopt some of these character traits and regress on the evolutionary scale. To 
prevent degeneration, Europeans not only sought protection against the heat but 
also reevaluated their use of cultural accommodation as a means of acclimating 
to the local environment. Since they considered indigenous people and their cul-
tures to be backward, such inuence on Europeans’ lives should be minimized. 
us, evolutionary and climatological determinism fostered the Europeaniza-
tion as well as the segregation of colonial society.14
e opening of the colony for private enterprise in 1870 following the aboli-
tion of the Cultivation System attracted a large number of Europeans who used 
recent technological advances to maintain a European lifestyle, resist cultural 
accommodation, and avoid degeneration as much as possible. In part, this was 
in response to civil servants’ dominance in colonial society. Initially comprising 
more than half of the professional population (in both government and military 
service), European civil servants regarded their right to indigenous displays of 
deference as a particular source of pride.15 By 1900, however, the majority of 
the European population worked in nongovernmental jobs, such as planters, 
lawyers, physicians, and journalists, and managerial personnel at mining compa-
nies, trade houses, and banks. In addition, the nature of government employ had 
changed with the addition of civil engineers, architects, and medical personnel 
to its ranks.16
Overall, the size and composition of the European population changed 
drastically at the turn of the century. Spread out over the archipelago, the total 
number of people with European status was 43,876 in 1860. In Java alone, this 
number had increased to 54,511 (38 percent women) by 1890 and 192,571 (47 
percent women) by 1930. In the same period, the indigenous population of Java, 
which had only totaled 4.5 million in 1815, expanded from 12.5 million in 1860 
to 23.6 million in 1890 to 40.9 million in 1930.17 Between 1890 and 1920, the in-
crease in European women (300 percent) was greater than that of men (200 per-
cent).18 Alongside the mixed marriage law of 1898, which stipulated that women 
assume the legal status of their spouse, the immigration of European women 
resulted in greater gender balance in Java’s colonial society. Some historians have 
argued, almost nostalgically, that the increased presence of European women 
led to the destruction of a harmonious nineteenth-century colonial society. 
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However, as Frances Gouda has convincingly argued, the decision to allow 
women to enter the colony was purposefully designed by the colonial authorities 
to create a stronger European community. Even so, indigenous inuences were 
never far o, especially considering that by 1930 only 21 percent of all women 
with European status were born in Europe. Until the end of colonial rule, the 
combined locally born European and Eurasian population would remain far 
greater than that of European immigrants.19
Taken together, these technological, economic, and demographic changes as 
well as the evolutionary racism that supported the belief in Western superiority 
led to the Dutch equivalent of a civilizing mission. roughout the nineteenth 
century, there had been occasional moral objections to exploiting the indigenous 
people of Java for the sole benet of the Netherlands, but it was not until the 
end of the century that this criticism was more generally acknowledged among 
the Dutch. is new perspective on the colonial relationship was famously ar-
ticulated by lawyer C. . van Deventer, who argued that the Netherlands had 
a “debt of honor” to fulll in the Indies. Likewise, journalist P. Brooshoo
 pro-
posed an “ethical direction in colonial policy” aimed at developing and civilizing 
the indigenous people of the Netherlands Indies and creating a form of limited 
self-government under Dutch patronage.20 Finally, in 1901, this change of heart 
regarding the colonial relationship was ocially announced in the queen’s an-
nual speech, in which she stated that the Netherlands had a “moral duty” toward 
the people of the Indies.
e Ethical Policy, however, was not a clearly dened set of policies, but rather 
a new general outlook on the colonial relationship. A broad array of initiatives 
fell under its umbrella, such as enhancing the socioeconomic condition of indig-
enous people, making Western education more widely available and accessible, 
empowering the role of the colonized in the colonial administration, providing 
a limited extension of democratic institutions, and improving infrastructure, 
public sanitation and health, and irrigation systems. Many of these develop-
ments were both benecial to indigenous people and highly protable to Dutch 
entrepreneurs and the colonial government. From the outset, this aspect raised 
questions about the intentions behind the Ethical Policy among both European 
and Javanese progressives.21
As the historiography of colonialism has demonstrated, the moral burden 
of civilizing allegedly less developed peoples provided Westerners with a justi-
cation for their continued colonial enterprises.22 On Java, the Ethical Policy 
oered a new hegemonic ideology to legitimize Dutch rule that was strikingly 
dierent from its nineteenth-century predecessor rooted in Javanese aristocratic 
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traditions. In fact, the contrasts between the two discourses could not have been 
greater: Javanization, feudalism, and autocratic rule were to be replaced with 
Europeanization, modernity, and democratic principles. However, although 
the Dutch and colonial governments supported the new hegemonic discourse, 
the Ethical Policy faced serious criticism from European civil servants and Java-
nese aristocrats on the ground in Java. Consequently, replacing one hegemonic 
discourse with another was far more complicated than anticipated. Moreover, 
the nascent Indonesian nationalist movement—in part a result of the Ethical 
Policy—produced its own hegemonic ideology, starting a erce ideological com-
petition that only made the social and political climate in Java more complex.
e Ethical Policy and indigenous national awakening in the Netherlands In-
dies did not develop in isolation from global events. e Spanish-American War 
of 1898 that resulted in the United States’ annexation of the Philippines served 
as either a cautionary tale or hopeful example of how a colonial power could be 
ousted by a modern and progressive rival, depending on one’s perspective. In a 
sense, the American presence in Southeast Asia forced the Netherlands to follow 
its civilizing example.23 Around the same time, the Chinese community in the 
Indies joined the growing opposition to the Qing dynasty, and the successful 
revolution of 1911 fueled a renewed sense of Chinese identity and nationalism, 
oering another example for the nascent Indonesian nationalist movement.24
Nationalists also looked toward British India for inspiration, pondering the in-
creased participation in the civil service and the establishment of the Indian 
National Congress. Japan attracted the most attention, however, as rapid indus-
trialization and development following the Meji Restoration of 1868 reached 
a symbolic conclusion with the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904–1905. Taken together, these Asian nations provided poignant examples 
that shaped both young nationalists’ and Dutch colonizers’ attitudes toward 
the future.25
In addition to inspiring the younger generation of Javanese ideologically, the 
promulgation of the Ethical Policy also accelerated the transformation of a seg-
ment of the priyayi from an elite class rooted in tradition and hereditary to one 
based on modernity and education. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the colonial state had established schools to provide their growing administra-
tion with cheap, Western-educated, indigenous labor.26 However, while the pri-
yayi class expanded in conjunction with the general population as Java moved 
toward the twentieth century, the number of administrative posts remained by 
and large the same. As a consequence, an increasing number of educated lower 
priyayi was forced to seek work outside the administrative civil service, either 
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in dierent government employ or in the private sector. Beginning in 1870 and 
especially with the Ethical Policy, the colonial state grew exponentially and 
began to rely on educated labor for, among other things, its pawnshop service, 
people’s credit system, opiumregie (sale and production of opium), state railways, 
and postal, telephone, and telegraph services. Similarly, the liberalization of the 
colonial economy oered work opportunities for Western-educated priyayi in 
areas like agriculture, factories, and nance. is new group, who also worked 
as clerks, teachers, doctors, engineers, and overseers, comprised the majority of 
people who would become active in the nascent nationalist movement.27
During the rst two decades of the twentieth century, this Western-educated 
indigenous elite emerged as the new middle class in colonial society. eirs was a 
hybrid world between East and West. As students and professionals, they partic-
ipated in a Western sphere in which they dressed like Europeans, spoke Dutch, 
read European literature, listened and danced to Western music, watched the 
latest Hollywood movies in theaters, and played European sports.28 At the same 
time, considering the priyayi background of most of these intellectuals, they 
were also rooted in indigenous society with their own languages, social cus-
toms, and cultural performances. It was their challenge to combine these expe-
riences—East and West—in their endeavor for kemajuan (progress), for which 
the notion of modernity was key. According to historian Takashi Shiraishi, this 
new elite strove for modernity as exemplied by the Dutch in particular and by 
Western civilization in general.29 However, they disagreed on how to achieve 
it as well as if or how it would incorporate indigenous culture and religion and 
what the Dutch role would be in a modern state.
e proliferation of opinions on how to move through an age of progress 
to achieve modernity was reected in the diversity of associations established 
within the nationalist movement. Some of these associations emphasized ethnic 
identities and interests; others focused more on religious values, ideologies, or 
secular principles. To complicate matters further, certain associations were po-
litically oriented while others were mainly cultural, and some included elements 
of both.30 As a consequence, it is dicult to speak of one distinct and teleologi-
cal nationalist movement. Instead, it is better characterized as a broad national 
awakening reected in an abundance of indigenous associations.31 Depending 
on their outlook—ethnic, religious, ideological, secular—these associations for-
mulated their own hegemonic ideologies as alternatives to, and in competition 
with, that of the European colonizer.
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Ethical Shi
s and the Hormat Debate
By the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch ocials and civil servants stood 
at the apex of the colonial social hierarchy and enjoyed a privileged lifestyle on 
Java. rough the Javanization of colonial authority, these ocials constantly 
reminded both the Javanese and European inhabitants of their inferior social 
ranks and positions. Deference rituals were arguably the most visible and sen-
sitive Dutch adaptations of Javanese aristocratic culture, encompassing social 
behavior, dress codes, a stratied language system, honoric titles, regulations 
regarding an ocial’s entourage, and other symbols of power. e Javanese were 
required to treat Dutch ocials as they would their own aristocracy—to ap-
proach them in a crouching walk ( jongkok), sit cross-legged on the ground (sila) 
in their presence, and place their hands together while bringing their thumbs to 
the upper lip (sembah) a
er speaking. e colonized also had to address colo-
nial ocials as kanjeng tuan, meaning “great lord,” and observe strict language 
protocols, speaking to their superiors in high Javanese (krama) while he or she 
responded in low Javanese (ngoko). In addition, European residents were accom-
panied by a plethora of servants, one of whom carried a golden payung as a sym-
bol of his power—historically the sole privilege of Javanese royalty. e ocial 
residency houses on Java also radiated a sense of prestige, with Roman columns 
on their verandas that gave them a Western appearance but featured architec-
tural adaptations of the Javanese pendopo (open pavilion).32
Some Javanese traditions were not so much copied as they were reinvented 
by Dutch civil servants. For example, the Javanese aristocracy organized cere-
monial festivities around family members’ births, circumcisions, marriages, and 
deaths—ceremonies that were crucial for communicating power. e Garebeg 
Puasa celebration at the end of Ramadan is a prime example. To commemorate 
the conclusion of the fasting period, a bupati would proceed to a mosque in pro-
cession with his payung, a
er which he would hold court. Here, lower bureau-
crats asked the bupati’s forgiveness for their shortcomings throughout the year by 
approaching him with a low crouching walk, making the sembah, and perform-
ing a knee kiss (sungkem).33 Inspired by the Garebeg Puasa, the Dutch hosted a 
similar court session on New Year’s Day during which Javanese civil servants and 
village headmen paid their respects to their Dutch superiors. In the words of one 
Dutch ocial, this was a yearly “Day of Reconciliation” between European civil 
servants and their Javanese subjects.34 However, with the absence of the tradi-
tional kawula-gusti relationship conveying mutual respect and responsibility, the 
Dutch ceremony was merely an elaborate performance of subservience.
58 chapter 2
Javanese language stratication was an essential component of the deference 
rituals upholding the colonial hierarchy. It was customary for a person of high 
rank to address his or her social inferiors in ngoko (low Javanese) and to receive a 
reply in krama (high Javanese).35 According to colonial advisor for native aairs 
G. A. J. Hazeu, who was also a scholar and linguist, the subdivision of both 
language types was so highly rened that “all nuances of rank of a feudal soci-
ety could be expressed therein.”36 e Dutch therefore consciously adopted the 
Javanese language stratication to legitimize their position as rulers. With the 
exception of high-ranking indigenous ocials, such as bupati (regent) and patih
(viceregent), all Javanese were to address Dutch ocials in krama and expect a 
reply in ngoko. However, by the turn of the century, as an increasing number of 
Javanese aristocrats received a Western education which included learning the 
Dutch language, a signicant addition was made to the colonial language hier-
archy. European ocials now addressed Western-educated Javanese in Dutch, 
although they still required that their reply be in krama. Remarkably, Dutch re-
placed low Javanese in these conversations, despite ngoko’s status as an “inferior” 
language. However, it simply would not do for the Dutch to speak ngoko to the 
Javanese and have them answer in Dutch.37
Europeans’ refusal to converse in Dutch with their indigenous colleagues in 
the civil service (in contrast, for example, to practices in French Indochina) was 
the topic of many spirited debates in the decades surrounding 1900. Knowledge 
of the Dutch language brought with it a certain level of social prestige. In a 
sense, it allowed indigenous speakers to distance themselves from traditional 
society and achieve more equal footing with Europeans. As early as 1890, the 
government encouraged European civil servants to communicate in Dutch with 
their Western-educated indigenous counterparts, but the fear of losing respect 
and weakening colonial rule prevented many from adhering to this circular. In-
stead, they demanded compliance with the traditional Javanese language strati-
cation, albeit with modications for including the Dutch language. e fear of 
oending Dutch civil servants was still too great, even for high-status Javanese 
aristocrats, to challenge the social order and request observance of the circular.38
Despite this fear, increased rumblings of discontent with hormat etiquette 
began to permeate indigenous society. Some Javanese regarded the Dutch em-
phasis on their own prestige as a “ridiculous spectacle” worthy of mockery but 
at the same time resented their adoption of Javanese deference customs to which 
traditionally only Javanese rulers were entitled.39 In 1899, an anonymous author 
pointed out that the Dutch reliance on Javanese symbols of authority actually 
came at the Javanese aristocracy’s expense, as they had been steadily losing their 
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own power. e author was particularly bothered by the propensity of lower 
Dutch civil servants—whom he regarded as petty kings—for demanding defer-
ence from lower Javanese aristocrats, maintaining that it was they, not the Dutch, 
who had the traditional right to hormat.40 Signaling this author’s concern, an 
1893 report submitted by the bupati of Demak, named Hadiningrat, reected 
the changing balance of power between the indigenous and Dutch branches of 
the colonial civil service. Hadiningrat argued that during the last decades of 
the nineteenth century, the Javanese branch had lost considerable prestige in 
the eyes of the Javanese people and Europeans alike. is was due to the general 
population’s increased direct contact with European civil servants, who, unlike 
their Javanese counterparts, maintained high educational standards. Alongside 
the highly educated Dutch in their midst, indigenous civil servants appeared 
far less formidable and authoritative. To compensate for their reduced power, 
Hadiningrat believed, many indigenous civil servants demanded more deference 
from Javanese people while showing more to their European superiors. Hadin-
ingrat argued that only instituting more Western-style education could remedy 
this imbalance and bring real prestige back to the indigenous civil service.41
ere were also Dutch colonial civil servants who opposed the use of Javanese 
deference rituals. One of the earliest challengers was H. E. Steinmetz, a young 
controller who was well aware of the pervasive deference practices on Java. In a 
book he wrote under a pseudonym in 1888, he severely criticized European civil 
servants’ behavior toward their Javanese subordinates, specically their abuse 
of hormat etiquette. Steinmetz sarcastically described the rst years of a civil 
servant’s career as the “hormat period,” a time when he was most susceptible to 
acquiring a taste for Javanese deference rituals. It was not surprising then, he 
argued, that young civil servants quickly learned to be “angered when an indige-
nous person passes him or his house without uncovering his head nor dismounts 
his horse; when a lower ranking civil servant dares to address him in Malay; a 
wedana or tax collector enters his home with footwear, etc.”42 Early in his career, 
Steinmetz noticed that many Javanese considered it humiliating to engage in 
such deference, especially toward Europeans. He believed that this was because, 
as cultural outsiders, Europeans did not fully understand their role in hormat
etiquette—that the reception of deference required a certain approachable atti-
tude in return. According to Javanese tradition, deference was an expression of 
the principle of kawula-gusti. In the absence of reciprocity, the etiquette repre-
senting this relationship lost its value.
In essence, Steinmetz argued that the nineteenth-century policy of cultural 
adaptation to legitimize colonial authority had either failed, or worse, had never 
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worked in the rst place. He asserted that continued use of hormat etiquette 
was degrading, time-consuming, and did little to further European prestige. To 
those who believed that Dutch colonial rule depended on Javanese deference 
and status symbols, he retorted that they should worry more about the Dutch 
propensity to live with indigenous concubines, alcoholism, and godlessness. In 
his opinion, those habits were far more detrimental to colonial authority than a 
lack of hormat etiquette would be. Moreover, he cautioned that failure to mod-
ernize the colonial relationship made the Dutch more vulnerable to Javanese 
civil servants’ manipulation, who, by showing exaggerated hormat, could try 
to improve their career opportunities. Steinmetz therefore proposed that the 
colonial government prohibit European civil servants from demanding tradi-
tional deference and using Javanese status symbols. However, in 1888 few were 
receptive to the young ocial’s radical plea.43
is changed in the following decade, when the rst appointed Advisor for 
Native Aairs Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje joined Steinmetz’s cause. Origi-
nally trained in the Netherlands as an Arabic and Islamic scholar, Snouck Hur-
gronje found his way to the colonies a
er a research visit to Mecca. He believed 
that understanding Islam in general and local cultures specically could improve 
the eectiveness of Dutch colonial policy. His inaugural post as advisor for na-
tive aairs, which he held from 1898 until 1907, reected his ideas and the chang-
ing times. Crucially, the Oce of Native Aairs enjoyed a direct and personal 
connection with the governor general, independent from the Department of the 
Interior, which was responsible for the conservative civil service. e advisor’s 
role was twofold; namely, to serve as a barometer of the indigenous population’s 
distress and to advise the governor general in that regard. Moreover, the advisor 
acted as a government liaison for the growing number of “educated natives.” 
Snouck Hurgronje personally tutored several young Javanese of high birth and 
provided them with a Western education. Most of his students went on to hold 
prominent positions in colonial society in the following decades.44
As advisor, Snouck Hurgronje drew attention to a contradiction within colo-
nial policy: the government’s continued reliance on Javanese forms of deference 
while seeking to modernize the colonial relationship. A
er almost a century of 
indirect rule, many Javanese traditions regarding rank, titles, entourages, social 
deference rituals, and the like had become outdated as well as dicult to main-
tain due to shi
ing historical circumstances. Technological, political, social, and 
economic changes resulted in a society that was rapidly losing its harmony with 
time-honored aristocratic customs. Yet to Snouck Hurgronje’s dismay, Dutch 
civil servants clung to the notion that deference etiquette not only remained 
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relevant but was indispensable for upholding colonial authority. ese diver-
gent perceptions led to growing tensions between various social groups, old and 
new, in colonial society. It was not until the promulgation of the Ethical Policy 
in 1901, however, that there was nally enough political support to attempt to 
resolve these dualistic policies and modernize the outward appearance of colo-
nial rule.45
roughout the period of the Ethical Policy, it was the Oce of Native 
Aairs that took the initiative in dismantling the Javanese aristocratic façade 
of Dutch colonial rule. For instance, in 1903, Snouck Hurgronje advised the 
governor general to prohibit European civil servants’ use of large retinues while 
touring their districts. ese honorary retinues, he argued, were a waste of time 
and money, and had no purpose other than fullling the European desire for 
display. He oered the example of a resident who required that his retinue of 
Javanese dignitaries run a
er his carriage. Several elderly Javanese had to beg 
his forgiveness, as they could not keep up.46 Snouck Hurgronje proposed that 
the use of retinues for high-ranking civil servants when touring in a carriage be 
prohibited, and that an escort of Javanese civil servants only be required when 
their presence had an actual purpose. Four months later, his proposal became 
an ocial government circular that banned escorts and honorary retinues for 
European civil servants. It was the rst sign of changes yet to come.47
e onset of the Ethical Policy as well as Snouck Hurgronje’s presence in-
spired Steinmetz to argue for abolishing Javanese deference rituals and status 
symbols once again. Despite the 1888 publication of his censorious book, Stein-
metz had successfully risen through the hierarchy of the colonial civil service 
and was eventually appointed president of the Diminished Welfare Committee. 
Founded in 1904, the committee was an institutional icon of the Ethical Policy, 
tasked with examining the causes of poverty and recommending solutions in 
Java. It was in this context that Steinmetz ocially proposed barring European 
ocials from demanding traditional Javanese deference, titles, honors, and ser-
vitude; in other words, that hormat abuses be eliminated.48 Snouck Hurgronje 
concurred and, in a letter to the governor general, argued that the broadening 
horizons of the modern age, due to improved modes of transport and commu-
nication, had laid bare the backwardness of Javanese hormat etiquette. Citing 
Japan and Siam (ailand) as models of more modernized Asian societies, he 
insisted that hormat culture be replaced with less outdated forms of deference.49
Just a few days a
er taking oce, Governor General Van Heutsz received 
Steinmetz and Snouck Hurgronje’s recommendations.50 Van Heutsz immedi-
ately addressed his advisors’ concerns, convinced that colonial authority should 
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no longer depend on Javanese symbols of power and traditional deference. With 
military decisiveness, he signed and promulgated two circulars in November 
1904 with the intention of modernizing the relationship between the European 
civil service and Javanese society, and colonial rule more broadly. e rst, the 
so-called payung circular, prohibited European civil servants’ use of payung, 
which was followed by the more expansive hormat circular prohibiting most 
other forms and rituals of deference.51 In his private correspondence with Minis-
ter of Colonial Aairs Idenberg, Van Heutsz boasted that with the stroke of his 
pen, he had banned European civil servants from demanding traditional Java-
nese deference, surrounding themselves with large retinues of Javanese subjects, 
being received and honored with triumphal arches and reworks, and, crucially, 
from carrying a golden payung as a symbol of their power.52 In short, Van Heutsz 
had launched an almost all-encompassing attack against what he described as 
the “foolishness” of the nineteenth-century colonial order.
e language of the hormat circular of 1904 revealed both Van Heutsz and 
Snouck Hurgronje’s underlying concerns and beliefs regarding the future de-
velopment of the colony. e circular explicitly stated that more contemporary 
international forms of respect should replace traditional Javanese deference in 
order to stimulate increased participation in the modern world. According to 
the circular, traditional hormat etiquette was outdated, time-consuming, and 
humiliating for those whose sense of dignity had just been awakened, foremost 
the Western-educated Javanese. Moreover, it was counterproductive to the nec-
essary development of trust between colonizer and colonized. In a sense, the 
circular intended to align the exterior appearance of colonial rule with the 
more modern administrative institutions and developments encapsulated by 
the Ethical Policy. Consequently, the hormat circular articulately challenged 
the nineteenth-century belief that Javanese traditions were necessary to legiti-
mize colonial authority: “It is a false notion indeed to think that the authority, 
through simplication of indigenous social formalities, would be endangered 
and that maintenance of customs such as appearing before superiors without 
footwear, sitting on the oor, accompanying discussions with sembah etc. would 
involve an interest of state.”53 is was a judiciously worded warning to those 
who maintained that the circular would diminish European prestige and colo-
nial authority.
Nonetheless, the hormat circular of 1904 le
 conservative detractors some 
wiggle room, since it stated that the process of change should be most strongly 
encouraged in areas of modern development (e.g., urban settings), thus excusing 
most of colonial Java from urgent and strict implementation.54 In addition, in 
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the Netherlands Indies, circulars were instructions that fell somewhere between 
strong advice and binding laws. is meant that compliance was expected but 
most of the time not monitored or enforced by the colonial government. Instead, 
ocials depended on local civil service representatives to execute their directives. 
Consequently, with respect to circulars, the theory and practice of colonial rule 
could be miles apart. Snouck Hurgronje acknowledged as much in 1904, stating, 
“e lips of a civil servant fold into a smile when pronouncing the word ‘circu-
lar.’”55 us, the promulgation of multiple government circulars challenged the 
aristocratic character of colonial society, but by no means signied its end.
Progressive eory, Conservative Reality
e payung and hormat circulars of 1904 triggered a erce debate in colonial so-
ciety that lasted until the end of Dutch rule. Although the new and progressive 
Ethical Policy had its advocates, its opponents were far more prominent in both 
the civil service and the colonial press—a point clearly illustrated by contrasting 
editorials in colonial newspapers. Among the few who applauded the governor 
general’s decision to prohibit hormat and the payung was the editor of the largest 
European newspaper in Surabaya. He argued that as long as hormat kept the Ja-
vanese stuck in past traditions, it would be impossible to upli
 them into strong, 
self-consciously economical individuals. More importantly, he stated, colonial 
rule should not be based on traditional Javanese deference, but on the virtue and 
moral superiority of the colonizer. In other words, he interpreted the circulars as 
measures to redene the grounds of cultural hegemony in the colony.56
In stark contrast, the editor of Semarang’s largest newspaper completely re-
jected his colleague’s reasoning, perceiving the circulars, and the Ethical Policy 
in general, as severe threats to the existence of the Netherlands Indies. In his 
opinion, the Javanized appearance of Dutch colonial rule was absolutely essential 
to maintain peace and order. It ensured that the colonizer did “not provoke com-
plaints and resistance,” which enabled control over “the numerically far larger 
indigenous population.”57 Abrupt changes to their style of rule, he cautioned, 
could force authorities to become more reliant on coercion. Representing the 
conservative argument, he insisted that hormat etiquette and the payung were 
essential parts of the Javanese social fabric that could not be so easily discarded. 
e editor of Batavia’s newspaper agreed, concisely summarizing, “Payungs are 
cheaper than bayonets and less cruel.”58
It was the prohibition of the payung, the nineteenth-century symbol of Dutch 
colonialism on Java, that conservatives in the colonial press especially lamented. 
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Colonial ocials felt robbed and humiliated by the governor general’s instruc-
tions. For them, the payung was not just a symbolic object but a physical exten-
sion of their authority, independently lled with power. To take away such a sig-
nicant entity was to seriously weaken the prestige and ability of the civil service. 
According to reports in the colonial press, the Javanese probably wondered if 
Van Heutsz had punished his civil servants. Others claimed that the Dutch had 
lost considerable respect and standing in the eyes of the colonized. What wor-
ried conservatives most was that Javanese civil servants were still entitled to their 
payung. In part, Dutch ocials were envious of their indigenous colleagues, but 
there were also serious concerns that without the golden payung of the resident, 
all ceremonial parasols would lose their importance. In other words, the Java-
nized system of colonial authority would collapse like a house of cards.59 While 
this was surely an exaggeration, several Javanese ocials, such as Bupati Achmad 
Djajadiningrat, decided to part with their own payung out of solidarity. How-
ever, Djajadiningrat was a pupil of Snouck Hurgronje, Western-educated, and 
therefore the exception rather than the rule. e indigenous civil service’s use 
of the payung would continue until it was ercely critiqued by the nationalist 
movement in the following decades.60
e anxiety surrounding the abolition of the payung was best captured in 
a nostalgic poem published in Batavia’s conservative newspaper. e opening 
stanza of the poem, titled “A Resident’s Farewell to His Payung,” described how 
the once-stately parasol suddenly degraded to the umbrella of a roasted peanut 
salesman.61 e poem portrayed the payung as the embodiment of colonial pres-
tige and order: a majestic and noble symbol of power. e Dutch author remi-
nisced about a time when a servant was proud to carry his payung, how people 
cheerfully honored it, and how ocial and payung were inseparable. e gilded 
emblem decorated his gallery, stood gracefully on his coach, and followed him 
as he paraded through Batavia. But no longer could the resident slumber in the 
payung’s protection nor count on its support. Without it, the author decried, 
“I could do nothing,” implying that deprived of the payung, European ocials 
lost their armor vis-à-vis the indigenous population of Java. is was the essence 
of the debate about the payung as well as hormat circulars: conservative Eu-
ropeans believed that without Javanese deference and symbols of power, they 
could no longer command authority in the colony as they had before. Instead, 
they assumed that colonial rule would revert to a reliance on the threat of co-
ercion. Governor General Van Heutsz was squarely blamed for putting colo-
nial authority in this perilous position as, according to the poem, the payung 
oated away, wreckage “on the currents of anti-hormat.” However, the circulars’ 
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advocates—propelling the “currents of anti-hormat” forward—dismissed their 
concerns as foolish, and argued that sincere morality and modernity were a 
much stronger basis for colonial rule.62
When news of the circulars reached the Netherlands, it was evident that they 
hit a nerve within the Dutch colonial community there, as well. In e Hague, 
Minister of Colonial Aairs Idenburg found himself confronted by many dis-
gruntled colonial veterans as well as civil service and military personnel, most 
of whom he characterized as conservatives. In a letter to Governor General Van 
Heutsz, Idenburg assured him that he fully supported the intent and content of 
the circulars, but conveyed that they had created many inuential enemies in 
the metropole. e Dutch press argued that the hormat circular in particular 
undermined an “important principle of Government.” Even Queen Wilhelmina 
reached out to Idenburg for an update on the sensitive issue. In their conversa-
tion, the minister of colonial aairs successfully convinced the Dutch queen that 
Van Heutsz’s measures were morally just, which was an essential component of 
the Ethical Policy she herself had announced in 1901. In order to answer ques-
tions regarding the issue in Parliament, Idenburg requested that Van Heutsz 
keep him as informed as possible.63 In his response, Van Heutsz thanked Iden-
burg for his support and posed a rhetorical question: who has more authority 
and prestige—those who rely on the payung or those who abolish it?64
In February 1906, Governor General Van Heutsz requested Snouck Hur-
gronje’s opinion on the eectiveness of the payung and hormat circulars. In his 
response, Snouck Hurgronje explained that the payung circular had been quite 
successful, as it concerned such a strong visual symbol that was hard to ignore. 
However, he considered the hormat circular an utter failure. Apparently, Eu-
ropean civil servants still demanded that their Javanese counterparts sit on the 
ground in the sila posture, present a sembah each time they spoke, and con-
verse according to the Javanese language hierarchy. Snouck Hurgronje there-
fore pressed Van Heutsz “that a renewed, strong inculcation of the intentions 
of the Government in this regard seems anything but redundant.”65 Van Heutsz 
concurred with his advisor and rather quickly issued a new hormat circular in 
April 1906.66
rough the hormat circular of 1906, Governor General Van Heutsz ex-
pressed his sincere discontent with the European civil service’s continued use 
of Javanese hormat etiquette. Civil servants who acted in accordance with the 
spirit of the circular were the exception instead of the rule, which resulted not 
only in the perseverance of the traditional character of colonial society, but also 
undermined the governor general’s authority. e new circular emphasized that 
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the days of the seigniorial civil servant were over and demanded that colonial 
ocials follow the orders of the central bureaucracy in Batavia. e circular also 
provided explicit examples of undesirable behavior, such as adhering to the Java-
nese language hierarchy. Furthermore, European civil servants were reminded 
that Javanese civil servants remained entitled to ceremonial payung, suggesting 
that their response to the payung circular had been to inappropriately force their 
indigenous counterparts to relinquish theirs, as well.67
But rather than establishing a reluctant consensus, the hormat circular of 
1906 exacerbated disagreements over the most eective approach to colonial 
rule. Within this debate, European civil servants represented those in favor of 
maintaining Javanese traditions, whereas central bureaucrats, such as the advisor 
for native aairs, advocated the Ethical Policy and modernization of the colo-
nial relationship. According to a conservative Batavian newspaper, this debate 
existed between “men of reality” (civil servants) and “men of theory” (Batavian 
bureaucrats like Van Heutsz and Snouck Hurgronje).68 e majority of the co-
lonial press as well as the European public in the colony concurred with the 
more “realistic” conservative position. Betraying their anxiety about the social 
changes that would accompany Javanese emancipation, they also argued that 
the disadvantages produced by a smaller Dutch population in Java was oset 
by Javanese mental weakness (that made them prone to submission).69 On the 
other hand, progressive European voices were not entirely absent from public 
discourse. Several authors argued that civil servants should stop obsessing over 
their prestige and alleged superiority and focus instead on actually serving the 
colonial community. Some mocked the ocials who clung to their payungs and 
wondered if they also wanted to convert to Islam, wear Javanese ethnic dress, 
and don a headscarf.70
It therefore came as no surprise that in the last year of Van Heutsz’s tenure, 
he was again forced to confront the persistent reality of European civil servants 
demanding deference from the Javanese. A
er reading in the newspapers about 
his own ocials’ continued deance of his orders, Van Heutsz reached out to 
the advisor for native aairs once more.71 G. A. J. Hazeu, who had replaced 
Snouck Hurgronje in 1907, conrmed that colonial ocials remained unwill-
ing to converse with civil servants and other educated Javanese in Dutch, fearing 
that they would consequently receive less traditional deference. To illustrate this 
point, Hazeu shared his experience during a visit to Cianjur (in western Java) 
in May 1907 during which he witnessed the local public prosecutor addressing 
the assistant resident in Sundanese while oering the sembah.72 When Hazeu 
later talked to the public prosecutor himself, he was surprised to learn that he 
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spoke uent Dutch.73 But by insisting on conversing in Sundanese, the assistant 
resident secured a more deferential attitude from the indigenous ocial. With 
hopes of nally eradicating these practices, Van Heutsz issued yet another hor-
mat circular in 1909, its language permeated with anger and disappointment. 
It stated bluntly that the governor general “can and will not allow that his clear 
orders be considered unwritten.”74 Civil servants who refused to comply with 
previous hormat circulars were threatened with dire consequences (although 
they remained undened).
Within six years, the third circular prompted another strong conservative 
rebuke toward the governor general. Civil servants felt cornered and mischar-
acterized by the accusations in the circulars, and two prominent ocials wrote 
condential letters to Van Heutsz to make their outrage known. In his letter, 
Resident Gonggrijp argued that the governor general was misinformed on the 
culture within the colonial civil service, either due to inexperience or malev-
olence—a not-so-indirect slight against past and present advisors for native 
aairs, whose ethical tendencies and inuence on colonial governance were a 
thorn in civil servants’ sides. Gonggrijp impressed on the governor general that 
in his twenty-ve years of service, he never disobeyed orders from the govern-
ment. European civil servants were not at fault; it was the Javanese themselves 
who prevented compliance with the circulars. According to Gonggrijp, Javanese 
civil servants simply refused to converse in Dutch with their European coun-
terparts, as they did not want to come across as impolite. He insisted that even 
a
er years of encouragement, his own public prosecutor still did not wish to 
speak with him in Dutch.75 In another private correspondence with Van Heutsz, 
Resident Boissevain echoed his colleague’s interpretation of aairs. He argued 
that a bupati in his residency put it best when he stated, “Javanese traditions and 
speaking Dutch do not go together.”76
e 1909 circular reected more clearly than its predecessors the progressive 
colonial elite’s frustration with the predominant conservatism among Europe-
ans in the colony. However, Residents Gonggrijp and Boissevain’s letters show 
that even in 1909, colonial civil servants rejected the assumptions within the 
Ethical Policy and blamed progressive ocials and the Javanese themselves for 
the unnecessary tension in society. ey urged the governor general to heed their 
advice before it was too late. Interestingly, there was no consensus among the Ja-
vanese elite about the proper role of deference in colonial society. While almost 
all wanted to end the custom of showing traditional respect to the colonizer, 
many conservative priyayi regarded these traditions as intrinsic to Javanese cul-
ture and identity. ey rightly feared that the more progressive young generation 
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wanted to also abolish these traditions from interactions among the Javanese. 
More conservatively inclined priyayi therefore emphasized hormat’s signicance 
for civilized conduct. To prevent social degeneration, the younger generation 
should be more, not less, respectful toward indigenous social superiors. ey rea-
soned that it was not humiliating for the Javanese to crouch or oer the sembah 
to their own ocials—those who truly understood the cultural signicance of 
these gestures.77 Some priyayi also accused progressive young Javanese of being 
hypocrites who argued in favor of abolishing hormat traditions from interac-
tions with their superiors but continued to exact deference from their inferiors.78
us, recognizing that the conservative pushback remained considerable, it be-
came clear that Dutch advocates for a modern colonial relationship needed help 
from like-minded Javanese.
e Hormat Circulars and the Indonesian National Awakening
e hormat debate between 1904 and 1909 coincided with the birth of an indige-
nous nationalist movement in the Indies. is was not accidental, since both can 
be considered consequences of the Ethical Policy. e emergence of the “young 
Javanese,” Western-educated and o
en employed in nontraditional professions, 
reignited the debate on Javanese deference traditions and changed its dynamic 
drastically. Whereas previously the question was to what extent Europeans could 
demand Javanese deference, the young Javanese questioned the pervasiveness of 
traditional deference as a whole. In other words, they did not just want to mod-
ernize interactions between Europeans and Javanese but among all members of 
society, just as older and more conservative priyayi warned. Interestingly, most 
of the young Javanese themselves originated from the privileged priyayi class, but 
as a result of their education and work outside the traditional civil service, many 
came to identify as a new class of intellectuals. Abdul Rivai, editor of the pop-
ular vernacular periodical Bintang Hindia (e Star of the Indies), dubbed this 
new generation the “kaum muda” (the young ones), whose desire to modernize 
Javanese society challenged that of the “kaum tua” (the old ones), who sought to 
preserve the status quo.79
Although the hormat circular of 1904 did not yield the anticipated overhaul 
of the appearance and performance of colonial authority, it had the unforeseen 
consequence of invigorating public discussion not only in colonial media, but 
also in the emerging vernacular press. Since the circular reected the govern-
ment’s “ethical” intentions, it allowed for a public critique of everything believed 
to hinder its implementation. e new generation of Javanese seized on this 
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opportunity to express their opinions forcefully and publicly. Goenawan’s arti-
cle, at the start of the chapter, perfectly exemplies this newfound mentality, his 
critique is representative of a broader change in attitude that stimulated many of 
his contemporaries to publish their opinions as well. Discussions of the hormat 
circular thus contributed signicantly to the emergence of what might tenta-
tively be called public opinion. It was an empowering and inspirational moment, 
as the colonized openly dared to criticize the colonizer and demand progress.80
e central tenet of Goenawan’s opinion piece in Java Bode, a progressive co-
lonial newspaper, was that hormat traditions had a demoralizing and obstructive 
inuence on Javanese intellectual and socioeconomic emancipation. He con-
structed his argument around the notion that deference customs should not be 
understood as enduring and essential elements of Javanese culture but instead as 
exible traditions that developed over time. Goenawan pointed out that contem-
porary deference rituals originated in the court culture of Java’s great kingdoms, 
during the Hindu-Buddhist era of the island’s history. But it was only under 
Dutch colonial rule that these customs were increasingly appropriated by both 
the European and indigenous civil services. us, contemporary bupati were 
addressed as royalty with the honoric Sampeyan-Dalem (Your Majesty) and 
received deference that was formerly the sole privilege of monarchs and sultans. 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, he continued, these customs 
became pervasive throughout civil service culture. His point was that just as 
easily these customs could be relaxed again. Adding yet another layer to his ar-
gument, Goenawan reasoned that deference etiquette was not merely a mental 
burden that communicated and instilled a sense of inferiority but also a physical 
one, as it gave the Javanese crooked legs from constantly sitting cross-legged on 
the oor. His hope that all Javanese would soon sit in chairs was thus as much 
about social emancipation as it was about public health.81
Unsurprisingly, Goenawan’s article was not well received by Batavia’s conser-
vative colonial newspaper, where it provoked a condescending rebuke by an au-
thor using the pseudonym Wongso, meaning “people” in Malay. Wongso wrote 
a regular column titled “Sketches of Javanese Life,” in which he explored the 
mysterious, primitive, and Eastern character of indigenous society for his Eu-
ropean readership. In response to Goenawan, he boldly claimed to have a more 
profound understanding of Javanese culture than the young student. He refuted 
Goenawan’s claims by arguing that Javanese deference traditions were not more 
time-consuming than shaking hands or taking o one’s hat. He claimed that 
deference did not explain the Javanese’s relative backwardness to Europeans 
and Chinese on Java; the Javanese were simply less entrepreneurial. Addressing 
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Goenawan’s point about crooked legs, Wongso posited that this was the result 
of being carried in a selendang (cloth baby carrier) too long. Finally, Wongso rid-
iculed Goenawan’s youthful iconoclasm, asserting that his arguments appeared 
to be about the right to sit in a chair. He warned Goenawan not to project his 
desires onto all Javanese. A mat was a beautiful piece of Javanese art in its own 
right. Who would exchange their culture for a piece of furniture? According to 
Wongso, such a proposition could only spring from “the mentality of someone 
who is on his way to denying their Javanese identity, on his way to renouncing 
his nationality—to being and to becoming neither indigenous, nor European, 
nor something else, but merely a hybrid.”82
In a striking display of condence, Goenawan wrote a scathing response in 
the colonial press. It was remarkable for a colonial subject to unabashedly re-
pudiate a colonizer in a public forum. Even more signicant was that Goen-
awan did so using his real identity, whereas the European Wongso hid behind a 
pseudonym. Goenawan was especially oended by Wongso’s childish claim that 
he had a more profound understanding of Javanese culture than a native-born 
Javanese. If Wongso truly wanted to know what it was like being Javanese, Goe-
nawan suggested that he dress in Javanese attire and try to purchase a train ticket 
while addressing the attendant in Dutch. Goenawan promised to let himself be 
skinned alive “if you are not rudely snubbed and are assisted in time.”83 None 
of this was just about the right to sit in a chair, to converse in Dutch, or to dress 
freely; it was about being treated with respect and equality. Goenawan blamed 
Wongso’s misconceptions on the ethnographic stereotypes created by European 
academics that portrayed the Javanese as docile and submissive—descriptions 
he rejected as reminiscent of “babies and toys.” Like Wongso, these scholars 
appreciated the Javanese as long as they remained “slaves to their traditions,” 
but once people like Goenawan expressed deviating desires, they were labeled 
inauthentic.84
From Wongso’s writing it is clear that he had not expected a public rebuke 
from a Javanese seventeen-year-old, but within a few weeks he retorted in kind. 
e author behind the pseudonym Wongso became more forceful in his writing, 
threatening even, as he tried to reestablish control over this deant colonial sub-
ject. Ignoring Goenawan’s invitation to dress as a Javanese, Wongso addressed 
the importance of the language hierarchy in colonial society. He asserted that it 
was only logical to converse in Javanese while in Java. European ocials, plant-
ers, and train station attendants all spoke Javanese or Malay with the indigenous 
population out of respect for local culture and traditions, not to emphasize their 
social superiority. Moreover, the Javanese should speak their own language in 
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their own country; doing so instilled in them a sense of self-worth and respect 
that no other language could provide. Wongso applied the same reasoning to 
deference and other cultural traditions, which were now being threatened by 
Goenawan’s iconoclasm and desire to become European. In times of economic 
hardship, Wongso concluded, such ideas were not only demoralizing, but also 
encouraged anarchy by taking away people’s self-respect and politeness.85
If conservative Europeans believed that they could silence Goenawan and 
other members of his generation, they were sorely mistaken. On the contrary, 
the release of the hormat circulars emboldened young Javanese to openly assert 
that they experienced their role in the colonial performance as humiliating, and 
they increasingly relied on the emerging vernacular press to voice their concerns. 
Rivai, editor of the richly illustrated biweekly Bintang Hindia, fully grasped the 
signicance of a vernacular platform to share and discuss ideas. While Rivai 
praised Goenawan for publishing his opinion in a premier colonial newspa-
per, he believed that the student should have addressed his important message 
directly to his own people to convince them of traditional deference customs’ 
harmful inuence. Rivai therefore decided to reprint Goenawan’s articles in the 
Bintang Hindia and provide them with additional commentary. Consequently, 
Goenawan’s public stando with a European journalist became widely known 
among the colonized.86 e Bintang Hindia was the rst vernacular publication 
to reach the whole of the indigenous elite (although it included Dutch articles, 
as well); it was read by government employees, students, and educated Javanese 
in private employ.87 But Rivai’s primary audience was what he called the kaum
muda: the new generation of Javanese that rejected outdated traditions and em-
braced modernity and Western knowledge without losing their own identity.88
e articles in Bintang Hindia clearly illustrate that the hormat circular of 
1904 signicantly transformed the nature of public debate in the vernacular 
press. As a government-subsidized, vernacular periodical, the Bintang Hindia
was in a unique position. Since it relied on government support, colonial au-
thorities expected articles to promote “ethical” ideals. As editor, Rivai needed to 
strike a balance between being informative, educational, and emancipatory, but 
not too radical or provocative. is balancing act is reected in articles on defer-
ence etiquette published before 1904, most of which oered uncritical accounts 
of its function in society. For example, one article emphasized the importance 
of showing traditional deference to one’s parents, ancestors, siblings, and the 
elderly in general. Interestingly, the author made no mention of the requirement 
to honor someone based on rank. In another, a teacher from Batavia explored the 
diverse ways in which dierent ethnic groups in colonial society pay respect. He 
72 chapter 2
explained that Europeans salute, Arabs take each other’s hands, Chinese bow to 
one another, and indigenous people crouch, sit on the oor, and oer the sembah 
a
er speaking. e author did remark that in Java’s large cities many indigenous 
people had begun to follow the European example, but neither article includes 
an explicit discussion of what this all meant, why Europeans received Javanese 
deference, or if these traditions hampered the emancipation of the colonized.89
However, the publication changed its standards for permissible content follow-
ing the dissemination of the payung and hormat circulars.
With the proclamation of the Ethical Policy as well as the hormat circular of 
1904, the government needed a more modern hegemonic script to legitimize co-
lonial authority. As a consequence, the outward appearance and performance of 
power became legitimate topics for discussion in the vernacular press. is was 
especially visible in the Bintang Hindia, wherein articles on deference etiquette 
turned much more opinionated and critical. In a 1905 article titled “Jongkok 
and Sembah,” a contributor explored what constituted proper deference in the 
context of colonial society. e primary cause of misunderstandings and anxiety, 
according to the author, was that the Javanese were required to show traditional 
deference to outsiders who did not fully comprehend local culture. In practice, 
this meant that colonizer and colonized interpreted deference etiquette dier-
ently. e Javanese understood a person crouching and oering a sembah a
er 
speaking as being respectful. To a Dutch observer, however, the same person ap-
peared servile, afraid, and clearly inferior. us, the Dutch demanded deference 
to see their superiority conrmed, while the Javanese preferred to only honor 
those they respected. In the eyes of the Javanese, the author argued, the Dutch 
were not worthy of their respect, as they lived in sin with concubines (nyai), 
enjoyed vulgar talk about women, and held hands and kissed in public. He there-
fore welcomed the hormat circular as an opportunity to end misunderstandings 
around deference etiquette. To avoid any confusion in the future, he proposed 
distinguishing between a modern public sphere and a traditional private sphere. 
However, if the circular was not eective, he suggested that the Dutch who came 
to Java for nancial gain have the decency to crouch for their hosts in accordance 
with local customs.90 Such a deant tone would have been impermissible before 
and exemplied the emboldened attitude of the new generation.
A recurring theme in the articles in the Bintang Hindia was the demand to 
be treated with more respect and dignity by the Dutch. One article in partic-
ular argued that a
er centuries of exploitation, the Dutch owed the Javanese 
some respect. e author noted that the hormat circular clearly exposed the 
ideological divisions between Dutch progressives and conservatives. e former 
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considered the Javanese as human beings, as equals even, and welcomed new reg-
ulations to reect that. e latter dierentiated themselves, in their eyes, from 
the racially inferior Javanese and rejected the circular and the Ethical Policy. For 
conservatives, the colonies were not so much a territory to be developed but one 
to be exploited. e author called on young Javanese to work with progressive 
Dutch in a joint eort to thwart conservative ideology. He reminded his readers 
that the Dutch had subjugated Java for close to three centuries, during which 
the Javanese had demonstrated themselves to be loyal subjects who enabled the 
glory of the Dutch nation. ey even fought in Dutch colonial wars to expand 
their island empire. As a reward for this service, the Javanese did not seek mone-
tary compensation but merely dignity and respect. ey wanted to be treated as 
human beings who did not humiliate themselves by “crouching for the Dutch 
or kissing the ground under their feet.” e author concluded that by comply-
ing with the hormat circular, the Dutch could show that “the Javanese deserve 
respect.”91
In the wake of the hormat circular of 1906, criticism in the Bintang Hindia
became even more pronounced and militant. In an essay-length article, an anon-
ymous author welcomed Van Heutsz’s second hormat circular but questioned 
if it could succeed where his rst attempt did not, pointing out, “e Dutch 
who are fond of receiving deference do not comply with these instructions.” He 
believed that the majority of the Dutch did not like change, making it “dicult 
for the [colonial] government to develop the Indies and its children.”92 In other 
words, the Ethical Policy could not be implemented as long as colonial ocials 
did not follow formal instructions. e author was skeptical that the latest hor-
mat circular would yield a dierent outcome unless Dutch ocials faced serious 
repercussions for their noncompliance. He did qualify his comments somewhat 
by granting that the situation was less severe in large cities, like Batavia, Sema-
rang, and Surabaya, where the indigenous population was more educated and 
the Europeans more progressive than in the countryside. However, the author 
warned that a failure to modernize the colonial relationship was increasingly 
estranging colonizer from colonized and slowing social change.
e author suggested that part of the problem was that the Javanese did not 
publicly protest the current hormat situation or express their thoughts, fearing 
the consequences of confronting their colonial superiors. But this was precisely 
what they should do, the author insisted, beginning by holding ocials ac-
countable for their actions. As examples, he shared three comprehensive stories 
of European ocials who, against the spirit of the hormat circulars, continued 
to demand traditional deference. e rst case study he presented was that of a 
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newly appointed Dutch minor district administrator (controleur). While his pre-
decessor addressed his Javanese colleagues in Malay, the newcomer insisted on 
conversing in Javanese, including all its hierarchical levels. His subjects quickly 
noticed an improvement in the administrator’s temperament whenever they 
showed him more deference than they were used to giving his precursor. ey 
addressed him as gusti (master) rather than kanjeng tuan (great lord), crouched 
for him, and presented the sembah a
er speaking, and he became friendlier, 
kinder, and more forgiving. e author of the article provided similar examples 
from ocials in the forestry service as well as plantation administrators and 
European entrepreneurs. But he stipulated, “To honor these ocials is not a 
matter of respect, but merely serves to buy their aection.”93 By giving in to the 
colonizer’s desire for deference, the author suggested, the Javanese manipulated 
them into receiving better treatment. Instead, they should openly demand not 
just better but more dignied conduct.
During the continued growth of the vernacular press in the following years, 
the discussion about the outward appearance and performance of colonial au-
thority remained at the center of attention. In January 1912, a contributor to 
the Batavia newspaper Pemberita Betawi repeated the argument that Goenawan 
made in 1905, urging his fellow countrymen to stop showing old-fashioned 
forms of deference to their superiors. He stated that these practices had their 
purpose in the past but have no place in the modern present.94 Reporting on 
the topic increasingly focused on the issue of European compliance with the 
circulars. A newspaper from Semarang, for instance, was highly suspicious of 
the Netherlands Indies Railway Company (Nederlandsch Indische Spoorweg-
Maatschappij), which had recently instructed all European employees to become 
uent in high and low Javanese. e author believed that this dubious attempt 
at customer friendliness was in eect a way to force indigenous personnel to 
converse in Javanese rather than Dutch with their European colleagues, and 
show them the accompanying traditional deference.95 But just as the vernacular 
press critiqued those who ignored the hormat circulars, it praised ocials who 
complied with them. For instance, the Pemberita Betawi commended the resi-
dent of Madiun for instructing his indigenous ocials to refrain from showing 
traditional deference to their European colleagues.96 In this way, the payung 
and hormat circulars had lasting eects, providing the young Javanese ongoing 
opportunities to discuss and assess the performance of colonial power.
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A Bittersweet Awakening
e turn of the twentieth century was a dynamic period in the history of colonial 
Indonesia marked by technological, economic, and demographic transformations. 
is coincided with the announcement of the Ethical Policy, the Dutch equiva-
lent of the civilizing mission. Buoyed by the latest insights from evolutionary rac-
ism, the Ethical Policy held that based on their superior level of development the 
colonizer had the moral obligation to upli
 the colonized. is new hegemonic 
script was strikingly dierent from its nineteenth-century predecessor, as the Ja-
vanization of colonial authority was to be replaced by an emphasis on Dutch and 
colonial modernity. But replacing one hegemonic discourse with another proved 
far more complicated than expected. It was out of frustration with the slow imple-
mentation of colonial authorities’ “sweet” ethical promises that Goenawan Man-
goenkoesoemo wrote his opinion piece on Javanese traditional deference in June 
1905. But Goenawan’s appeal to colonial and Javanese ocials to lead by exam-
ple largely fell on deaf ears; the conservative resistance—of colonial ocials and 
priyayi—against progressive change was pervasive. Likewise, the initial hormat 
circulars proved unable to align the performance of colonial power with a new 
ethical hegemonic script. In response, Goenawan later characterized these experi-
ences as a “bitter awakening.” However, by focusing on everything that remained 
unchanged, he initially missed the signicant transformations that did occur.
Goenawan’s articles as well as the discussion in the vernacular press that 
followed reveal that the payung and hormat circulars provided young Javanese 
with a unique opportunity to openly discuss and critique not only the outward 
appearance of authority but also the colonial relationship more broadly. Know-
ing that they could rely on the support of central authorities in Batavia invigo-
rated their desire for greater equality and respect and proved to be a profoundly 
empowering experience. Increasingly, the colonized spoke up, made themselves 
heard, and expressed their desire for emancipation in the burgeoning vernacular 
press as well as by establishing the rst Indonesian cultural and political asso-
ciations. Goenawan himself played a leading role in the foundation of Boedi 
Oetomo (Noble Endeavor) in 1908, the pioneering association founded with 
objectives of renewing an appreciation for Javanese culture and history, stimulat-
ing the development of Javanese land and people and advocating for the spread 
of Western education and knowledge.97 Other cultural, religious, and political 
associations followed suit as institutional expressions of this new mentality 
among the colonized. us, in hindsight, it was perhaps not so much a “bitter” 
but rather a bittersweet awakening.98
76 chapter 2
Over time, however, the tone of the discussion became more radical and 
frustrated, conveying a sense of exasperation that progressive Europeans shared. 
Governor General Idenburg alluded to the schism that had developed within 
the European community between advocates of the Ethical Policy—which he 
described as a relatively small group that included himself and Hazeu—and “the 
large heap of Europeans” supporting the conservative policies of the previous 
century. According to Idenburg, at stake was the question of whether the Dutch 
were “sincere in upli
ing the natives both mentally and materially or whether 
everything remains the same.”99 In fact, what he described in the Indies was a 
great fragmentation of social and political order.
For his part, Hazeu was unsurprised by the development of a more openly 
assertive mentality among the colonized. Only to the untrained observer, he 
argued in 1908, did the Javanese appear unchangeable and static—a sneer to his 
conservative adversaries—but he reasoned that many Europeans failed to notice 
this evolution because it “did not yet manifest itself in outward signs or appear-
ance.”100 As long as the Javanese did not visually express their new mentality with 
transformed hegemonic conduct, including updated deference rituals, dress, and 
language, conservative forces could maintain that the colonized remained indo-
lent and servile. Hazeu’s observation struck at the heart of the debate over the 
hormat circulars; it was the absence of a visual representation and performance 
of the new progressive attitude that prevented broader Javanese emancipation. 
In other words, for the national awakening to take root, a hegemonic struggle 
over material and visual culture was going to be essential. During the rst decade 
of the twentieth century, conservative forces were able to withstand the surge 
in nationalism but in 1913, the young Javanese took matters in their own hands.
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Ch a pter 3
Disrupting the Colonial Performance
e Hormat Circular of 1913 and the National Awakening
I n February of 1913, Raden Soemarsono, a young Javanese public pros-ecutor, was on his way to report to his new European superior, Assistant Resident J. C. Bedding of Purwakarta (western Java). Soemarsono had just 
been transferred from Batavia, the Dutch East Indies cosmopolitan capital, to 
the backward provincial town of Purwakarta. On his arrival to the local police 
court, he was shocked to see his fellow countrymen crouching before Bedding, 
sitting on the oor, and addressing the European civil servant in high Java-
nese. Aer each sentence, they also brought their hands together in a gesture of 
respect and obedience (sembah). For the Western-educated Soemarsono, these 
longstanding traditional forms of deference, known collectively as hormat, were 
considered a thing of the past. On the contrary, when Assistant Resident Bed-
ding noticed that Soemarsono was dressed in European fashion (trousers and 
a jacket), a clash between tradition and progress (kemajuan) ensued. Bedding 
demanded that Soemarsono exchange his European trousers for a Javanese 
sarong and sit on the oor. Soemarsono refused. He had attended a European 
secondary school, spoke uent Dutch, sat in chairs in the presence of Europeans, 
and was used to being treated as an equal. Grudgingly, Bedding allowed Soe-
marsono to attend the meeting but provided him no chair. e prosecutor could 
not sit on the oor because he was dressed in Western trousers—to do so was an 
unequivocal sign of submission within Javanese deference tradition—and thus 
would have been forced to stand throughout the meeting. Rather than submit 
to that humiliation, Soemarsono excused himself to attend to the pile of paper-
work that came with his new o
ce.1
Soemarsono’s disturbance of the colonial performance was representative of 
the coming of age of a more assertive generation of Indonesians that demanded 
greater equality and respect in colonial society. is new generation was highly 
educated, multilingual, globally conscious, professionally employed, and aware 
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of the Ethical Policy’s civilizing discourse. ey began to organize in cultural, 
economic, and political associations, and like Soemarsono, many performed
truth to power by refusing to submit to humiliating deference traditions. eir 
decisions about which language to speak, what to wear, how to approach some-
one, where to sit, and which gestures of respect to oer all became acts of he-
gemonic contestation. However, Soemarsono’s confrontation with Bedding 
stands out because of a signicant, albeit unintentional, consequence: the issu-
ance of a new hormat circular in 1913. is nal hormat circular was instrumen-
tal in energizing an Indonesian national awakening and irreparably damaging 
nineteenth-century colonial hegemony.
e hormat circular of 1913 was a remarkable piece of colonial legislation, as 
the government publicly acknowledged that its own o
cials had failed to com-
ply with its previous circulars (1890, 1904, 1906, and 1909) and recognized that 
traditional deference rituals were incredibly humiliating for the colonized.2 In 
addition, the circular was a promise that the government would insist that its 
civil servants adopt a more progressive attitude. Finally, it plainly encouraged the 
colonized to be more assertive in demanding respect from Europeans, suggest-
ing that like Soemarsono (whose experiences were included in an anonymized 
addendum), one could adopt Western dress and thus make compliance with 
outdated deference traditions nearly impossible.
e hormat circular received vast public attention. Its implications were 
widely reviewed in the burgeoning vernacular press and, tellingly, the govern-
ment actively collaborated with the Sarekat Islam, Indonesia’s rst mass politi-
cal association (founded in 1911), to announce and interpret the signicance of 
the circular’s message. ese discussions instilled in the colonized a great sense 
of condence and justice that was instrumental in bringing about the trans-
formative era in Indonesian history that Takashi Shiraishi so aptly described 
as “an age in motion”—a period of rallies, protests, demands, strikes, debates, 
and an emerging national consciousness.3 us, by fanning the growing ames 
of advocacy for equality and respect, the hormat circular of 1913 played a cru-
cial but oen overlooked role in the development of the Indonesian nationalist 
movement. Once this impact became apparent, conservative colonial o
cials 
and Javanese aristocrats formulated a strong reactionary response, accusing the 
progressive coalition of young Indonesian intellectuals and Dutch proponents 
of “ethical” ideals of destabilizing colonial order and destroying traditional 
indigenous culture. ese lamentations increased as the national awakening 
grew stronger and more assertive, resulting in erce public debates over what 
constituted proper deference. is reactionary movement reestablished control 
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over the government in the 1920s, but by then it was impossible to reimpose 
nineteenth-century colonial hegemony. Instead, the broad nationalist move-
ment persisted in its assault on these traditions as markers of colonial and social 
authority. Still following Soemarsono’s example, by the early 1930s it had accom-
plished this goal.
Performing Truth to Power: From Conict to Circular
e small and dusty provincial town of Purwakarta seems an unlikely place for 
the confrontation between Bedding and Soemarsono. Although Purwakarta 
was part of the residency of Batavia, life in the town hardly resembled the hus-
tle and bustle of the cosmopolitan colonial capital. Its relative isolation in the 
island’s interior gave the town an aura of backwardness that seemed to shield it 
from modern developments such as the Ethical Policy and the national awak-
ening. Purwakarta was a quintessential nineteenth-century colonial town with 
a layout reecting the duality of colonial governance. e small European com-
munity and the residence of the assistant resident, constructed in the Empire 
style with a hipped roof (all sides slope downward) and rectangular oorplan 
based on Javanese designs, were located to the south of the pond in the town’s 
center. e o
ce of the bupati and the local mosque bordered the town square 
(alun-alun) with two holy banyan trees to the west of the pond. However, it was 
precisely because time seemed to move more slowly in Purwakarta that it was 
a prime location for a clash between a proponent of progress (kemajuan) and a 
defender of the old order.
Being of priyayi descent and Western-educated, Raden Soemarsono personi-
ed the tension between tradition and progress in turn-of-the-century colonial 
Indonesia. As his title Raden indicated, he was of noble birth, descended from 
the upper levels of Java’s priyayi elite.4 His grandfather had been the district head 
(bupati) of Grobogan (central Java), while his father was the public prosecutor 
( jaksa) at the native court in Magelang (central Java). Soemarsono was there-
fore well versed in priyayi culture and familiar with proper Javanese etiquette, 
language, dress, literature, gamelan music, and wayang kulit (shadow puppet 
theater).5 His priyayi background also enabled him to attend one of the most 
prestigious secondary schools in the colony: the Gymnasium Willem III in Bata-
via. In 1901, he was one of only four non-European students—three Javanese and 
one Chinese—of the 148 who took and passed the admissions exam.6 During 
his time at school, from 1901 to 1906, Soemarsono was immersed in a European 
cultural environment in which he wore European dress, conversed in Dutch, and 
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socialized freely with his European classmates. On completing his education, 
he began his civil service career in 1906 as a clerk and rose through the ranks to 
become a public prosecutor in 1912. At age twenty-six he was appointed as jaksa 
of Purwakarta, for the rst time in his young life substituting the progressive 
colonial capital for an “old-fashioned provincial town” where both European 
and indigenous o
cials “maintained a tradition of sti conservatism.”7
Considering Soemarsono’s experiences in cosmopolitan Batavia at both 
school and work, the conict with Bedding over appropriate deference was 
hardly surprising. In a correspondence with the resident of Batavia, H. Rijf-
snijder, under whose authority the regency of Purwakarta fell, Soemarsono 
described his disbelief on learning that at meetings of the Purwakarta police 
court it was still customary for the public prosecutor to approach the assistant 
resident in a crouching walk and sit on the oor for the duration of the session. 
When he had appeared wearing trousers, he immediately sensed that Assistant 
Resident Bedding was ill disposed toward him. All of this surprised Soemar-
sono, who wrote that he could not possibly have known “that high ranking civil 
servants [in Purwakarta] still valued old-fashioned hormat traditions and cus-
tomary law (adat).”8 Very aware of the various government circulars regarding 
the issue, Soemarsono refused to submit to Bedding’s demands. In the months 
following the confrontation, an adjunct public prosecutor took Soemarsono’s 
place in the police court while he relocated to the native court, where the Eu-
ropean judge worked outside of the civil service hierarchy and did not demand 
traditional deference. Soemarsono only returned to sessions of the police court 
in May when Bedding allowed him the “personal privilege” of sitting in a chair 
and wearing European dress. Soemarsono’s perseverance in performing truth to 
power seemed to have paid o, but it was the events of the following months that 
explain how knowledge of his experience became widely shared.
While Bedding’s concession cleared the air, Soemarsono’s increasing involve-
ment in the nationalist movement ensured that their mutual understanding was 
short-lived. During his time in Batavia, Soemarsono had joined Boedi Oetomo, 
colonial Indonesia’s rst modern association (founded in 1908) and established 
friendships with its founder, Wahidin Soedirohoesodo, and other prominent 
young intellectuals such as Soewardi Soerjaningrat and Tjipto Mangoenkoe-
soemo. Immediately aer his arrival in Purwakarta, Soemarsono took the ini-
tiative to encourage what he called “association life,” which, in his estimation, 
quickly “revolved around him.” He acted as the local representative of Boedi 
Oetomo and was the driving force behind establishing a local branch of the 
Sarekat Islam in March 1913. Hosted by a local hajji (Muslim who made the 
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pilgrimage to Mecca), the founding meeting was attended by approximately f-
teen hundred people, including the district head, civil servants, teachers, mer-
chants, hajjis, local village heads, and even peasants. Since Soemarsono’s work as 
public prosecutor made it di
cult to assume a daily role in the governing board, 
he acted as a special advisor to the association. He derived a great sense of pur-
pose and happiness from his work with these associations, which he considered 
to be joyful signs of “the awakening of the people’s consciousness and initiative.”9
Assistant Resident Bedding was deeply troubled by these developments. He 
feared that the Sarekat Islam would escalate tensions among various ethnic 
groups in the district, especially between indigenous people and the Chinese. 
Riots between these two groups had already erupted in early March. Bedding 
credited the Sarekat Islam’s success, and with it the risk of intergroup violence, 
to Soemarsono’s use of his position as a civil servant to lend the association the 
“aureole of authority.” He therefore scolded Soemarsono for his involvement in 
the organization and prohibited the group from meeting outside the town of 
Purwakarta.10 Once again, the young public prosecutor opted not to yield to 
Bedding’s demands, stating that nothing could “keep me from my duty to my 
people, that we aristocrats have neglected for so long.”11 In large part due to Soe-
marsono’s support, the Purwakarta branch of the Sarekat Islam grew to een 
thousand members by the end of the calendar year.12
Soemarsono’s involvement in association life culminated in a public lecture 
commemorating the ve-year anniversariy of Boedi Oetomo on May 25, 1913.13
In front of a large audience, he argued that if indigenous people wanted to 
achieve real progress, increase their prosperity, and reclaim their dignity, they 
had to shed their servitude and contest colonial inequalities. He metaphorically 
described the colonial hierarchy as a seating arrangement, with indigenous peo-
ple perched on the oor below the table looking up at the Chinese, who sat on 
chairs closer to the table, and further up to the Dutch, seated at the table itself. 
To challenge this colonial order, Soemarsono proposed that the colonized work 
together in associations, forge a distinct national identity (based on Islam and 
their Hindu-Buddhist past), and demand modern education for their youth. 
Most importantly, Soemarsono proposed a change in mentality. e Javanese 
should no longer be docile and submissive but rather self-condent and assser-
tive in advocating for equality. As if recalling his rst encounter with Bedding, 
he suggested that they adopt modern clothes, at which time he presented his 
own outt consisting of a blazer, pantaloons, and shoes. Encouraging his compa-
triots to emulate his example, Soemarsono conveyed his conviction that a change 
in appearance signaled a newfound self-respect and refusal to be humiliated. 
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Clad in modern trousers, they signaled a refusal to submit to traditional defer-
ence etiquette.14
In the days following his lecture, a rumor spread that Soemarsono had called 
for the violent expulsion of the Dutch from Java if the colonial authorities would 
not legally recognize the Sarekat Islam.15 Bedding, who had not attended the lec-
ture, immediately solicited witness accounts from indigenous civil servants who 
had been present. According to these witnesses, Soemarsono had done nothing 
of the sort, although they did suggest that he could have chosen his words more 
carefully considering the largely uneducated audience. Despite these reports, 
Bedding concluded that the incident conrmed his opinion of Soemarsono as 
a troublemaker, especially because he believed that the lecture “had a fatal in-
uence on the less educated priyayi, instigating them against the government.”16
To prevent further disruption of colonial peace and order, Bedding suspended 
all of the Purwakarta Sarekat Islam’s activities until the government reached a 
decision about the association’s request for legal recognition. On Bedding’s rec-
ommendation, even the governor general was informed of Soemarsono’s speech. 
e highest authority in the colony instructed the resident of Batavia to scold 
Soemarsono and impress on him that if he wished to remain a civil servant, he 
must refrain from expressing opinions that could be interpreted as inciting en-
mity against the government.17
At this crucial juncture, Soemarsono appealed for support from his former 
high school mentor: the inuential and progressive Dutch advisor for native 
aairs G. A. J. Hazeu. When colonial authorities denied the Sarekat Islam’s re-
quest for legal recognition in June 1913, the government directed further peti-
tions to o
cially approve the continuation of local branches to Hazeu’s o
ce.18
As the Purwakarta spokesperson of the Sarekat Islam, Soemarsono seized this 
opportunity to share some of his frustrations with Hazeu and his assistant, D. 
A. Rinkes. In late July, Soemarsono conded that he was severely distressed by 
the o
cial reprimand sanctioned by the governor general himself. He simply 
could not fathom how standing up for the common people’s interests led to ac-
cusations of “inciting” against the government or having “revolutionary tenden-
cies.” Disillusioned with his career, Soemarsono inquired about the possibility of 
leaving the civil service and continuing his education in the Netherlands, which 
would allow him to engage with “truly civilized and well-mannered Europeans 
in their own environment.”19 Hazeu advised his former pupil to let bygones be 
bygones, to be more cautious, and bide his time until he was promoted to a more 
progressive district. Interestingly, Hazeu also reached out to the governor gen-
eral about the situation in Purwakarta. He presented Soemarsono as a youthful 
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intellectual with a tendency to exaggerate but argued that it had been Bedding’s 
treatment that le him feeling misjudged and conrmed his mistaken views. 
Hazeu’s insinuation was clear: maybe Soemarsono’s behavior was not the real 
problem.20
Despite Hazeu’s counsel, Soemarsono found himself at the center of yet an-
other dispute with his European superiors in early August 1913. Aer distrib-
uting a controversial pamphlet as a personal favor to the author, Soemarsono 
was interrogated under suspicion of transgressing the colonial press law. e 
pamphlet, Soewardi Soerjaningrat’s Als ik eens Nederlander was (If I Were a 
Dutchman), was thought to incite ethnic hatred, as the author critiqued the up-
coming centennial celebration of Dutch independence from Napoleonic France. 
Soerjaningrat argued that if he were a Dutchman, he would not hold “indepen-
dence celebrations in a country where we deny the people their independence,” 
eectively exposing colonial hypocrisy.21 In a letter to Hazeu, Soemarsono main-
tained that he had acted in good faith in distributing the pamphlet, but that he 
also understood the gravity of his predicament. As Soerjaningrat himself had 
been arrested and exiled for this publication, Soemarsono expected to at least 
be suspended and at worst, discharged. However, he underestimated just how 
much Bedding detested him. e situation provided the Dutch o
cial with the 
opportunity to rid himself of his troublesome adversary, and he advised the gov-
ernor general to discharge and incarcerate Soemarsono.22
Aware of the danger facing his protégé, Hazeu requested that Soemarsono 
send him all relevant correspondence that could be used as evidence against 
him.23 As he examined Soemarsono’s materials, Hazeu became convinced that 
the real threat to colonial peace and order was not the young Javanese but rather 
the civil service itself. He believed that the arrogance of European o
cials and 
their persistence in demanding humiliating forms of deference, despite previ-
ous hormat circulars’ explicit instructions, “literally drive our young Javanese to 
imprudence, anger, vexation, and eventually a pressing desire to rid themselves 
from such o
cials.”24 Such damaging responses emerged from the strikingly dif-
ferent social environments that Western-educated Javanese encountered during 
their studies and in their civil service careers. As students, they were treated 
as equals, sat on chairs, conversed in Dutch, and befriended Europeans. But, 
as Soemarsono’s confrontations with Bedding demonstrated, as civil servants 
they were looked down on, considered racially and intellectually inferior, and 
expected to conform to outdated forms of deference. Hazeu was particularly 
incensed by a curt note that Bedding sent to the adjunct public prosecutor who, 
following Soemarsono’s example, dared to sit on a chair during a session of the 
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police court: “Considering you are expected at the session of the police court 
tomorrow, I notify you, that I do not allow you to sit on a chair, since that is a 
privilege I have only granted to Jaksa R. Soemarsono. You always used to sit on 
a mat and without my permission, you allowed yourself to sit on a chair. ere is 
no reason for that.”25 To Soemarsono, this short notice illustrated the relation-
ship between the modern and educated Javanese on the one hand, and those 
“European and indigenous civil servants, who still place value in the old worn-
out hormat customs within the civil service” on the other.26 Reading through 
Soemarsono’s experiences in Purwakarta, Hazeu increasingly feared “serious 
consequences” if the culture within the civil service was not modernized, as the 
Javanese “no longer tolerate these humiliations as they used to.”27
Within a day of receiving Soemarsono’s evidence, Hazeu sent a lengthy and 
passionate defense of his protégé to the governor general’s o
ce in which he re-
futed the accusations against his former student and called for a comprehensive 
overhaul of the culture within the civil service. He argued that it should be im-
possible for someone like “Assistant Resident Bedding to have the power to de-
cide individually if a native of modern development and civilization is allowed to 
sit on a chair in the company of European o
cials.”28 Hazeu proposed to resolve 
the situation in Purwakarta by transferring Soemarsono to a more progressive 
district, while o
cially reprimanding Bedding for his behavior. Moreover, as 
Bedding had many “spiritual doppelgangers,” Hazeu urged that civil servants be 
forced to comply with the demands of the new ethical discourse by issuing a new 
hormat circular. e governor general was swayed by Hazeu’s assessment and on 
August 22, 1913, only ve days aer Soemarsono sent his materials to his mentor, 
decided to transfer Soemarsono and scold Bedding. In addition, he issued the 
sternest circular to date, signaling an overhaul of colonial cultural hegemony 
rooted in Javanese deference rituals.29
e hormat circular of 1913 was a curious piece of legislation that sought to 
align the social etiquette and deference shaping colonial encounters with the 
civilizing discourse of the Ethical Policy. It was indicative of the great value that 
Dutch colonial authorities still placed on orchestrating the outward appearance 
and rituals of power to legitimize and maintain their dominance. In the de-
cree, the government expressed concern over o
cials’ demonstrated disregard 
for the previous hormat circulars (1890, 1904, 1906, and 1909), as tensions be-
tween the civil service and the growing number of educated Javanese had in-
creased as a result. e circular stressed that the Javanese national awakening 
was not to be feared, but “instead, it should be interpreted as the rst result of 
long-term eorts to civilize the natives.”30 In a condential letter to civil servants 
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accompanying the circular, Hazeu emphasized that the relationship between 
European and indigenous civil servants in particular needed to change. e doc-
ument was clearly inspired by Soemarsono’s experience in Purwakarta, discussed 
anonymously as an example of European o
cials’ abuse of power. Hazeu used 
Soemarsono’s incident to argue that Europeans should treat their indigenous 
counterparts more humanely and fairly, as “the old condition was destined to be 
replaced by a dierent one, more along European lines.”31 Both the circular and 
the condential attachment thus forewarned European civil servants that those 
who continued to defy the government’s instructions on the subject of hormat 
would be punished, although the penalties remained undened.
European civil servants were taken aback by the latest hormat circular, which 
they considered a humiliating public aront by the colonial government. Resi-
dent W. Boissevain, for instance, wrote that it was tolerable when the vernacular 
press critiqued the civil service but not when the government did so. eir pride 
was further tarnished as the condential letter to civil servants—which con-
tained the most damning language—was leaked to the press and widely dissem-
inated. e civil servants felt undervalued for their crucial work in the colonial 
administration and believed that the accusations against them were exaggerated. 
ey blamed the O
ce for Native Aairs in particular, arguing that Hazeu had 
only theoretical and no practical knowledge of indigenous society. According to 
many civil servants and the conservative colonial press, the circular was a his-
toric mistake, undermining European prestige by contradicting the supposedly 
innate Javanese sense of servility. Many Europeans even argued that the Javanese 
were themselves to blame for the perseverance of deference traditions, as they 
considered conversing in Dutch or wearing Western clothing to be impolite. 
How could European o
cials disagree?32
However, although it was Hazeu’s letters that got the governor general’s at-
tention, it was Soemarsono’s actions during his tenure in Purwakarta that truly 
ignited the overhaul of the hegemonic colonial cultural system beginning in 
August 1913. On the same day that the hormat circular was published, Hazeu 
informed Soemarsono that he did not have to fear for his position, as the gov-
ernor general had sided with him and issued the hormat circular to ensure that 
behavior like Bedding’s would not be tolerated. He further pointed out that 
this outcome was only possible because of the well-documented grievances and 
convincing evidence that his former pupil had provided.33 It was thus Soemarso-
no’s resolve during his confrontations with Bedding and his shrewdness in com-
municating with Hazeu that led to this signicant—and ultimately eective—
hormat circular. Soemarsono’s response was full of gratitude but also indicated 
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a sense of disappointment. He wondered why incidents always had to escalate 
before changes were made. In addition, he made it clear that the hormat circular 
was only the beginning, as he believed the Javanese also deserved surage and 
a national parliament. Although Hazeu urged him to practice self-control and 
strive for gradual change, Soemarsono’s experiences in Purwakarta had pushed 
him in a more radical direction.34 Moreover, in the following years, the hormat
circular that resulted from his struggle became a rallying point for the Javanese 
national awakening as well as for a reactionary conservative movement that 
sought to put an end to attempts to modernize the colonial relationship.
Contesting Hegemony: Mass Rallies and the Vernacular Press
e impact of the hormat circular of 1913, especially compared to the circulars of 
the previous decade, was in part magnied by the colonial government’s delib-
erate decision to collaborate with the Sarekat Islam to announce its publication. 
is partnership was surprising, given the government’s ambivalent attitude to-
ward the association. On the one hand, colonial authorities feared the Sarekat 
Islam’s impressive mass following; on the other, they considered the movement 
to be the culmination—and therefore validation—of the Ethical Policy. e 
Dutch consequently opted to refuse legal recognition of a centrally led Sarekat 
Islam but oered their support in establishing local branches of the association, 
including the Purwakarta branch that Soemarsono had launched.35 To signal 
the government’s support of the movement, adjunct Advisor for Native Aairs 
D. A. Rinkes joined the charismatic chairman of Sarekat Islam, Oemar Said 
Tjokroaminoto, on a tour of Java in December 1913. Rinkes took on the role of 
mediator between conservative o
cials and representatives of the association.36
For instance, in Purwakarta, Rinkes brushed aside Bedding’s criticism of the 
Sarekat Islam, which he attributed to a personal grudge against Soemarsono. But 
Rinkes’s task encompassed more than dealing with conservative o
cials. More 
importantly, he was expected to gain the trust of the Sarekat Islam’s followers. 
e hormat circular was essential to achieving this goal.
In late 1913 and early 1914, Rinkes traversed Java to speak at large public gath-
erings sponsored by the Sarekat Islam. One can only imagine the murmurs in the 
crowd as the high-ranking Dutch colonial o
cial took the stage to address the 
oen thousands of people in attendance. Rinkes’s speeches followed a singular 
script. He rst explained that he was there to assist in establishing local branches 
of the Sarekat Islam. His presence, he continued, was a sign of the government’s 
goodwill toward the association and support for the Sarekat Islam’s program for 
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economic, religious, and social emancipation, as long as it occurred within the 
boundaries of the law. He then introduced the hormat circular as evidence of 
the government’s noble intentions. Occasionally, he read the circular aloud, but 
most oen he summarized its contents. e message he delivered to the captive 
audience was clear: the governor general had prohibited humiliating deference 
rituals as a means of removing obstacles to equality and progress. is meant, 
according to Rinkes, that the colonized were no longer second-rate subjects in 
their own country. He stressed that civil servants were there for the people, not 
the other way around. Rinkes also explained that circulars were rm orders from 
the governor general that mandated all European o
cials’ compliance. is dec-
laration set up the apotheosis of Rinkes’s performance: he publicly encouraged 
all in attendance to report transgressions of the hormat circular to the author-
ities. In a way, he urged tens of thousands of people to act like Soemarsono.37
Rinkes’s words reverberated throughout colonial Indonesia, as they implied 
that colonial o
cials were fallible, would be held accountable, and that the 
colonized had a right, perhaps even a duty, to monitor their behavior. While 
Rinkes’s presence was meant to defuse the Sarekat Islam, it eectively became 
a call for further political and social engagement. Moreover, he demonstrated 
that the hormat circular of 1913 could be weaponized as a powerful instrument 
to demand equality and bring about social change. Within Sarekat Islam cir-
cles, familiarity with the circular became widespread. At a meeting in Sema-
rang in 1914, attendees carried a banner proclaiming: “2014: Do not forget this 
circular!” For those who missed the reference to the circular’s administrative 
designation—it was listed as decision number 2014—another banner was more 
direct: “e Javanese do not want to squat like a frog.”38 In Sukabumi, Sarekat 
Islam followers distributed symbolic degrees to local district heads (wedana) 
for their compliance with the hormat circular, conrming Rinkes’s prediction 
that once European civil servants were forced to change their habits, indigenous 
civil servants were bound to follow. 39 Perhaps most importantly, Sarekat Islam 
meetings turned into safe spaces in which people could openly discuss European 
civil servants’ transgressions. In addition to abuses perpetrated by administrative 
o
cials like residents, such discussions incorporated other civil servants, such 
as those in the government run pawnshop service, forestry service, and the state 
service overseeing the production and sale of opium and salt.40
In the following years, the Sarekat Islam’s leadership ingeniously adapted 
Rinkes’s words to their Islamic nationalist discourse.41 is was perfectly re-
ected in a speech at the Sarekat Islam’s rst national congress in Bandung 
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(western Java), heavily criticized the detrimental inuence of Javanese defer-
ence traditions, especially the requirement to crouch and sit on the oor and 
present the sembah. Prawiroatmodjo proclaimed, “As long as the people will-
ingly submit to servile treatment, there can be no progress.”42 Echoing Rinkes, 
he reminded his audience that civil servants were there to serve the people—a 
sentiment that to him applied to European and indigenous o
cials alike. Cru-
cially, Prawiroatmodjo argued that a servile attitude and the intricate system of 
deference etiquette guiding social interactions and expressing social hierarchies, 
which he referred to as sembah-jongkok, never were intrinsically Javanese but 
rather cultural residues of Hindu dominance in Java’s past. According to this 
view, Hindu rulers had imposed humiliating deference rituals on the Javanese in 
order to exploit them. Shedding these traditions in the present would therefore 
not only lead to progress but also purify Java from damaging Hindu inuences. 
Prawiroatmodjo asserted that Islam actually prohibited the knee kiss (sungkem) 
and sembah, stressing that this was not an argument against politeness and re-
spect, of which he was in favor but against oppressive foreign traditions.
In addition to the Sarekat Islam’s large public meetings, the burgeoning ver-
nacular press provided a crucial platform through which Indonesians learned 
about the 1913 hormat circular. As cultural and political associations developed 
in the years preceding the circular, the vernacular press increasingly became an 
extension of the nascent nationalist movement. Associations like Boedi Oetomo 
and the Sarekat Islam founded their own publishing houses, newspapers, and 
periodicals—publications that quickly turned quite opinionated and political. 
Although nancial stability was always an issue, as reected in the high turn-
over rate of these publications, from 1914 onward the vernacular press expanded 
rapidly and became a force to be reckoned with in colonial society.43 e discus-
sion of the hormat circular was arguably the rst issue that clearly showcased 
the vernacular press’s new role in this regard. is role is particularly evident in 
the periodical Doenia Bergerak (e World Is in Motion), founded in 1914 by 
Marco Kartodikromo as the weekly publication of the Inlandse Journalisten 
Bond (Union of Native Journalists) in Surakarta. Unlike Soemarsono, Marco 
Kartodikromo belonged to the lower priyayi, received limited Western educa-
tion, and was not uent in Dutch. However, he was infatuated with moder-
nity and a highly critical observer of colonial society. Before founding Doenia
Bergerak, Kartodikromo gained journalistic experience as an apprentice to Tirto 
Adhisoerjo, the “founding father” of Indonesian journalism, and as editor of the 
Sarekat Islam’s newspaper in Surakarta. rough his writing, Kartodikromo 
sought to challenge colonial inequalities and achieve greater solidarity among 
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Indonesians. ese goals were reected in his decision to publish in Malay rather 
than in Dutch, the language of the oppressor, or in Javanese, a language with 
strict hierarchies. In Doenia Bergerak, Kartodikromo published critical and 
oen sarcastic articles, letters, and complaints written by him and his friends. 
And throughout 1914, the latest hormat circular dominated its pages.44
In Doenia Bergerak, Kartodikromo praised the colonial government for is-
suing the hormat circular, echoing the consensus in the vernacular press.45 He 
was cautiously optimistic that the circular was a signicant step toward greater 
equality and mutual respect in colonial society. e circular, Kartodikromo 
believed, had the potential to accelerate the national awakening, as it encour-
aged the common people (wong cilik) to display greater self-condence in their 
interactions with their alleged superiors. However, he pointed out that change 
would not come easily, as those in positions of power never willingly give up 
their privileges.46 In an article titled “Deference Must Be Appropriate,” readers 
were therefore advised to stand up for change by no longer “[showing] their 
masters respect like monkeys, while in their minds cursing them to die,” but 
by being polite without humiliating oneself. is meant not treating superiors 
like gods by performing outdated deference rituals and addressing them with 
grandiose titles. at, the author argued, is “the way to progress [kemajuan] 
and freedom [merdeka].”47 Another contributor conveyed the same message by 
pretending to be someone with high status—a popular expressive form since 
Soewardi Soerjaningrat’s famous pamphlet. In the article, the author wondered 
why the Javanese would want to abolish sembah-jongkok, the time-honored tra-
ditions of their ancestors. He implored the reader to stop pursuing change, as it 
would no longer allow him to “oppress and suck your blood” by obtaining “your 
rice paddies for cheap,” and turn the Javanese into a “clever, brave, and righteous 
people.” In addition, the author beseeched his readers to avoid Western dress, 
oer sembah-jongkok, and to not cut their hair, as a cold head leads to a clear and 
clever mind.48 ese articles in Doenia Bergerak presented the hormat circular as 
a great opportunity, and emphasized that its implementation depended on the 
colonized themselves.
e pages of Doenia Bergerak make it clear that Marco Kartodikromo used 
the hormat circular to critique the behavior of both colonial and Javanese of-
cials. While the hormat circular applied specically to relations between 
colonizer and colonized, Kartodikromo forcefully argued that it should be 
extended to the priyayi in general and the bupati in particular. is signied 
a new direction in the hormat discussion that became increasingly important 
in the following decades. According to an article titled “Who Takes Care of 
Disrupting the Colonial Performance 91 
Whom?” the traditional patron-client relationship (kawula-gusti) between the 
common people and the priyayi was broken. e Javanese elite demanded ex-
cessive deference from the people without the customary reciprocation of ben-
ecial leadership and protection. e author argued that compliance with the 
hormat circular could restore balance to this distorted relationship.49 Inspired 
by Soewardi’s pamphlet, another article titled “If I Were a Bupati” discussed the 
proper behavior and responsibilities of these traditional o
cials. Drawing on 
this fantasy, the author successfully exposed the hypocrisy of the age. He argued 
that as a bupati he would not demand sembah-jongkok but rather would permit 
his subordinates to sit in chairs and don European dress. In a veiled example of 
everyday resistance, he also reasoned that he would no longer demand the title 
Gusti (Lord or Master), as someone could “accidentally” address him as Gusi, 
referring to oral gums. He asserted that as a bupati, he did not wish to inspire 
fear and would only hire people based on merit, work toward emancipation, 
and establish a women’s association and girls’ school, as women were crucial to 
achieving real progress.50 e latter was a reference to the emergence of various 
women’s associations around the same time, which began to draw elite women 
out of the seclusion of the household and into the public sphere.51
In addition to these opinionated pieces, Doenia Bergerak and other vernac-
ular publications assumed a more activist stance as they vigorously monitored 
European and indigenous o
cials’ compliance with the hormat circular. is 
marked a signicant turning point for the vernacular press, as readers were in-
vited to share their experiences and observations. e editors of the Oetoesan
Hindia (Messenger of the Indies), the Sarekat Islam’s newspaper in Surabaya, 
justied this vigilantism by pointing out that the current hormat circular would 
have been redundant if European o
cials had complied with the circular of 
1904.52 Within months of the 1913 circular’s release, the pages of the vernacu-
lar press were dotted with long and short exposés documenting transgressions. 
In June 1914, Doenia Bergerak published a letter from a pawnshop employee 
accusing his European boss of continuing to demand that he crouch and don 
traditional dress. According to the writer, his boss considered the Javanese to be 
animals rather than human beings.53 Doenia Bergerak published many similar 
complaints, as did other vernacular newspapers.54 In the Sarekat Islam’s news-
paper in Semarang, Sinar Djawa (Java’s Radiance), a contributor threatened to 
expose the identity of an assistant wedana in Kudus who still ordered traditional 
deference from the people in his district.55 Dutch colonial o
cials were equally 
branded, as with an assistant resident in Kendal who refused to let his Javanese 
colleagues sit in chairs.56 e Oetoesan Hindia in turn reported on abuses within 
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the state facilitated opium services, describing the department as outdated in the 
age of progress (kemajuan).57 Together these complaints in the vernacular press 
helped bring about the realization that hormat abuses were a shared experience 
under colonialism—one that could only be undone by collective action. As such, 
the discussion of the hormat circular played an important role in the develop-
ment of a nascent national consciousness.
One of the most signicant and democratizing outcomes of these public 
discussions of the hormat circular was its publication in Malay, the nonhier-
archical language of the people. Kartodikromo, who was involved in both the 
vernacular press and the Sarekat Islam, was among the rst to dare publish the 
controversial circular in Malay, with the clear objective of familiarizing people 
with its message and providing them with the necessary information to stand 
up to hormat abuse. As Kartodikromo and other editors were quick to point 
out, knowledge was a powerful weapon that empowered the colonized to de-
mand real change.58 On the rst anniversary of the hormat circular (August 
22, 1914), Doenia Bergerak published an article expressing concern that many of 
the colonized had only limited knowledge of its contents. In a typical expressive 
form, the “circular” itself addressed the reader, lamenting its danger of being 
forgotten and requesting that it remain strictly enforced. e article went on 
to ask that all Javanese wear trousers and shoes to avoid traditional hormat de-
mands (if they could aord to do so) and sit in chairs during meetings. It also 
insisted that all government circulars be translated into vernacular languages 
to ensure compliance.59 It was in response to this article that Kartodikromo 
published a Malay translation of the o
cial hormat circular in Doenia Bergerak
on October 31, 1914.60 Other vernacular newspapers followed suit. For instance, 
the Sarekat Islam newspaper in Bandung, Kaoem Moeda (e Young Ones), 
published the circular on its front page in November 1915 to celebrate the tenure 
of Governor General Van Idenburg, asserting that the hormat circular was the 
dening feature of his governance.61 ese Malay translations of the circular 
democratized access to information and inspired a new generation. Uninten-
tionally, the hormat circular had played a crucial role in the formation of a more 
informed, critical, and politically engaged generation of Indonesians, willing to 
ght for change.
As widespread discussion in the vernacular press and at Sarekat Islam ral-
lies illustrates, many Javanese interpreted the 1913 hormat circular as a public 
confession—the government admitting that the existing deference rituals were 
humiliating and no longer appropriate. ey viewed it also as a pledge that they 
would be entitled to more respectful treatment in the immediate future, and 
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as encouragement to proactively demand change by refusing to pay traditional 
homage to European o
cials. By instilling a sense of self-condence and activ-
ism in the colonized, the 1913 hormat circular was a signicant factor in bringing 
about a transformative period in Indonesian history that scholar Takashi Shi-
raishi has aptly described as an “age in motion.” As Shiraishi demonstrated, the 
een years following the foundation of the Sarekat Islam saw the proliferation 
of newspapers and journals, cultural and political associations, mass meetings 
and rallies, and trade unions and strikes, as the colonized increasingly expressed 
themselves politically. Gradually, their call for equal rights, political represen-
tation, and even a promise of independence became more widespread. It was 
through these experiences that the ethnically diverse inhabitants of the Neth-
erlands Indies came to think of themselves for the rst time as Indonesians.62
For his part, Soemarsono, the little-known spark behind these developments, 
was transferred to the district of Purworedjo in central Java in September 1913. 
e restlessness that had characterized his tenure in Purwakarta followed him 
there as he continued to balance his activities in associations, especially Boedi 
Oetomo, and his career as a public prosecutor. Within Boedi Oetomo, he be-
came one of the most vocal proponents of a more overtly political course, pri-
marily by demanding democratic reforms. It was therefore apt that he made the 
association’s candidacy list for the rst People’s Council, an advisory body to the 
colonial government inaugurated in 1917. Although he was not voted into the 
People’s Council, Soemarsono was elected to Batavia’s city council the following 
year. By this time, the government had discharged him from employment, o
-
cially for missing police court proceedings but more likely for being unable to 
combine his professional and political activities.63 Aer serving as a regular con-
tributor to the Javanese nationalist periodical De Wederopbouw (Restoration) 
throughout 1920 and 1921, Soemarsono disappeared from the forefront of “asso-
ciation life,” as well as from historians’ radar.64
Continued Debate: e Hormat Circular and Its Implications
While the 1913 hormat circular was widely praised among the Javanese and in-
strumental in initiating a national awakening, European colonial o
cials re-
acted less positively. ey too interpreted the document as a confession—one in 
which they were publicly scolded and humiliated by the colonial government. 
e circular’s distribution and subsequent Javanese resistance to hormat rituals 
generated a reactionary movement among conservative colonial o
cials who 
sought to reinstate the feudalism that had previously characterized their rule.
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D. A. Rinkes’s partnership and lecture tour with the Sarekat Islam aer the 
hormat circular’s release in 1913 particularly irked European civil servants and 
the European colonial press. Moreover, to their dismay, Governor General Van 
Idenburg fully supported Rinkes’s speeches and the growth of the nationalist 
association. Not only was a condential and humiliating letter leaked to the 
press, now the colonial government added insult to injury by debating the re-
cent circular publicly with Javanese nationalists. A periodical for European civil 
servants insisted that Rinkes’s ideas could only result in complete disobedience 
from the Javanese, who were instructed to no longer show deference to their 
superiors. is was a grave mistake, according to the press, since obedience and 
servitude were important Javanese character traits. e press argued, “Whoever 
disconnects the Javanese of these traits, changes their character, takes away their 
most precious possession, and turns them into anarchists during this current 
phase of their evolution.”65 In the years that followed, both European civil ser-
vants and the traditional Javanese elite would use this argument about the pres-
ervation of Javanese culture and identity to justify their intention to re-feudalize 
Javanese society.
In late 1916, Hazeu, the advisor for native aairs, reached out to the governor 
general to express his concern over the growing disquiet permeating colonial 
society. He argued that the agitation primarily stemmed from conservative Eu-
ropeans’ unreasonable rejection of the indigenous population’s national awaken-
ing, which he emphasized was the desired result of the Ethical Policy. According 
to Hazeu, the reactionary movement among Europeans was the real threat to 
colonial peace and order. To reinforce his argument, he brought up Assistant 
Resident M. B. van der Jagt’s recent publications, in which he mused nostalgi-
cally about the aristocratic spirit at the root of colonial authority and lamented 
the loss of the payung as a powerful symbol of colonial power. Van der Jagt’s 
writings reected the reactionary conviction that the Ethical Policy encouraged 
the Europeanization of indigenous society, transforming a naturally deferen-
tial and servile people into insolent and assertive nationalists. Such arguments 
implied that halting or even reversing the Ethical Policy and the 1913 hormat
circular could restore the subservient Javanese.66
Waxing wistfully about the good old days, Hazeu warned, would not reverse 
the direction of societal development—quite the contrary. To clarify his per-
spective, he shared his impressions of the Sarekat Islam’s rst national meeting 
in 1916, where the association’s representatives and members formulated clear 
aspirations, such as participation in government administration, political rep-
resentation, legal certainty, an end to arbitrariness, and to be treated as equal 
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citizens rather than as inferior or lesser people. Hazeu reported that, while the 
association greatly appreciated the colonial government’s recent support, specif-
ically the hormat circular, he observed a growing awareness among the attendees 
that they were not given what they were due. Recognizing this as an enduring 
change in mentality, he therefore argued that it was imperative to not turn back 
the clock, as the reactionaries proposed, but to continue working with indige-
nous leadership to guide the nationalist movement, as “time is running out.”67
Heeding Hazeu’s counsel, the government continued to view the national 
awakening as a positive development. However, at the same time, the tone of 
the debate in both the colonial and vernacular press hardened considerably. As 
the presses catered to dierent readerships, there was initially little direct dis-
course between the opposing sides. eir dissociation suddenly changed with 
the inauguration of the People’s Council (Volksraad) in May 1918. Originally 
intended to be a European advisory committee to the colonial government, the 
People’s Council was recongured to include indigenous Javanese, Chinese, and 
Arab representatives. While it was not a truly representative body—half of the 
members were not elected but appointed, and the majority were still European—
the People’s Council did provide a relatively safe place for open discussion, as 
members were protected from censorship law on the council oor. As a result, 
the inaugural meeting featured feisty debates between conservative Europeans 
and progressive nationalists.
Van der Jagt was sworn into the People’s Council to represent the interests 
of the European colonial civil service. By this time, he had rmly established 
himself as one of the strongest proponents of the reactionary movement, advo-
cating for strict observance of hormat, reinvigorating the Javanese aristocracy 
to counter the nationalist movement, and protecting indigenous people from 
negative European inuences. Above all, Van der Jagt was convinced that co-
lonial rule depended on the maintenance of Javanese traditions, such as aristo-
cratic culture, etiquette, and deference. During his rst address in the People’s 
Council, he underscored this belief by again recalling the payung from distant 
memory, describing it as an inexpensive emblem of power, similar to a crown in 
the West. He argued that discarding the payung destroyed “the symbolic bridge 
between an Oriental people and the Western bearer of authority.”68 Like many 
other colonial o
cials, Van der Jagt believed that this loss of symbolism resulted 
in subversive behavior among the colonized. For instance, Van der Jagt him-
self was oended when the president of the Sarekat Islam in his district dared 
to address him in Dutch, and without waiting for permission, seated himself 
in a chair during a meeting. Irritably, Van der Jagt described the local leader’s 
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attitude as a “hybrid mixture of Western and Javanese allures and manners and 
a childish naivety with rened impertinence.”69 Moreover, just as he had repri-
manded the Sarekat Islam leader for his behavior, he ercely criticized the Eth-
ical Policy in the People’s Council meeting. While there was some pushback 
from Europeans—for instance, the liberal editor Stokvis argued that hormat 
was “one of the causes of a not very symbolical distancing between colonizer and 
colonized”—this time around, the strongest rebuttal of Van der Jagt’s reaction-
ary ideas came from indigenous representatives in the People’s Council itself.70
Governor General Van Limburg-Stirum personally appointed several promi-
nent nationalist movement gures to the People’s Council—a gesture symboliz-
ing the coalition between progressive Dutch and indigenous nationalists. ese 
representatives voiced the strongest condemnation of Van der Jagt’s reactionary 
position. First to speak was Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, one of the cofounders of 
the Indische Party (Indies Party) and an intellectual driving force in the national 
awakening. Tjipto immediately tested the limits of his mandate, publicly calling 
into question the legitimacy of the council and insulting European civil servants 
outright. In unmistakable terms, Tjipto argued that Van der Jagt’s comments 
illustrated that European o
cials were trapped in the past and unable to accept 
that they were mere servants of the government rather than the dictators of yes-
teryear—petty kings within their administrative districts. Instead of adapting to 
the times, he accused Van der Jagt and his colleagues of trying to bring back the 
“older sister of Miss Ethics, the hag Mrs. Ancien Régime.” is old but familiar 
character, he continued, “needed to chase us back to sleep, tamper our desire for 
human rights, and delay our march to a brighter future.”71
Tjokroaminoto, president of the Sarekat Islam, concurred with Tjipto’s as-
sessment, and was quick to point out the centrality of the hormat circular to the 
entire discussion. He proclaimed that the hormat circular was perhaps the most 
remarkable government regulation in Indies history, as it essentially constituted 
an acknowledgement of indigenous people’s national awakening and grievances, 
and a public self-reection on colonial o
cials’ behavior. He also recalled how, 
with Rinkes’s help, Sarekat Islam members learned that indigenous people had 
the same right to humane and just treatment as Europeans. But to o
cials like 
Van der Jagt, Tjokroaminoto continued, the circular made indigenous people 
arrogant and bold: “Where they used to crouch and show respect to every Euro-
pean, to everyone wearing a coat and trousers and hat, they now dare to assault 
Europeans.” e latter was a reference to increasing social tensions that found 
their expression in strikes, attacks on estates, and racial riots in Kudus in Oc-
tober 1918, all attributed to Sarekat Islam agitation. Tjokroaminoto concluded 
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that Van der Jagt’s words could only be interpreted as a call to forcibly re-instill a 
sense of respect for European o
cials among indigenous people before it was too 
late. is was an anathema to Tjokroaminoto, as it went against everything that 
the government and the national awakening had worked so hard to achieve.72
In his retort the following day, Van der Jagt demonstrated that he was much 
better at doling out criticism than receiving it. Tjipto and Tjokroaminoto’s 
words clearly hit a nerve. Van der Jagt was aronted by the public nature of 
the criticism of the European civil service in the vernacular press and, now, on 
the oor of the People’s Council. How dare the colonized challenge and insult 
the colonizer so directly? Dropping all pretenses, Van der Jagt accused Tjipto 
and Tjokroaminoto of “breaking and dismantling” Javanese traditions by push-
ing for Europeanization. Van der Jagt was particularly bothered by the cultural 
modes of resistance encouraged by the hormat circular, such as the adoption of 
Western dress, insistence on conversing in Dutch, and refusal to crouch. He no 
longer considered these acts to be innocent growing pains of a “forward looking 
primitive people,” but rather, “malicious, even criminal, action masked by sweet 
words and phrases and slogans that lead the Javanese astray” from their tradi-
tions, culture, and identity.73 In short, the innocence of the nationalist move-
ment was long gone. For Van der Jagt and his conservative cohort, it had become 
a danger to colonial authority and Javanese tradition that needed to be stopped.
e confrontation among the three men did not end there but continued 
during a preparatory meeting of the People’s Council exploring the possibility of 
a native militia. As a government representative, Hazeu also attended the gather-
ing, which made a lasting impression. For instance, the advisor was stunned that 
Van der Jagt purposely addressed a Javanese committee member in low Javanese 
(ngoko) because he was unsure if the person was “worthy” of a conversation in 
either Dutch or high Javanese. With such behavior, Van der Jagt publicly deed 
the hormat circular—in the presence of its author, no less. e atmosphere in the 
meeting worsened when someone proposed to only enroll intellectuals—mean-
ing educated—Javanese into the potential native militia, which then prompted 
Van der Jagt to proclaim that there were no Javanese intellectuals. According 
to Hazeu, the assistant resident even declared that there was more culture in 
his own chair than in the Javanese people, since all of the culture in Java was 
imported from abroad. is was too much for Tjipto to tolerate. He stood up 
and politely told Van der Jagt, “e dierence in opinion between the two of us 
is too considerable for me to be able to cooperate with you,” and angrily le the 
room.74 Van der Jagt stood by his remarks, and continued to proudly represent 
the conservative bloc within colonial politics in the People’s Council.
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Hazeu found Van der Jagt’s behavior profoundly unsettling and once more 
took up his pen to write the governor general. He made his position very clear: 
behaviors and comments such as those made by Assistant Resident Van der Jagt 
should be impossible under the latest hormat circular. More importantly, ac-
cording to Hazeu, Van der Jagt was not alone in his beliefs; his mentality was 
widely shared among European o
cials as well as Javanese aristocrats. ere-
fore, he urged the governor general to take a powerful stand against those civil 
servants who still ignored, opposed, or ridiculed these government regulations. 
From a disciplinary perspective, Hazeu wrote, such persistent contempt for the 
highest authority could not be tolerated, as indigenous leaders could interpret 
government inaction as a lack of commitment to the national awakening.
In contrast to August 1913, this time Hazeu’s warning fell on deaf ears.75
Governor General Van Limburg-Stirum was not convinced that another hor-
mat circular, public reprimand, or other form of chastisement directed toward 
the European civil service was politically expedient. Tensions in the Indies had 
reached a boiling point, as the end of World War I brought the specter of social-
ist revolution to the colonial world. e outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1917, 
in Germany in 1918, and ever so briey in the Netherlands in November 1918 
lled colonial authorities with dread, fearing they would inspire the national-
ist movement. e governor general sought to stymie the development of these 
tensions by promising reforms in meetings of the People’s Council in November 
1918. ese so-called November promises (November beloen) comprised colo-
nial authorities’ vague intent to grant indigenous people greater participation 
in governance, specically by expanding the People’s Council’s responsibilities. 
While indigenous leaders received these promises with cautious optimism, con-
servative European civil servants, planters, and citizens ercely rejected them. 
us, the November promises ultimately enhanced the reactionary movement 
enormously, strengthening conservative Europeans’ conviction that the Ethical 
Policy had reached its limits. Van Limburg-Stirum had no intention of stoking 
these anxieties further by following Hazeu’s advice.76
In 1919, the polarization of colonial society continued, eventually resulting in 
Hazeu’s professional downfall as well as the breakdown of the coalition between 
progressive Dutch and progressive Indonesians. On top of the strikes, mass meet-
ings, and protests of the previous years, the outbreak of violent incidents linked 
to the Sarekat Islam in 1919 further reinforced the reactionary bloc’s position. 
In June a Dutch civil servant was murdered in Toli-Toli (Sulawesi) following 
a Sarekat Islam leader’s propaganda tour in the region. e following month 
alleged Sarekat Islam followers in Garut (western Java) were believed to have 
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plotted an armed resistance and were killed by the authorities. While Hazeu 
continued to defend the Sarekat Islam as the desired outcome of the Ethical Pol-
icy, most Europeans came to see it as an association of radicals and agitators that 
threatened colonial peace and order. e advisor for native aairs was mocked in 
the colonial press as a contemporary Don Quixote, searching for an imaginary 
“Ethical Dulcinea.” Reactionary journalists blamed Hazeu for indoctrinating 
successive governor generals with dangerous ethical ideals. His name became 
a synonym for weakness in dealing with the colonized, and in one of the more 
personal attacks, a conservative newspaper called him a moron, “a being stripped 
of all strength; a weak, hesitant, old-hag; a sentimental boy, too dull to exercise 
any authority.”77 ese assaults had their desired eect. Hazeu lost the governor 
general’s trust and subsequently announced his repatriation to the Netherlands 
to be a professor. With his departure in March 1920, the reactionaries crowed 
victory while indigenous leaders mourned the loss of a powerful ally. His retreat 
also signied a devaluation of the O
ce of Native Aairs, as reactionary forces’ 
inuence on colonial policy increased at Hazeu’s successors’ expense. e ver-
nacular press no longer depicted the O
ce of Native Aairs as an ally, but rather 
as an instrument of the authorities to spy on and control indigenous society.78
With Hazeu out of the way, the reactionary call to return to a more tradi-
tional form of colonial power grew louder. Illustrative of this change was Van 
der Jagt’s promotion to resident in 1922, as opposed to being reproached for his 
attitude and comments in the People’s Council, as Hazeu had suggested. at 
same year, J. W. Meijer Ranne—Van der Jagt’s successor in the People’s Coun-
cil—argued in an essay intended for civil servants that, simply put, the Ethical 
Policy had failed. Using the recent institution of mobile police units to make his 
point, Meijer Ranne wrote, “A democratic instrument of power, such as a mod-
ern police force, costs several millions more than the old Asian instrument of 
power: hormat.”79 To ensure colonial stability and end the reliance on coercion, 
he therefore suggested restoring the prestige of the European and indigenous 
civil services to their nineteenth-century glory. eir aristocratic aura would 
serve as a counterweight to the nationalist movement.80
is reactionary turn in colonial politics instilled in Indonesian intellectuals 
a great sense of distrust and disappointment. From the outset, the vernacular 
press criticized Van der Jagt’s public speeches, and journalists wondered how 
many European o
cials agreed with him.81 One author noted that even the Eu-
ropeans who conversed with educated Indonesians in Dutch always addressed 
them with the informal pronoun jij and expected the formal pronoun U in re-
turn.82 A deep suspicion toward the reactionary movement was clearly reected 
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Figure 4. Advertisement for a Sundanese language course suggests that by learning 
to speak Sundanese—a hierarchical language, like Javanese—European planters can 
transform insolent subjects into obedient ones who show them customary deference. 
Source: Algemeen Landbouwweekblad voor Nederlandsch-Indië, April 22, 1921.
in numerous newspaper articles suggesting that the government had revoked the 
1913 hormat circular and required that the colonized crouch again. A contrib-
utor to the Sinar Hindia even went so far as to compare revoking the circular 
to being forced to lick old and stinking saliva from the ground. While other 
reactions were less unsavory, they all agreed that the general populace could not, 
and would not, return to old-fashioned feudal customs.83
For all its nostalgic musings, the reactionary turn did not result in a return to 
the nineteenth-century hegemonic script. e hormat circular was far too inu-
ential, instilling a growing number of Indonesians with the self-worth, language, 
and actions to irreparably disturb the colonial performance. is is an important 
but oen overlooked aspect of the “age in motion,” brought on by Soemarsono 
and others like him who demanded equality. As the vernacular press rightly 
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observed, reestablishing such traditions was an impossibility that would require 
physical coercion and destabilize colonial society completely. Rather than take 
that route, the reactionaries sought to halt the modernization of indigenous so-
ciety—to slow down changes that could result in challenges to their supremacy. 
Even so, the Javanese nationalist movement continued to push for moderniza-
tion and emancipation in the nal years of the colonial era.
Broad Emancipation and Assertive Advocacy
In November 1926, members of the Communist Party (Partai Kommunis Indo-
nesia, PKI) revolted in the streets of Batavia and in the Banten residency. How-
ever, due to internal discord, poor planning, and government intelligence, the 
intended overthrow of the colonial government rapidly descended into failure. 
A separate revolt in January 1927 in Minangkabau (western Sumatra) similarly 
turned into a asco. Nonetheless, the intent behind the revolts shocked colo-
nial authorities, which resulted in a far more repressive colonial regime. Rebels 
were arrested, imprisoned, executed, or placed in internment camps in New 
Guinea. Press censorship increased, as did political oppression. As historians 
have pointed out, this marked the denitive end of the Ethical Policy era in colo-
nial Indonesia. e outbreak of open violence and the government’s reliance on 
its coercive apparatus raised the question of whether there could have been a way 
to restore colonial peace and order before the eruption of such conict.84 e 
authorities found it hard to reconcile their own notion of the colonized as doc-
ile and submissive with these events and eagerly blamed outside interference by 
foreigners, especially China, for the outbreak.85 But it also brought back to the 
fore the question of the outward appearance of colonial authority. In response 
to the communist revolts, both European conservatives and Indonesian moder-
ates lobbied to fortify the civil services by either restoring traditional forms of 
deference or completely disavowing them.
In the minds of many Europeans, the communist uprisings conrmed what 
the conservative colonial press had propagated for years: that the abolition of tra-
ditional forms of deference and status symbols would inevitably result in a cycle 
of anticolonial insurrections and repressive countermeasures.86 Karel Wybrands, 
one of the colony’s most conservative newspaper editors, rhetorically questioned 
if “the communist revolts and radical agitation could have reached such heights 
if deference etiquette had not been relaxed.”87 e obvious answer, according 
to Wybrands, was no. e colonial press identied the hormat circular of 1913 
as one of the primary causes of the revolts with a curious mix of apprehension 
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and vindication. ere was great concern about the largest insurgence since the 
Java War a century earlier, but to conservatives, these events exposed the Ethical 
Policy’s shortcomings more than anything else. According to Samuel Kal, a 
retired newspaper editor, it was now evident that “an Eastern people, which still 
has great respect for outward appearance, needs to be governed according to 
Eastern traditions.”88 Promoting this perspective, the conservative press argued 
that reintroducing traditional deference etiquette and other symbols of power 
would strengthen the colonial civil services, restore colonial peace and order, 
and pacify the communist and nationalist movements. ey further justied 
this reactionary proposal with the culturally relativist claim that the govern-
ment should not intervene in local customs but rather leave it to Indonesians 
themselves to change over time. But unsurprisingly, the colonized had no desire 
to turn back the clock.89
Moderate Indonesians’ response to the communist uprisings was precisely 
the opposite of the reactionary proposal. eir perspective was most pointedly 
articulated by Achmad Djajadiningrat, the progressive bupati of Batavia. In 
meetings of the People’s Council in June and July 1927, Djajadiningrat suggested 
that communism might be contained by increasing the indigenous civil service’s 
inuence on the population. is, he reasoned, could not be achieved by rein-
troducing outdated deference rituals, as the “glory of the payung belongs to the 
past,” but by strongly emphasizing merit and character.90 According to Djajad-
iningrat, this was the only way to entice educated Indonesians into a civil service 
career without the fear of having to submit to humiliating displays of deference. 
Subsequently, the overall quality of the civil service would improve, as would 
its social standing.91 Other Indonesian representatives on the People’s Council 
echoed Djajadiningrat’s analyses but added that the idea would require substan-
tial changes to the civil service. Traditional deference forms were still prevalent 
in both branches, but especially among indigenous administrators. Representa-
tive Soeroso shared his amazement that o
cials, “in a time of elegant footwear 
and Zeiss-glasses. . . still dare to require such deference.”92 His colleague Soejono, 
a progressive bupati from Pasuruan, concurred and publicly called for a new 
hormat circular that applied to the indigenous civil service explicitly, rather than 
to European o
cials alone.93
In his 1929 opening address to the People’s Council, Governor General De 
Grae nally addressed the intensifying debate on the outward appearance of 
colonial authority. In front of his assembled advisory council, he praised the 
European and indigenous branches of the colonial civil service as pillars of co-
lonial rule. However, he impressed on his audience that the pillars’ stability did 
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not depend on their rigidity but on their exibility to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances. He implied that the prestige of colonial o
cials—and by extension 
the authority of the government—could not depend on “articially preserved 
traditions and etiquette” but on the intrinsic quality of their work and charac-
ter. Referencing Djajadiningrat’s observation that educated young Indonesians 
preferred careers outside the civil service, De Grae warned that clinging to 
outdated deference etiquette alienated the colonized from the colonial author-
ities. With a sense of urgency, he asserted, “Obsolete hormat traditions can no 
longer be retained,” and expected colonial o
cials to display proper manners 
and civilized behavior in accordance with the times.94 To ensure that his mes-
sage came across, De Grae deliberately opted for a public announcement in 
the People’s Council rather than another circular. And although the governor 
general specically directed his words toward those European civil servants who 
still ignored the hormat circulars of the previous decades, he strongly implied 
that their meaning extended to indigenous civil service culture and interactions 
between o
cials and colonial subjects more broadly.95
Unsurprisingly, the European colonial press and o
cialdom were highly crit-
ical of the so-called hormat passage in De Grae’s annual address. Just as in 1913, 
they particularly resented the public nature of the governor general’s stern com-
ments, which they feared further undermined European standing in colonial 
society.96 B. J. Suermondt, the representative for the Association for European 
Civil Servants, articulated these sentiments in the People’s Council. Recalling 
the prohibition of the ceremonial payung in 1904, Suermondt claimed that the 
“hormat passage” resulted in a loss of prestige that could only be compensated 
with higher police expenditures.97 Regarding the demand that o
cials display 
“civilized behavior,” he wondered aloud what civilization the governor general 
had in mind. In a twist of cultural relativism, Suermondt reminded the council 
that colonial Indonesia was home to various civilizations—Western, Chinese, 
Javanese, and more—and argued that none should be elevated over another. 
Suermondt also repeated a frequent claim made in the colonial press: that the 
majority of Indonesians, especially those in rural areas, did not nd it humiliat-
ing to show deference to their superiors by squatting, crouching, or presenting a 
sembah. It was this silent majority that needed the government’s protection from 
the damaging whims of culturally estranged, Western-educated intellectuals.98
In other words, a change in deference traditions should stem from within indig-
enous society, not be imposed by the colonial government.
Among Indonesian representatives on the People’s Council, as well as in the 
vernacular press, there was widespread appreciation for De Grae’s “hormat 
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passage.”99 Representative Wiranatakoesoema expressed “profound gratitude” 
for the governor general’s words, while Soejono described them as “coming 
straight from his own heart.” In addition, Dwidjosewojo praised the passage 
for its “broad social signicance.”100 Interestingly, it was this topic that guided 
the ensuing debate, as discussants considered the speech’s impact on the culture 
within the indigenous civil service and on interactions between people in posi-
tions of power and commoners in general. European civil servants’ alleged (mis)
behavior was conspicuously absent—an omission that reected a transformative 
moment in the ongoing discussion about the outward appearance of authority. 
e conversation was no longer merely about demanding equality within colo-
nial society, but about establishing a clearly dened, modern national cultural 
identity. For instance, Soejono rhetorically wondered if the Menadonese, Am-
bonese, or Sumatrans were impolite for not conforming to Javanese deference 
etiquette and dress. Clearly they were not, as each community had its own def-
erence and sartorial traditions. However, according to Soejono and his peers, the 
challenge would be to rewrite the script guiding social interactions in such a way 
that worked for all Indonesians. ey would need to apply this sort of agreeable 
modication to the indigenous civil service, as well.101
During the deliberations in the People’s Council, several speakers brought up 
Bupati Nitinegoro of Probolinggo (east Java). Nitinegoro had recently attempted 
to modernize the indigenous civil service in his regency by issuing a local hormat
circular. is initiative was applauded as an example of self-improvement that 
could be emulated elsewhere. Bupati Nitinegoro’s actions were informed by con-
cern about the civil service’s dwindling popularity among young Indonesians, 
whom he believed were essential to proper governance in his regency. He believed 
that civil servants too oen masked their own ineptitude by demanding servile 
deference—a mandate that deterred talented youth—and implied that a com-
petent civil servant was one who did not rely on excessive deference. Nitinegoro 
looked to Turkey and Egypt for inspiration, arguing that while Java remained 
backward, these two countries had successfully shed the outdated cultural tra-
ditions that had previously held them back. His own hormat circular, issued in 
December 1928, stipulated that civil servants were not allowed to squat or crouch. 
In addition, he no longer expected them to present the sembah but permitted 
anyone who was uncomfortable with the change to oer it once on arriving and 
once on departing a meeting. With regards to clothing, the bupati allowed his 
civil servants to wear European dress (dened as a suit and shoes) but always in 
combination with a Javanese headscarf (ikat kepala). As these terms demonstrate, 
Nitinegoro sought to adapt Javanese traditions to the modern era.102
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Bupati Nitinegoro’s hormat circular provided an inspiring blueprint for those 
interested in reforming the indigenous civil service. In nearby Surabaya (only 
sixty miles from Probolinggo), the local branch of the Persatoean Prijaji Bestuur 
Boemipoetera (PPBB; Association of Indigenous Civil Servants) formed a spe-
cial committee tasked with formulating hormat policy. In June 1929, the com-
mittee presented its recommendations, which reected those in Nitinegoro’s 
circular. e committee proposed that civil servants converse in Dutch if possi-
ble, or alternatively, in Malay; always wear European clothes and footwear (and, 
if needed, glasses) in combination with a Javanese headscarf during meetings; 
and no longer sembah-jongkok.103 e Surabaya branch presented their proposal 
at the national PPBB meeting in Surakarta in August 1930, where it was em-
braced.104 e PPBB also recommended government punishment for civil ser-
vants who did not conform to these regulations, but as De Grae had made clear 
in his speech, the indigenous civil service was free to decide how to shape interac-
tions within its own ranks.105 e PPBB campaign’s success was reected in the 
organization’s growing membership: about half of the bupati in Java had joined 
by 1932 and accepted the hormat conditions as decided by the association.106
However, not all Indonesians were impressed by the massive changes in indig-
enous civil service culture and by extension, indigenous society. For progressive 
social and political activists, these transformations were too little and too late. 
For instance, Soetomo, a doctor and cofounder of both Boedi Oetomo and the 
Indonesische Studieclub (a study club for Western-educated Indonesian intel-
lectuals) was highly critical of Bupati Nitinegoro’s circular. In the Indonesische 
Studieclub’s periodical, he described Nitinegoro as out of touch with both reality 
and the times. He was oended by the language used in the document, such as the 
stipulation that it applied to visitors to the bupati’s palace. As Soetomo was quick 
to point out, this terminology insinuated that the bupati considered himself to 
be a great lord or king, rather than a regional administrative servant. Moreover, 
he reminded his readers that the bupati did not write anything original; Kartini, 
the early voice of women’s emancipation, had proposed similar changes decades 
earlier, as did the Sarekat Islam, while Prince Mangkunegoro IV, ruler of one of 
Java’s principalities, prohibited sembah-jongkok in his palace in 1904. Soetomo 
also argued that Nitinegoro’s proposal was actually less progressive than it ap-
peared, as it still expected civil servants to wear a traditional headscarf. If the 
governor general did not require his indigenous servants to wear a headscarf, he 
reasoned, why should a bupati? In Soetomo’s opinion, Nitinegoro deserved ridi-
cule rather than praise and insisted that the priyayi’s self-congratulatory attitude 
would only create more resentment and anger among the people.107
106 chapter 3
As Soetomo’s erce criticism demonstrates, opinions about what constituted 
proper deference were not limited to civil service circles; it was a topic with broad 
social, cultural, and political appeal. For the many young educated professionals 
in Indonesia’s urban centers, this was a debate about self-respect and cultural 
identity. ey considered themselves to be participants in the modern world—a 
status increasingly reected in their preferred manners, language, dress, and 
consumption patterns. e continued practice of sembah-jongkok was at odds 
with this self-image, as it made them appear backward and inferior to outsiders, 
like the Dutch and Chinese. To them, these customs were tools of oppression 
that kept the colonized weak and hindered the development of a truly national 
identity. Rather than clinging to outdated traditions, many young Indonesians 
proposed disregarding them entirely in order to forge a new, more egalitarian 
national identity. eir Islamic faith provided a useful rationale to achieve this. 
In discussions, sembah-jongkok was increasingly depicted as a legacy from the 
Hindu Javanese period that was simply incompatible with Islamic principles of 
equality—the foundation behind the community of all-believers (ummah). Mus-
lims were only allowed to crouch and worship during their prayers to Allah.108
e public discussion of appropriate social deference reached its peak in 1931 
when the bupati of Lamongan (eastern Java) reprimanded teachers in his district 
for refusing to perform and instruct sembah-jongkok at local schools. Following 
the example of the civil servants united in the PPBB, many other young pro-
fessionals working in the public sector demanded to be treated with respect, as 
equals. Teachers were one of the largest professional groups to do so. At school, 
they were still expected to crouch and pay homage to social superiors, such as 
principals, school inspectors, and civil servants. Increasingly, teachers considered 
these traditions to be demeaning obstacles to progress. In the periodical pub-
lished by the Perserikatan Goeroe Hindia Belanda (Association of Teachers in 
the Netherlands Indies), numerous articles called for an end to sembah-jongkok 
to bolster teachers’ self-condence.109 Perhaps these publications inspired the 
young teachers in Lamongan when they spoke truth to power and announced 
that they would no longer humiliate themselves at work. e local bupati was 
incensed and immediately issued a circular ordering the teachers not only to 
show traditional deference themselves but also to instruct their students in these 
traditions, as these were essential skills for pursuing a career.
When the vernacular press got wind of these events, this local incident sud-
denly became a national topic of discussion.110 Once again, journalists played 
a vital role in drawing readers’ attention—primarily educated Indonesians—
to the misconduct of people in positions of power, with the ultimate goal of 
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bringing about societal change. For instance, under the headline, “Disrespect-
ful?” (Koerang Adjar), the Batavian newspaper Bintang Timoer published and 
discussed the bupati’s circular. Just as in 1913 with the infamous hormat circular, 
publishing an internal government document allowed readers to judge for them-
selves whether the teachers in Lamongan were insolent or if the bupati was arro-
gantly craving deference. Of course, the editors oered their own interpretation, 
commenting that the circular could not be dated August 7, 1931, as its contents 
suggested that it was composed in the early 1800s.111
Interestingly, the ercest criticism and most original attempt to mobilize 
public opinion originated in Java’s cultural heartland: Yogyakarta. Living 
up to its name, the Malay-language newspaper Aksi (Action), partnered with 
Javanese-language newspaper Sedio-Tomo to organize a public referendum on 
Javanese deference forms. Both newspapers published a ballot with which read-
ers could vote on whether they agreed or disagreed with the abolition of sem-
bah-jongkok. e editors of Aksi urged readers to let their voices be heard, as 
silence implied agreement with the current situation. Referencing the poll, the 
editors of Aksi echoed Bintang Timoer, writing that their readers clearly indi-
cated the time had come to break with the “frog system” (kodok-systeem)—a 
popular idiom for the crouching that characterized Javanese deference tradi-
tions—once and for all.112
In central Java, this position was still controversial and invited a rebuke 
from Javanese nationalists. Darmo Kondo, a Javanese-language newspaper in 
Surakarta, engaged in a polemic exchange with Aksi over the place of Javanese 
deference in the modern era.113 e editors of Darmo Kondo argued that social 
change could not be forced or imposed from above; rather, change would come 
gradually once society was ready to embrace the new and let go of the old. For in-
stance, while the editors acknowledged that jongkok had fallen out of favor, they 
believed that the sembah was still a powerful and essentially Javanese gesture. 
Using the sembah in social interactions was not a sign of submission or coward-
ice but a culturally relevant Javanese convention. e editors’ main argument 
was that becoming modern did not require mimicking Europeans in every way. 
ey asserted that all people use hand gestures as signs of deference: Europe-
ans salute each other, while the Chinese use the st-and-palm salute. How, they 
asked rhetorically, are these dierent from the sembah? To drive this argument 
home, the editors wondered if the Javanese should then also adopt the Dutch 
custom of kissing in public. e answer was obvious to readers—of course not; 
such acts of public aection were taboo. Other publications also defended Java-
nese traditions. Similar arguments could be found in Djawa, the periodical for 
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the Djawa Institute in Yogyakarta. For a contest about how to reform Javanese 
etiquette, the winning articles likewise preached an evolutionary perspective. In-
terestingly, these articles suggested that deference traditions only be performed 
for or in the presence of Javanese, but no longer for Europeans or anyone else. 
is, the authors claimed, would make these customs less humiliating while 
Figure 5. Opinion ballot on “sembah djongkok.” e editors of the newspaper 
Aksi ask their readers to indicate on this polling ballot whether they agree 
(moefakat) or disagree (tidak moefakat) with the statement that traditional 
deference (sembah and jongkok) is outdated. Source: Aksi, October 13, 1931.
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maintaining a strong Javanese identity. But by this time, such ideas had become 
untenable among modern Indonesians.114
In a series of articles, Aksi’s editors refuted Darmo Kondo’s reasoning and ad-
vocated for revolutionary rather than evolutionary change.115 ey recalled that 
two years earlier, several Indonesian journalists, including the editor of Darmo
Kondo, were forced to crouch, sit on the oor, and present the sembah during 
celebrations at the Surakarta kraton (palace) while their European and Chinese 
colleagues sat comfortably in chairs.116 ey eectively employed this example 
to show that Javanese etiquette made Indonesians look like submissive and weak 
“frogs” to outsiders. As the example demonstrated, the sembah diered from 
the European salute and the Chinese st-and-palm salute in that it emphasized 
social dierence. According to Aksi, presenting the sembah to someone of higher 
rank immediately made the presenter feel inferior and small. To honor God or 
one’s parents, the editors reasoned, the sembah was a proper Javanese gesture, 
but it was no longer appropriate in a multicultural colonial society of Europeans, 
Chinese, and a plethora of Indonesian o
cials all demanding it as a right. In this 
moment, the sembah and other Javanese deference traditions had become obsta-
cles to progress and self-respect, without which the Indonesian nationalist cause 
was doomed to fail. e editors understood that many Javanese considered their 
culture to be an essential part of their identity. However, they explained that just 
as wars were now fought with revolvers instead of daggers, outdated deference 
traditions needed to join ceremonial daggers (kris) in museums.117
“No Time to Waste, Change Your Kain for Trousers!”
By drawing attention to the myriad ways through which colonial authority was 
communicated and contested, the remarkable history of the hormat circular of 
1913 captures the signicance of the colonial performance of power. e circu-
lar sought to align the enactment colonial power with the new Ethical Policy’s 
hegemonic script. Conservative forces in colonial society—primarily colonial 
o
cials but also entrepreneurs, journalists, and others—resisted the transition 
away from the nineteenth-century Javanization of authority, which they argued 
would necessitate greater reliance on the coercive apparatus of the state. In con-
trast, supporters of the Ethical Policy, like Hazeu, believed that failure to im-
plement the circular would further alienate and agitate a new generation among 
the colonized and inevitably result in escalating social tensions. However, the 
hormat circular’s timing and success can only be explained by the disturbance 
of the colonial performance by Soemarsono and others like him. eir refusal to 
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sit on the ground, oer humiliating customary deference, observe the Javanese 
language hierarchy, and conform to ethnic dress codes exemplied how the col-
onized could contest and negotiate the hegemonic script. is new generation 
of educated, professional, multilingual, and globally conscious colonial subjects 
changed their attitude to demand respect and to be treated as equals in the 
colonial encounter. e circular’s message—acknowledging that government 
o
cials were fallible, recognizing that deference traditions were humiliating, 
and a pledge to rectify that—emboldened the national awakening, as reected 
at Sarekat Islam rallies and its extensive discussion in the vernacular press. In 
fact, the prompt proliferation of everyday discursive acts around 1913—so easy to 
overlook in favor of later, more direct political resistance—constituted a broad 
social transformation and change in mentality from which open politicization 
would ultimately emerge.
e intensity of the debate over social etiquette and deference only subsided 
during the last years of Dutch colonial rule. e vernacular press remained a 
critical social observer, as it continued to expose abuses committed by European 
and indigenous civil servants, but the frequency at which these reports were 
published decreased signicantly.118 On the one hand, this decline was due to 
the more explicitly political nature of public discourse; on the other, it indi-
cated that many traditional social etiquette and deference forms had retreated 
from public life. To observers, it was clear that modern Indonesians no longer 
crouched for anybody—European or indigenous—but showed and demanded 
respect in more modern ways. is was an instrumental development in the con-
struction of an Indonesian national identity. Discussions in the People’s Council 
followed a similar pattern. Aer the erce debates in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, representatives increasingly used the past tense when bringing up the issue 
of hormat in their deliberations. In 1936, Representative Soetardjo even claimed 
that the “jongkok system” was all but eradicated among civil servants, and to a 
large extent was no longer the norm in interactions with commoners. One of the 
most important reasons for this rapid change, according to Soetardjo, was the 
introduction of a new modern costume for civil servants, a European suit, which 
made the practice of sembah-jongkok much more di
cult.119 Tellingly, a few 
years earlier the editors of Aksi advised their readers a tactic that Soemarsono 
had already used in 1913: “No time to waste, change your kain for trousers!”120 As 
the next chapter demonstrates, a change of clothes was indeed a powerful way to 
challenge colonial hierarchies.
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Contesting Sartorial Hierarchies
From Ethnic Stereotypes to National Dress
I n November 1913, Raden Moehamad Enoch, a junior engineer at the Department of Public Works, patiently waited in line to purchase a second-class train ticket at the Bandung railway station. Dressed in a Euro-
pean suit, Enoch exemplied his generation of young Javanese who enjoyed a 
Western education, were uent in Dutch, and had roots in the lower aristoc-
racy but worked in nontraditional professions. When it was his turn, Enoch 
approached the window and, in Dutch, kindly requested a train ticket to 
Madiun, his hometown. e European ticket ocer, clearly annoyed, replied 
to Enoch in Malay and told him to wait. When he then immediately accepted 
a European patron at his window, Enoch stepped up to another ocer at the 
counter for third-class tickets, only to be denied service once more. On Enoch’s 
inquiry as to why he was not served at either window, the ticket ocer yelled 
at him—this time in Dutch—and told him unmistakably to either shut up or 
su
er the consequences. Enoch refused to back down, which provoked the ticket 
ocer into bellowing: “You are a native, and thus need to buy your ticket at the 
window for natives.” Instead, the proud Enoch demanded to speak to the sta-
tion chief. When the chief arrived, he was forced to acknowledge Enoch’s right 
to purchase his ticket at any window he pleased—a right that was previously 
limited to Europeans.1
On the train to Madiun, Enoch described the episode in a letter to Advisor 
for Native A
airs G. A. J. Hazeu. From their correspondence, it is evident that 
Enoch was particularly bothered by the fact that although he wore European at-
tire and spoke Dutch, the ticket ocers still refused to treat him as an equal. He 
emphasized this point when recalling the moment the ticket ocer scolded him 
for his impudence, writing with palpable astonishment and disbelief, “[But] I 
was dressed in European style.”2 While Enoch believed that he could breach the 
divide between colonizer and colonized by dressing “up,” the European ticket 
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ocers interpreted his actions as a transgression of the colonial order. How-
ever, their attempt to humiliate and re-educate Enoch backred; he was well 
aware of his rights and unwilling to relinquish them. As a result of the Ethical 
Policy’s attempt to modernize the colonial relationship, recent government cir-
culars explicitly allowed him to wear European attire, converse in Dutch, and 
be treated with respect. Not only was Enoch ultimately permitted to purchase a 
second-class train ticket, his correspondence with the advisor for native a
airs 
also resulted in a reprimand for the European personnel of the Bandung railway 
station and an ocial apology from the head inspector of the Netherlands Indies 
State Railways.
e incident at the Bandung railway station constituted a considerable chal-
lenge to the predominant ethnic sartorial hierarchy of the nineteenth century. 
Before 1900, strict sartorial regulations were a signicant component of Dutch 
attempts to legitimize their colonial authority by appropriating local etiquette. 
rough the Javanization of colonial power, the Dutch essentialized indigenous 
culture, in e
ect codifying ethnic stereotypes in laws and decrees. Police regu-
lations stipulated that everyone in the colony dress according to their ethnicity 
or position. As overseers of these regulations, the colonizers thus demanded the 
right to determine what constituted proper Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, 
Malay, Arab, and Chinese costume. ese ethnic sartorial regulations were re-
laxed and eventually abolished as part of the Ethical Policy; a modern colonial 
state could not limit the clothing choices of its population. But although this led 
many Javanese to cautiously experiment with composite dress by adding Euro-
pean elements, it did not e
ectively end the ethnic sartorial hierarchy.
Moehamad Enoch’s experience in November 1913 was not an isolated inci-
dent. In late 1913 and early 1914, the colonial and vernacular press published 
numerous accounts of young Javanese men discarding their sarong and kebaya
for trousers, shirts, jackets, and ties. e timing of what e
ectively constituted 
a sartorial revolution was certainly no coincidence. It followed in the wake of 
the hormat circular of August 1913, which prohibited European ocials from 
demanding traditional forms of deference from the colonized. e vernacular 
press and Sarekat Islam rallies not only informed the public about the circu-
lar but also encouraged them to force European compliance, emphasizing that 
dressing “up” in European style was an important way to signal a refusal to par-
ticipate in humiliating deference rituals. Clothing thus became an important 
site of the contestation of colonial hegemony. By changing their appearance, 
Javanese demanded to be treated with respect and to be considered civilized 
and modern.
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e widespread sartorial transformation in colonial society was an expression 
of larger social and intellectual changes that characterize a signicant turning 
point in Indonesian history, yet this crucial connection has not been established 
in the elaborate scholarship on dress in colonial Indonesia.3 is sartorial shi 
was a profoundly visible political statement that took many by surprise, making 
dress and the social body increasingly contested sites in the colonial relation-
ship. As anthropologist Emma Tarlo has argued, the key to unpacking these 
controversial moments is to focus on the question of “what to wear rather than 
a description of what is worn.”4 In this formulation, the human body is a social 
rather than a physical entity around which clothing serves as a marker of vari-
ous identities.5 When the Javanese embraced European attire, Dutch colonizers 
were forced to change their appearance accordingly, as they could not continue 
to don seemingly indigenous dress that was widely discarded by the Javanese 
themselves, even in the semiprivate sphere. To reassert their dominance in co-
lonial society, the Dutch increased their own sense of sartorial correctness by 
dressing “up” in the latest European fashions, while at the same time ridiculing 
identical Javanese attempts to appear modern. Even so, for the colonized, these 
experiences were empowering and inspired contemplation of what it meant to 
be modern and how clothes reected one’s ethnic or national identity. Similarly, 
Europeans were challenged to rethink their own identity in the colonial world. 
Crucially, these experiments with dress were highly gendered, raising questions 
about how clothing reected and, in some cases, challenged gender roles in soci-
ety. is sartorial hegemonic struggle was thus a signicant factor in the emer-
gence of new ethnic, national, and gender identities in colonial Indonesia.
Colonial Hegemony and the Creation of Ethnic Stereotypes
In nineteenth-century Dutch colonial Java, dress was a crucial social and racial 
marker that distinguished between colonizers and colonized. Due to a long his-
tory of racial mixing among Europeans and Javanese, as well as other groups 
in Java such as Chinese and Arabs, skin color alone did not set people apart. 
Many Eurasians appeared racially Javanese but held European status, and vice 
versa. is posed signicant challenges, as nineteenth-century colonial society 
was structured around a plural administrative and legal system. Dutch colonial 
law sorted the population into “Europeans,” “Natives,” and “Foreign Orientals” 
(mostly Chinese), and the conation of race and legal status had far-reaching 
consequences. Europeans, Natives, and Foreign Orientals were governed by 
di
erent civil service branches, prosecuted in di
erent courts, and subject to 
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di
erent legal statutes that regulated work, travel, and more. It was therefore es-
sential that the authorities be able to easily discern to which legal or racial group 
an individual belonged. Consequently, strict regulations required everyone in 
the colony to dress according to his or her ethnicity.6
e institution of dress regulations coincided with the formation of the 
Dutch colonial state in the nineteenth century. At rst, these regulations were 
issued locally, by city or district, but in 1872 they were all superseded by police 
regulations that applied to the entire colony. ese included stipulations regard-
ing dress for Europeans and natives, specifying that “whoever appears in public, 
disguised in a di
erent dress than the one corresponding with one’s ethnicity or 
position, with the exception of masked or costumed-parades” would be punished 
“with a ne between sixteen and twenty-ve guilders.”7 For the colonized, this 
was an especially exorbitant penalty. Moreover, these regulations empowered 
the colonizer to categorize colonial subjects, assign them xed ethnic costumes, 
and e
ectively dene their cultural identities.8 is included specifying dress, 
language, traditions, and customs for Javanese, Sundanese, Malay, Madurese, 
Chinese, and Arabs, as well as Europeans. Considering the deep histories of 
cultural and racial exchange in the region, this was an overtly ambitious if not 
outright impossible task. e assumption that only the Dutch could make co-
lonial society comprehensible testied to the arrogance of the colonial mindset 
and indicated a profound belief in the necessity of ethnic categorization for co-
lonial rule.
e institution of this ethnic sartorial hierarchy was an indispensable part of 
the nineteenth-century Javanization of colonial authority. In the multiracial and 
culturally hybrid colonial world, dress was a visual reection of a person’s rank, 
position, gender, ethnicity, and legal status—all of which determined social and 
interpersonal etiquette. In the everyday experience of colonialism, external ap-
pearance at a glance made social interactions and relations legible. Who was 
required to show deference to whom? What honorics were appropriate? And 
in what language(s) would the conversation be conducted? Without dress as a 
visual marker, the proper etiquette for social interactions would have been im-
possible to ascertain. It is therefore no coincidence that dress regulations coin-
cided with the Javanization of colonial authority—the Dutch appropriation and 
codication of Javanese cultural traditions. Prior to the 1872 police regulations, 
the colonial authorities clearly circumscribed the attire of the bupati and priyayi 
in specic guidelines issued in 1820 and 1824, respectively.9 Together these regu-
lations ensured that colonial hierarchies could be read instantly and reinforced 
through the Javanized performance of colonial power.
Contesting Sartorial Hierarchies 115 
e history of the sarong, a traditional wraparound skirt, and kebaya, a short 
or long-sleeved blouse closed in the front with pins or brooches, illustrates the 
complexity of assigning xed sartorial identities. Traditionally, men and women 
in Java wore a variety of long cloths around their lower body, precursors of the 
sarong. Whereas men went bare-chested, women who could a
ord it wore a 
breast wrap (kemban). Most likely under the inuence of Hindu-Javanese court 
culture (eight to eenth centuries), aristocratic women wore a sheer fabric 
blouse over their kemban. Due to the spread of Islam from the thirteenth cen-
tury onward, this sheer garment was slowly transformed into a more conceal-
ing blouse, the kebaya, which eventually became common among the Javanese. 
Around the same time, Javanese men began to wear long-sleeved shirts to cover 
their torsos as well as a form of headdress, varying from a headscarf to a cap. 
e sarong likewise evolved with changing circumstances. In the seventeenth 
century, Eurasian and European women adopted both sarong and kebaya and 
elaborated on their design. In the nineteenth century, Eurasians and Chinese 
disrupted the monopoly on batik production in Java and developed batik stamps 
(batik cap) as opposed to hand-drawn patterns (batik tulis). Production soared 
and made the batik sarong available to those outside the traditional elite, such 
as Europeans, Chinese, and lower-class Javanese. e importation of imitation 
batik from the Dutch textile industry further accelerated the process. us, 
although the sarong and kebaya became increasingly associated with local eth-
nic identities, their history reveals diverse origins and a development that was 
never static.10
e Dutch colonizer’s position in this sartorial hierarchy was ambiguous in 
the nineteenth century. European men and women wore European dress in the 
public sphere as an indication of their prestige and privilege but changed into 
clothing akin to Javanese dress in the private sphere.11 Women wore a batik sa-
rong and white kebaya. Men wore trousers made from batik, which they found 
less feminine than the sarong, in combination with a white collarless shirt. 
Although this seems counterintuitive to the sartorial hierarchy’s objective, Eu-
ropean dress in the private sphere was still clearly recognizable as that of the 
colonizer. e Dutch appropriated the batik, a familiar indigenous marker of 
status, in the wake of the Java War, thus breaking its exclusive connection with 
the Javanese aristocracy. However, they did not simply adopt Javanese batik 
styles, but under the entrepreneurial initiative of Eurasian women, designed 
their own patterns known as batik Belanda (Dutch batik). Like their embrace 
of the payung and traditional Javanese forms of deference, the Dutch used batik 
as a status symbol to legitimize their colonial authority.12
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In addition to batik cloth, European colonial attire included another visual 
marker of colonial power. Both in the public and private spheres, Europeans 
wore white. eir white shirts and kebaya in the private sphere as well as the 
high-collared white colonial suit ( jas tutup) that men wore in public (also known 
as a tropical suit) were of course practical in the hot and humid climate of Java. 
But the Dutch display of spotless white garments was also an e
ective sign of 
status, as it communicated that the wearer did not perform manual labor and 
could a
ord the expensive acquisition and maintenance of white clothes. More-
over, that white had strong connotations of Christian purity and sacrice—as 
opposed to in Java, where it was traditionally associated with death and mourn-
ing—only aided in the colonizer’s appropriation of the color. Toward the end 
of the nineteenth century, an increased number of hajjis (Muslims who had 
undertaken the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca) also donned white garb but by this 
time white clothing had already become, in the words of the editor of Batavia’s 
conservative colonial newspaper, the protective armor of colonial authority and 
prestige.13 In this way, the Dutch used clothing to maintain and visually express 
their distinction from and superiority to their indigenous subjects.14
e Ethical Policy and the Overhaul of the Sartorial Hierarchy
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, several groups in colonial soci-
ety gradually began to push back against the ethnic sartorial hierarchy. In large 
part this was due to Java’s economic opening in the 1870s and the island’s en-
suing interconnectedness with the wider world. As people, products, and ideas 
moved more freely, maintaining xed cultural traditions and stereotypes proved 
increasingly dicult. For instance, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and 
the introduction of steamships enabled the exponential growth of Hajj travel 
to Mecca from the Indonesian archipelago.15 On their return to colonial Java, 
pilgrims wanted a visual indicator of their newly acquired status as hajji. For 
some, this consisted of a white jubah (an Arab robe), while others opted for a 
white European jacket over their sarong, and almost all adopted the Arab tur-
ban.16 Around the same time, members of the small Arab Hadrami community 
living in colonial Indonesia used the same transportation networks to study in 
Ottoman Turkey. On completion of their studies, they returned to Java wear-
ing modern Turkish attire consisting of a European suit and fez, instead of a 
turban.17 e proliferation of hajjis and Arab students created a conundrum for 
colonial authorities: should and could colonial subjects be permitted to change 
their ethnic attire and identities?
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is question was further complicated by Japan’s rise as an imperial power 
and the simultaneous decline of the Qing dynasty in China, which impacted 
sartorial developments throughout Asia. Japan embraced Western appearance 
to symbolize the country’s rapid modernization and industrialization following 
the Meiji Restoration in 1868, projecting Japanese power by replacing traditional 
Samurai clothing and hairstyles, like the topknot (chonmage), with Western 
suits, uniforms, and haircuts.18 is led many to speculate about whether Japa-
nese modernization was related to their change of dress. is question became 
particularly pressing following China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894–1895. Chinese reformers contrasted the modern appearance of 
the Japanese with their own traditional look, dominated by the queue (pigtail), 
which was increasingly associated with the oppressive Qing dynasty and Chi-
nese backwardness. Beginning in the 1890s, Chinese revolutionists cut their 
queue as a form of protest.19 ese tensions a
ected colonial Indonesia, espe-
cially following the Dutch decision in 1899 to grant European legal status to Jap-
anese in the colony, an acknowledgement of Japan’s new international prestige. 
is ruling energized the large Chinese diaspora in Java who, feeling slighted, 
demanded the same privileges as the much smaller Japanese community. ey 
expressed their push for equality by forming associations, schools, newspapers, 
and economic cooperatives but perhaps most strikingly by embracing Western 
dress and cutting their queues.20
ese sartorial developments among the Japanese and Chinese provided the 
indigenous people of colonial Indonesia with a model to emulate. Associating 
European dress with modernity, progress, and respect, many Javanese began to 
adopt composite fashion, consisting of both local and European clothing.21 For 
instance, one observer remarked that women were replacing earrings made of 
rolled coconut leaves and pineapple ber pins with silver, nickel, and tin alter-
natives to secure their kebaya. Paradoxically, these sartorial experiments were 
enabled by Western imports. Following the economic opening of the colony, 
European imitation batik, colorful linen, cotton, and silk as well as leather belts, 
chainwatches, jewelry, and other consumer products found their way into Java.22
e introduction of innovative technology, like sewing machines in the 1880s, 
allowed local tailors to create modern Western attire from imported cloth.23
By the turn of the century, the streets of Batavia o
ered a diverse array of fash-
ion choices among indigenous people, from those donning any combination of 
jackets, trousers, tropical helmets, shoes, and boots to those who went barefoot 
in a simple sarong and open shirt.24 Yet very few Javanese dressed entirely in Eu-
ropean attire to the extent that they became indistinguishable from Eurasians. 
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is was the authorities’ foremost concern, as skin color was not a reliable indi-
cator of ethnic and legal status. Even so, the proliferation of composite dress—
even minimal changes like natives wearing shoes—created much anxiety in the 
colonial press and among Dutch ocials, which was reected in the upsurge of 
nes issued for sartorial transgressions.25
In formulating a more formal and extensive response to these 
turn-of-the-century sartorial challenges, the colonial government relied on the 
insights of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje. As a specialist in Islamic and Oriental 
studies and the colony’s rst advisor for native a
airs, he played an important 
role in the practical implementation of the Ethical Policy. A central tenet in 
Snouck Hurgronje’s numerous reections on the issue of dress from 1890 and 
1905 was his belief that appearance, like European fashion, was always in ux. He 
therefore argued that it was “unfathomable, that a civilized government would 
force Arabs to wear a turban, Chinese a pigtail, and natives a sarong over their 
trousers, when these subjects have rejected these elements of their appearance 
themselves.”26 Snouck Hurgronje considered the universal adoption of West-
ern attire to reect the growing interconnectedness of the age. Only those who 
loved the picturesque, were obsessed with their own prestige, and did not believe 
that the colonized could ever be equal to Europeans, could support maintaining 
these articial ethnic stereotypes through “tyrannical measures.” He therefore 
suggested a less narrow interpretation of the existing police regulations to allow 
colonial subjects the individual freedom to dress as they pleased, as long as they 
did not intend to evade the law or cause harm by disguising themselves.
In his capacity as advisor for native a
airs, Snouck Hurgronje considered a re-
quest to wear European attire, submitted by Javanese physician Raden Moekadi 
in 1903, demonstrating the social complexity of sartorial questions at that time. 
Although he had attended the School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen 
(STOVIA) medical school, spoke uent Dutch, and was used to socializing with 
Europeans, Moekadi petitioned to be allowed to wear a European suit in combi-
nation with a Javanese headdress because he was still expected to don traditional 
Javanese dress. According to Snouck Hurgronje, Moekadi was not the only one 
with the desire to change his attire; many other educated Javanese longed for 
the same privilege. is was part vanity, he reasoned, as lower ocials sought 
to mimic their superiors. But it was also because European clothes were simply 
better suited for the modern era; trousers were more practical than the tradi-
tional sarong, which restricted the wearer’s movements. Likewise, modern life 
required shoes rather than bare feet. Moreover, Snouck Hurgronje recognized 
that Western-educated Javanese were ashamed of their ethnic attire, well aware 
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that Europeans associated it with lower social status and an inferior civilization. 
He agreed that wearing European clothes was an e
ective way to appear more 
civilized and modern.27
But perhaps most importantly, Snouck Hurgronje believed that Moekadi’s 
request was motivated by his wish to evade, in the physician’s own words, the 
“onerous formalities” of Javanese society. According to the advisor, the more 
European the appearance, the less appropriate it was to engage in deference rit-
uals and conform to the Javanese language hierarchy. Snouck Hurgronje felt that 
abandoning such customs was an emancipatory development that should not be 
allowed to run its “natural course” and saw no reason to deny Moekadi’s request 
to dress “in a more or less European fashion” or to withhold the same rights from 
others. As the physician intended to continue to wear a Javanese headdress, there 
could be no confusion about his ethnic status, so he was not violating the police 
regulations. However, he did caution against too rapid—or unnatural—a pace 
of change. As a Western-educated Javanese, it was Moekadi’s responsibility to 
adjust his appearance and behavior depending on the social context. is meant 
that he could wear European attire in urban centers but might have to change 
into a sarong and o
er traditional deference in Java’s more conservative interior. 
Moreover, he cautioned Moekadi that wearing European clothes did not give 
him the right to treat others in a way he tried to avoid for himself; namely, by 
insisting on deference. Snouck Hurgronje’s elaborate deliberations on the re-
quest were published as a circular in June 1903, intended to remind European 
civil servants to be more open to sartorial changes. It was the rst step toward 
relaxing the nineteenth-century sartorial hierarchy.28
Within two years, the ocial ethnic sartorial hierarchy was dissolved en-
tirely. is was not a result of the 1903 circular but primarily due to the rapid 
emancipation of the Chinese community in colonial Indonesia. As the Chinese 
community’s demand for respect and equality grew more assertive following 
the colonial government’s decision to grant European status to the Japanese, the 
colonial press reported with increasing frequency about Chinese men cutting 
their queue. e European press was worried that the Chinese would become 
indistinguishable from the Eurasians and Japanese in their midst. European 
civil servants were unsure about what to do in these situations; some arrested 
and ned Chinese men without their queue, while others condoned the new 
hairstyle.29 In an attempt to formulate a cohesive and unambiguous response 
to these sartorial challenges, the government once again relied on Snouck Hur-
gronje for advice. is time, the advisor for native a
airs suggested completely 
abandoning the supercial connection between ethnicity and appearance.30 e 
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colonial administration issued a dress circular in March 1905, which stated that 
the government wished “to leave her subjects free from interference with regards 
to their hairstyle and dress as long as it is evident there is no intent to evade or 
break the law.”31 In theory, colonial subjects were now free to dress and style 
their hair as they pleased, but in practice, it took several years before the policy 
was implemented.
Although the dress circular of 1905 did not immediately impact everyday life 
for the majority of the colonized, it did spark a debate among young Javanese. 
Two students initiated the discussion in the periodical Bintang Hindia. A young 
medical student named Moesa took issue with his peers’ desire to don European 
clothes, inspired by Moekadi’s successful appeal.32 He described a recent inci-
dent in which, on his way home from a gamelan performance in Batavia, Europe-
ans and natives (ethnic Malay) jeered at him and shouted, “Telur asin” (literally 
“salted egg”) in mocking reference to the knot in his traditional central Javanese 
headdress (blangkon). On returning to his dorm room at the STOVIA, Moesa 
cast o
 his Javanese clothes in anger and humiliation, but almost instantly re-
gretted his actions as he considered the love, time, and e
ort his mother had put 
into making his batik sarong. is experience prompted him to argue that there 
was a logic to the colonial sartorial hierarchy, as each ethnic or national group 
looked most elegant, natural, and appropriate in their own costume. European 
clothes also obscured Javanese nationality and made them indistinguishable 
from Eurasians in Western dress, who were not only held in low regard by Euro-
peans and Javanese alike but also, due to their legal status, paid higher fares on 
trains and at theaters. As a nal caution, Moesa warned that employers frowned 
on Javanese who emulated Europeans in every way.
In response to Moesa’s article, a student attending the European secondary 
school in Semarang (Hogere Burgerschool) argued that the Javanese should not 
be so preoccupied with futilities, like appearance or deference traditions, but 
instead be concerned with transforming their mentality. If they wanted to com-
pete with Europeans and Chinese in what he tellingly described as the “struggle 
for life,” the colonized needed to become more innovative, courageous, entrepre-
neurial, and diligent. He reasoned that appearance did not hinder the Javanese 
in their glorious past nor did it prevent many of his contemporaries from gradu-
ating from European universities. He also pointed out that the Dutch were not 
bothered by similar concerns, rhetorically wondering if anyone believed that 
Europeans who were honored as Javanese with traditional deference ceased to 
be Europeans in their hearts and minds. Of course not, he argued, and there-
fore he and his peers could similarly acquire Western knowledge as long as they 
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remained Javanese in spirit. Regardless of “the clothes we wear and traditions we 
follow, we are and will remain Javanese.”33
Many subsequent contributors disagreed with both students and argued that 
a change in appearance and a change in mentality were inextricably connected. 
For them, dress was not simply an expression of a more assertive mentality; it 
was a material extension of it that was essential to suppress outdated traditions 
like deference etiquette, demand equality, and instill a sense of self-respect. At-
tire and other cultural traditions were not at all futile, but vital to the Javanese 
emancipation movement. One author recalled that only a decade earlier he was 
scorned and ned by Europeans for adopting European clothes and considered 
an indel (kar) by his own family. He felt vindicated by the dress circulars and 
argued that the twentieth century had proven that European clothes were more 
comfortable, practical, and egalitarian than his ethnic costume.34 In addition 
to altering their clothing, many young Javanese also cut their traditionally long 
hair, which according to another author, could be traced back centuries to the 
Hindu-Javanese era. But just as the Javanese had later embraced Islam, they were 
now free to adopt a neater and more hygienic hairstyle, taking inspiration from 
the Chinese in Java who had recently cut their queue and the Japanese who had 
cut their topknot.35
ese discussions in Bintang Hindia were conducted within a small circle of 
educated Javanese, an elite group that was enthralled with modernity and the 
desire to be considered equal to Europeans. But such conversations about dress 
did not reach nor involve most of the colonized, especially the majority living in 
the countryside. Even in Java’s cities, where there was plenty of experimentation 
with composite dress, most of these attempts did not blur ethnic distinctions. 
Nonetheless, they were the cause of great anxiety within the colonial press. For 
instance, a European author ridiculed a Sundanese dandy he observed wearing 
shoes, linen trousers under a shortened sarong, a high-collared dress shirt, cuf-
inks, a colorful necktie and pocket square, a tted jacket, a watch chain and 
pocket watch, and a Javanese headscarf.36 But underneath such scorn was fear of 
the possibility that the colonized would soon be indistinguishable from Europe-
ans. Without a larger source of motivation to encourage an indigenous sartorial 
makeover, however, their worries remained gratuitous.
Dressing “Up”: e Sartorial Revolution of 1913
Moehamad Enoch, the condent young engineer with whom this chapter began, 
purposefully adopted European clothing to signal that he was a cosmopolitan 
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man of the modern age. is message would have been clear to observers on both 
sides of the colonial divide, his clothes and posture communicating that he was 
educated, probably uent in Dutch, and professionally successful. But Enoch’s 
appearance would also have been immediately recognized as a contestation of 
the racial and cultural hierarchies of colonial society. His European suit was 
very much intended as a provocative means of demanding equal treatment by 
Europeans in colonial spaces, and it was perceived as such when he strode into 
the Bandung railway station on a Sunday aernoon in November 1913. By in-
sisting on his right to communicate in their language and travel in their class, 
and then complaining to colonial authorities when these rights were withheld, 
Enoch proved to be anything but the submissive subject that the Dutch believed 
the Javanese to be. His new European appearance was clearly accompanied by 
a recalcitrant attitude. And although Enoch’s story is one of exceptional nerve, 
his was by no means an isolated incident.
In late 1913 and early 1914, tens of thousands of young, educated, indigenous 
professionals—teachers, physicians, railroad employees, pawnshop personnel, 
clerks, and lower civil servants—cut their hair and adopted European clothing, 
especially trousers, shoes, and jackets. ese sartorial transformations proved 
extremely contagious; a quick succession of newspaper reports describing this 
vibrant makeover emerged within several months. e atmosphere and land-
scape of colonial society noticeably changed as colonial subjects donned their 
new outts in public squares, parks, streetcars, trains, railroad stations, theaters, 
markets, fairs, and oces. Both the colonial and vernacular press discussed the 
sudden popularity of European dress at great length. One of these dress-related 
press reports concluded, “ere is a sociological relevance to this surprisingly 
rapid development that began in September 1913; with every age a new costume 
comes into vogue and anyone who still doubts the dawn of the liberation of the 
people in the Indies should, with a little sociological insight into these symp-
toms, come to the conclusion to change the décor.”37 e author recognized 
the revolutionary nature of these sartorial changes. is was not an expression 
of mere dandyism or a desire to appear modern, nor was it a straightforward 
challenge of nineteenth-century dress regulations. By defying the etiquette, 
policies, and rituals regulating public conduct—elements that communicated 
colonial power—the new generation of Javanese did not just seek to change 
their appearance, but the underlying assumptions of the colonial relationship 
more broadly. For some, the goal was to force the implementation of the Ethical 
Policy; for others it was merely the rst step toward independence from the yoke 
of colonialism.
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is sartorial revolution was part of the larger challenge to colonial authority 
that arose following the hormat circular of 1913—a pivotal moment that forged a 
progressive coalition between Dutch proponents of the Ethical Policy and Java-
nese nationalists. While previous studies of dress in colonial Indonesia have fo-
cused primarily on the dress circulars of 1903 and 1905, sartorial change was slow 
and far from widespread until 1913.38 With the hormat circular, the government 
sought to nally align the colonial performance of power with its new “ethical” 
discourse, publicly working with the nationalist association Sarekat Islam to 
announce that civil servants were there for the people and not the other way 
around. Emboldened by the hormat circular and ensuing encouragement from 
the Sarekat Islam and the vernacular press, many Javanese demanded the right 
to sit in chairs during meetings, shake hands, and converse in egalitarian lan-
guages like Dutch or Malay as well as choose their manner of dress. ey made 
an explicit connection between attire and emancipation, arguing that when one 
dressed in European clothes, especially trousers, one could not perform tradi-
tional deference. Donning European attire thus became a provocative weapon 
to exact equal treatment from conservative Dutch and indigenous forces in co-
lonial society, and many Javanese rapidly adopted European dress in the months 
following the hormat circular of 1913.
e Sarekat Islam, the rst Indonesian association to have a mass following, 
played a major role in promoting this view about freedom of dress to the public, 
presenting a change in costume as an e
ective method of resistance. Adjunct 
Advisor for Native A
airs D. A. Rinkes, who attended these gatherings to show 
government support for the association, was struck by the numerous followers 
donning European attire, particularly trousers, at meetings and rallies. He wit-
nessed progressive members encouraging each other to adopt European dress 
as a means of evading traditional deference demands and commanding more 
respect from Europeans and Chinese alike. Several local branches of the Sarekat 
Islam even issued their own dress regulations stipulating that members wear 
trousers and shoes.39 However, Rinkes also reported that indigenous support for 
the sartorial makeover was not unanimous. Some Javanese nationalists feared 
the loss of traditional culture and identity and were also concerned about the 
potential destruction of the batik industry. In addition, according to Rinkes, 
orthodox Muslims argued that wearing European attire constituted emulating 
kar (indels) in thought or appearance, which was strictly prohibited. In re-
sponse, progressive Sarekat Islam followers circulated a fatwa (religious ruling) 
from Egypt, the center of the Islamic modernist movement, stating that wear-
ing trousers was not in conict with the Islamic faith.40 In this and other ways, 
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progressive nationalists embraced sartorial transitions as an important step to-
ward emancipation.
e vernacular press reported extensively on the sartorial makeover as it trans-
pired in colonial society. Press coverage made it clear that the protagonists of this 
movement were primarily young, educated professionals who hailed from the 
lower priyayi and the nascent middle classes. It was precisely these groups that 
felt most frustrated with and humiliated by the continued prevalence of hormat 
etiquette, and they embraced dress as way to end these degrading customs. ese 
reports played an important role in adding momentum to the transformation 
that was taking place, instilling condence in and providing inspiration for 
their readership. For instance, when articles about school teachers in Batavia 
who voted to wear European attire to work were published in November 1913, 
reports of teachers doing the same in Malang, Bandung, and Surabaya soon fol-
lowed.41 Similar reports appeared about other professional groups, such as civil 
servants, pawnshop personnel, and railroad employees.42 From his exile in the 
Netherlands, Soewardi Soerjaningrat saluted these developments, exclaiming, 
“Bravo! is proves the unwillingness to be treated as inferior in the future. is 
is what happened when one was dressed in indigenous clothing. If one appears 
European in the Indies, one looks more prominent. at is the right that the 
indigenous peoples demand for themselves, to be prominent and engaged.”43
Emphasizing that shiing circumstances shaped fashion, a contributor to the 
Oetoesan Hindia (Messenger of the Indies) reminded readers that it was only 
natural for clothing to adjust to the times. Even what many considered tradi-
tional Javanese dress, he argued, in part originated elsewhere. For instance, the 
white cloth necessary for batik production traditionally came from the Indian 
subcontinent, while under Dutch colonial rule they were imported from Europe. 
e batik stamps that enabled the mass production and consumption of batik 
cloth were only invented aer the Java War (1825–1830), and their use pioneered 
by European and Chinese entrepreneurs. As for the traditional shirt (baju) worn 
by Javanese men, the author argued that it was inspired by Spanish and Portu-
guese inuences in the archipelago. Most Javanese men would have originally 
gone bare-chested like the indigenous peoples of Papua (western New Guinea). 
Finally, he claimed that Arab, Chinese, and European norms inspired Javanese 
footwear. By explaining the diverse roots of Javanese clothes, the author argued 
that ethnic groups did not have xed costumes nor did their identity depend on 
them. Aer all, the modern Japanese and Chinese did not lose their identities 
when they discarded their kimonos and queues.44 For those who feared a loss of 
identity or prestige by wearing trousers, the author suggested that if they insisted 
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on a traditional look, they would have to wear a costume made from banana tree 
bers.45 In other words, the Javanese should feel free to don European clothes, as 
they were most suited to the modern era.
However, many understood that these changes in appearance were about 
much more than simply adjusting to the times; they were part of a broad move-
ment for social emancipation that was closely linked with the issuance of the 
hormat circular of 1913. For instance, in the typical satirical style of editor Marco 
Kartodikromo, several contributions to his periodical Doenia Bergerak (e 
World in Motion) sketched out what was at stake by taking the perspective of 
power holders like Dutch civil servants and bupati.46 In an article about the 
hormat circular, an imaginary ocial asked the reader directly: “Why are you 
discarding your sarong and headscarf and replacing them with shoes and a suit?” 
Does the reader not realize, the author continued, that without their traditional 
outt, “you do not want to worship or crouch for me anymore?” e author went 
on to wonder why the reader had cut their hair: “Because if you cut your hair 
your head will feel cold, if your head is cold, you gain a clear mind, which makes 
you smarter, and when you are smarter you no longer want to honor me.”47 e 
author declared that not receiving such deference would surely kill him! is 
was a recurring theme in Doenia Bergerak; another article claimed that a bupati 
fainted on seeing a Javanese in European attire, while a di
erent bupati allegedly 
had a heart attack when he spotted a Javanese wearing shoes. e author sug-
gested walking past his house oen in order to make him sick.48
Unsurprisingly, the majority of the traditional Javanese ruling class ercely 
contested the sudden acceleration in the westernization of indigenous appear-
ance, in defense of their own aristocratic privileges and rank in colonial soci-
ety.49 As an author in the Oetoesan Hindia explained, the adoption of Western 
dress undermined the entire system of deference that informed all social inter-
actions. As an example, he presented an awkward situation that unfolded when 
a European controller met with a subdistrict administrator (wedana) wearing 
traditional dress and an indigenous teacher donning European clothes. e 
wedana sat on the oor during the meeting, as was customary, but the teacher, 
wearing trousers, could not. Since o
ering him a chair would further insult the 
higher-ranking wedana, the teacher had to stand throughout the meeting.50 An-
other article recounted that to avoid such a situation, a bupati simply refused to 
receive an indigenous engineer from the Department of Public Works because 
he wore European dress.51 For similar reasons, local ocials in Bojonegoro tried 
to prohibit young people from wearing European footwear in order to maintain 
clear class distinctions.52
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However, such attempts became increasingly dicult to enforce, as assertive 
young Javanese had the support of the colonial government, the Sarekat Islam, 
and the vernacular press.
Kartodikromo took a direct, activist stance toward the many letters and re-
ports he received from indigenous people who wanted to wear European clothes 
but were either intimidated or thwarted by their superiors or did not even dare 
try for fear of the imagined repercussions. In order to familiarize colonial sub-
jects with government regulations and better understand their rights, he decided 
to publish a Malay translation of the dress circular of 1905, in which the governor 
general had conrmed years earlier that people had the right to dress according 
to their own desires. Kartodikromo’s goal was to create an informed and critical 
readership that could stand up for itself and hold its superiors accountable. To 
o
er further reassurance, so “that the readers of Doenia Bergerak do not worry 
too much about wearing European clothes,” he insisted that he never encoun-
tered any problems while donning European attire himself.53 He even argued for 
an egalitarian, standard dress style for the people of the Indies, which he believed 
should reect European norms.
e vernacular press provided a crucial platform for readers to not only share 
their experiences but also put pressure on those unwilling to comply with the 
existing dress regulations. When a government employee sought Kartodikromo’s 
advice about his Dutch boss who did not allow him to wear European attire to 
work, Doenia Bergerak printed a response. In his editorial commentary, Karto-
dikromo encouraged the reader to persist in dressing as he pleased, as was his right, 
even if his supervisor was “crazy for deference.”54 In several other articles, Karto-
dikromo encouraged his readers to not give up the ght and stand up for their 
rights.55 Doenia Bergerak as well as other publications were lled with complaints 
and recommendations like this.56 Disclosing negative incidents was cathartic; it 
demonstrated that being denied one’s rights was a shared experience and created 
an awareness among the colonized that they were not alone. ey enacted their 
awakening by shedding their native dress along with their indolence, and became 
more assertive in colonial society. is sartorial revolution heralded, according to 
one journalist, the arrival of the “age of progress” in colonial Indonesia.57
Dress and Identity: Ethnicity, Nationality, and Gender
e sartorial revolution of 1913–1914 was a pivotal moment in the hegemonic 
struggle to remove cultural traditions as obstacles to progress. e pace and 
character of these changes took many by surprise and raised questions about 
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what it meant for Javanese ethnic, national, and gender identities. Had the Ja-
vanese gone too far in their emulation of Europeans? Could one truly become 
equal to them by donning their dress? Had they lost their identity in the pro-
cess? And what were the distinct implications for men versus women? Di
ering 
opinions on these issues reected a division within the national awakening, as 
Javanese grappled with the implications of breaking with nineteenth-century 
norms. At the heart of these disagreements between those known as Javanese 
nationalists and those known as Indies nationalists were the questions of who 
belonged to the newly imagined nation and what represented the nation. Java-
nese nationalists valued the nation’s aristocracy, characterized by its elite culture, 
including hierarchical deference and etiquette traditions. ey sought to restore 
the greatness of Majapahit’s fourteenth-century Hindu-Javanese kingdom. In 
contrast, Indies nationalists believed that the colonized formed a single nation 
that through modernization and democratization could become an independent 
nation-state. For both sides, clothing signaled these distinct hopes for the future; 
the ostensibly egalitarian power of the European suit appealed to proponents of 
Indies nationalism but threatened Javanese nationalists’ vision.58
Two contributors to De Indiër (e Indian), a weekly publication established 
by exiled leaders of the nationalist Indies Party in the Netherlands, promoted 
these divergent opinions. Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo was one of the most vocal 
advocates of Javanese nationalism and a staunch defender of Javanese dress. In his 
contributions, he expressed shock and amazement at the “fast and unexpected 
change of clothes” in colonial society. Soetatmo quickly linked this development 
to the hormat circular of 1913, questioning if this transformation in appearance 
transpired for the right reasons. He warned his countrymen, “A slave is and will 
remain a slave even if he wears the costume of a king,” and urged them not to 
adopt trousers and European hats as a means to avoid traditional deference.59 In 
Soetatmo’s eyes, anyone who tried to hide his servile character with trousers was 
a hypocrite. Arguing that Europeans only respected the clothes, not the person, 
he encouraged his compatriots to act like satryas (Hindu caste of warriors) and 
don indigenous dress with pride. Doing so would inspire their people to join the 
nationalist cause, not estrange them by wearing European attire.60
Soetatmo’s Javanese nationalist opinion drew a strong rebuke from Soewardi 
Soerjaningrat, at the time a clear advocate for the more inclusive Indies nation-
alism. According to Soewardi, national identity did not reside in a sarong or 
headscarf but in the hearts of the people. He agreed that Javanese dress should 
not be discarded too easily but at the same time argued that European attire had 
its benets, characterizing it as more a
ordable and practical for daily use. Most 
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importantly, Soewardi argued, European dress emancipated indigenous people 
by exempting them from servile obedience: “Time and again it is surprising to 
witness the change in the servile attitude and manners, yes even of the opinions, 
into unforced, frank, but always Eastern-polite manners, because of a change of 
clothes.”61 Soewardi considered European clothing a “weapon with which we 
force the colonizers to give our people their legitimate rights.”62 For Soewardi, 
the ends—emancipation, equality, and eventually independence—justied the 
means of adopting European attire.
In the following decade, the debate about dress continued along these lines, 
both sides echoing Soetatmo’s and Soewardi’s respective sentiments.63 e out-
break of World War I intensied the discussion, as it laid bare the West’s moral 
shortcomings and suggested that scientic and industrial development alone 
did not inevitably signify civilization and progress.64 is raised the question 
of whether it was necessary or even desirable to emulate the West in order to 
become modern and civilized. Perhaps the Javanese could simply revitalize and 
adapt indigenous heritage to the modern age.65 On the streets of colonial Java, 
people continued to experiment with their appearance and nd ways to reect 
their desired identity. A new consensus gradually emerged in the 1920s, as men 
adopted the European suit while women continued to wear traditional attire. 
is gendered divide on the issue of dress seemingly resolved concerns over 
cultural loss, as even proponents of ethnic dress supported this surprising turn 
of events.
For instance, in 1923, the Java Institute, founded several years earlier to pro-
mote and preserve Javanese culture, organized an essay competition through its 
periodical Djawa on the advantages and disadvantages of European dress.66 e 
second-place essay, a passionate defense of Javanese dress, was never published and 
remained hidden in the Djawa archives. e piece was clearly written by an ardent 
Javanese nationalist who sought to reconcile Javanese cultural traditions with the 
modern age. e author considered his countrymen’s rejection of the sarong and 
traditional headdress as “a negation of Javanese culture” that imperiled the batik 
industry and Javanese culture and identity along with it.67 e author acknowl-
edged the appeal and benets of European dress, recognizing that even when a 
Javanese in traditional attire was “more educated and intelligent than a white 
person,” Europeans still treated him with contempt. In addition, he understood 
that “modern natives nd the indigenous traditions too subservient, servile, and 
deferential and therefore consider European clothing to be more in accordance 
with their free spirit.” Yet he was convinced that sporting European clothing was 
not the solution. Like Soetatmo a decade earlier, the author reasoned that it took 
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“moral and ethical courage to present oneself as an indigenous person in a circle of 
European mediocrity.” As a compromise, he suggested that Javanese dress be worn 
outside of work hours, such as at home, while going out with women, and during 
parties, holidays, and other social gatherings. Finally, he urged nationalist and 
community leaders to don traditional attire with pride to not only set an example 
but also to ensure the preservation of the batik industry and Javanese identity.
In stark contrast, the winning essay, written by Javanese teacher Roesalam 
Dwidjadisastra, emphasized the benets of European attire over traditional Ja-
vanese dress. His essay was optimistic rather than nostalgic in tone. As a man of 
the modern era, the educator from Madiun constructed his argument around 
the latest notions of hygiene. He referred to studies that claimed that wearing 
a headscarf in hot tropical climates was an impediment to one’s intellectual 
abilities. He also asserted that the traditionally open Javanese wooden sandal 
(terompah) did not protect its wearer from injuries, worm larvae, or snakebites. 
In his experience, European clothes were more a
ordable, especially for the com-
mon man, and did not wear out as quickly. Moreover, he emphasized the greater 
practicality of European dress by reasoning that it allowed for more freedom of 
movement when partaking in sports, such as cycling, running, horseback riding, 
tennis, and gymnastics. Crucially, he also repeated Soewardi’s argument that 
European clothes communicated that one had too much self-respect to crouch 
or crawl for another person, and thus allowed the wearer much more freedom 
in social interactions. But Roesalam Dwidjadisastra’s most original argument 
in favor of European dress was that because Javanese clothes were only worn 
by the ethnically Javanese, and not by other inhabitants, they could not dene 
a national dress. e European suit was thus not only more hygienic, practical, 
a
ordable, and aspirational but most importantly, a potential symbol of Indo-
nesian national unication and identity.68 is idea about Indonesian identity 
reects signicant changes to Javanese society that began in the 1920s.
While the voices of Javanese women were underrepresented in discussions 
about dress, their appearance featured prominently in debates about clothing 
and identity. e nationalist discourse that emerged in the 1920s was centered 
on the “new Indonesian man,” for whom European suits represented political 
power. Women, on the other hand, were directed toward subordinate posi-
tions and retained traditional Javanese dress to reect their status as guardians 
of national culture.69 However, this outcome was not foregone in the imme-
diate aermath of the sartorial revolution in 1913. e vernacular press o
ers 
numerous indications that many Western-educated Javanese girls and women 
experimented with European clothing just like their male counterparts.70 Yet 
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conversations about their attempts to adopt Western fashion were not framed 
as part of the struggle against Dutch colonial rule or oppressive deference tra-
ditions but instead in terms of morality, sexuality, decency, and social freedom. 
Javanese women’s experiments with Western and composite dress posed a dual 
challenge: to the colonial hierarchy and the Javanese gender hierarchy.71
Most Javanese women who experimented with adding European clothes 
to their appearance came from a privileged background and had attended 
government-run elementary schools. e dress codes at these institutions pre-
scribed European attire for girls, such as dresses or skirts, as opposed to nongov-
ernmental institutions like the famous Kartini schools, where indigenous attire 
was mandatory.72 Javanese boys outnumbered Javanese girls by a wide margin at 
government schools. In 1915, only 5,494 students in attendance were female, a lit-
tle less than 19 percent. By 1940, attendance had increased to 33,925 (38 percent). 
Compared to Java’s population of approximately 35 million, this number was 
a pittance, but these students became inuential women in society as activists 
in women’s associations, teachers, secretaries, nurses, telephone operators, and 
more.73 Unlike boys, however, they could not continue their education at the 
secondary level—expected to retreat into the patriarchal private sphere, clad in 
traditional attire—which, according to the vernacular press, not all women did. 
By the late 1910s, frequent reports indicated that educated Javanese women em-
braced European dress. Although there were some positive progressive responses 
to this development, the Europeanization of Javanese women’s appearance was 
most oen associated with an assault on traditional gender roles.
e rapid Europeanization of the appearance of Javanese men immediately 
raised the question of the implications for Javanese women. In 1913, the author 
who analyzed the “sociological relevance” of the sartorial transformation en-
couraged women as well as men to cast aside their traditional attire. He con-
sidered clothing a means of spiritual revolution and strongly opposed the “poor 
fools who go up against the spirit of the age.”74 Several years later, another pro-
gressive observer expressed support for women in European clothing, which he 
linked to their entry into the public domain as working professionals in previ-
ously all-male environments.75 But these responses were the exception rather 
than the rule. Soetatmo, for instance, strongly argued against women dressing 
in European clothes, as such Western tendencies were in stark opposition to 
the Eastern dignity of Javanese women. In addition to jeopardizing the devel-
opment of a steadfast female character, the ever-changing whims and fancies of 
Parisian fashion threatened a man’s nances. According to Soetatmo, nothing 
was more dreadful than for a Javanese woman “to put on the airs of a fashion 
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doll or a su
ragette.” She would be much better o
 as a loyal housewife.76 Oth-
ers agreed that women should be educated to run a modern household, not to 
compete with men in the job market.77 Even the victor of Djawa’s essay contest, 
who strongly advocated for Javanese men to adopt European dress, argued that 
women should not follow their example, claiming that such attire was imprac-
tical and unattering.78 Clearly, although men disagreed about their own ap-
pearance, they found common ground on the appearance of Javanese women. 
Dress provided them with an opportunity to challenge colonial hegemony, 
while simultaneously maintaining traditional gender roles that worked to their 
benet.79
Many observers in the vernacular press warned that Western culture nega-
tively inuenced Javanese girls and women both socially and sexually. e sen-
sual character of European dress, by virtue of the amount of skin le exposed, 
was considered an a
ront to Javanese and Islamic traditions alike. Girls were 
deemed especially susceptible to such immorality, adopting short skirts and 
thin European clothes that le little to the imagination. Authors cautioned that 
scantily clad young women incited lust and passion in men when participating 
in gymnastics at school, attending dances, or merely cycling around town.80 In 
addition, there was great concern that girls in Western dress demanded the right 
to socialize freely with their friends—of both genders—going out unsupervised 
to movie theaters or strolling arm-in-arm through fairgrounds.81 Many in the 
vernacular press argued that young Javanese women were simply too di
erent 
from their European counterparts to safely imitate them. Whereas European 
girls enjoyed a socially free upbringing, Javanese girls did not and were thus 
ill-prepared to navigate male advances in public. is was further complicated 
by the assumption that Javanese girls allegedly blossomed earlier than Europe-
ans, which enhanced the danger of social interactions with the opposite sex.82
During the 1920s, authors increasingly advised that female adolescents only 
adopt from Western culture what was practical, like knowledge about running 
a household, and ignore dangerous components like improper dress and carefree 
social contact.83 ese reports demonstrate that Javanese women did experiment 
with European attire and its social and political implications alongside their 
male counterparts. However, despite a lasting sartorial revolution for Javanese 
men, widespread gendered anxiety prevented westernized appearance—and be-
haviors—from taking hold among Javanese women.
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European Responses: Putting Down and Dressing Up
e abolition of nineteenth-century ethnic dress regulations and the rapid 
sartorial transformation in 1913 challenged Europeans’ understanding of their 
alleged superiority. A peculiar situation arose, as the colonized embraced Euro-
pean dress while the colonizers continued to wear attire akin to indigenous garb 
in the semiprivate sphere. Troubling questions emerged with this new distinc-
tion: which of the two appeared more modern, and how would these changes 
a
ect both Dutch and indigenous status in colonial society?84 e possible blur-
ring—or worse, reversal—of the boundaries between colonizers and colonized 
was cause for great anxiety among the Dutch, for whom dress was employed as a 
signicant social marker demonstrating European superiority and legitimizing 
colonial rule.85 In response, the Dutch tried to di
erentiate themselves from 
the dressed “up” Javanese by out-dressing them in European fashion. A similar 
phenomenon occurred in British India, where scholar Emma Tarlo found that 
the increasing European appearance of Indian men encouraged “the British to 
make their own sense of sartorial correctness more rigid.”86 In Java, this process 
heralded the marginalization of the sarong, kebaya, and batik trousers in Euro-
peans’ wardrobes.
Dutch anxieties about clothing and appearance found expression in the con-
servative colonial press. Dramatically declaring that the sartorial transformation 
signaled an imminent end to colonial rule, editor Karel Wybrands argued that 
the abolition of traditional deference rituals and the sartorial hierarchy had ir-
reparably damaged colonial authority. He mourned the loss of the privileged 
“white jacket,” which aer serving as the white man’s armor in the colonies for 
generations, had lost its symbolic power when widely adopted by the colonized. 
According to Wybrands, there was a direct correlation between the Javanese 
embrace of trousers and white jackets and their increased rebelliousness. Refer-
encing the emergence of the nationalist movement and reports that indigenous 
workers were increasingly standing up to plantation owners, he wrote, “e 
blunderer [Governor General] Van Heutsz has allowed natives and Chinese to 
dress like us.  .  . and now the attacks on Europeans are frequent.”87 Given this 
context, it is no wonder that the Sarekat Islam’s mass meetings attended by thou-
sands of indigenous people in white suit jackets were particularly intimidating. 
Europeans, like the Javanese, understood that these forms of cultural resistance 
had shied the dynamic of the colonial relationship.
e initial European response to Javanese experiments with composite dress 
was to ridicule their appearance. As Patricia Spyer demonstrates, in the colonial 
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context mockery was an e
ective means of emphasizing di
erence and otherness 
and was also meant to arm the Dutch’s continuing superiority.88 But in the 
wake of the sartorial revolution of 1913, conservative Europeans could no longer 
consider Javanese dressed in “a slit coat, borrowed blue glasses, brown shoes, and 
two pens in the upper pocket” as an innocent expression to be tolerated with a 
smile.89 Instead, conservative civil servants like M. B. van der Jagt believed it 
Figure 6. “e past and the present!” Illustrative of the Dutch 
ambivalence toward sartorial changes in society, the cartoon suggests 
that without the nineteenth-century sartorial hierarchy, colonial subjects 
become more impertinent. Source: De Reector, July 14, 1917.
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evil, even criminal, that the Javanese politicized European attire to become more 
vocal, demanding, and assertive. According to Van der Jagt, although wearing 
European dress instilled in the colonized a naïve belief that “within limited time 
their place on the world’s stage will be equal to that of her European educator,” 
this was merely a façade.90 e dissolution of ethnic dress regulations created 
the illusion of equality, while in reality dressing similarly only obscured intrinsic 
di
erences between colonizer and colonized. With similar rationale, the conser-
vative editor Wybrands encouraged the Javanese to remain Eastern: “If against 
all laws he tries to molest his being by adopting Western ways to look like a West-
erner, he becomes just as much of a misnomer as the Westerner who tries to be 
an Easterner.”91 e implicit cultural relativism in this remark implied that the 
Dutch themselves should be more distinctly Western—a suggestion that many 
Europeans began to take seriously.
us, in addition to putting down Javanese in Western garb, the Dutch 
dressed “up.” By making their own appearance more distinctively European 
in both the public and private spheres, they sought to reassert control over the 
colonial sartorial hierarchy. eir Europeanization marked the colonizer as 
modern and civilized and rearmed their superiority and right to rule. His-
toriography on dress primarily ascribes this process of Europeanization to ex-
ternal forces, such as the increased immigration of men and especially women 
from Europe. Technological and scientic advancements in transportation, 
communication, medicine, and hygiene allowed these newcomers to maintain 
a European lifestyle in the tropics. Informed by Social Darwinist notions, they 
regarded everything that derived from indigenous society as suspect and with 
potentially degenerative powers.92 However, this is only half the story, as it does 
not adequately explain the particular timing of the Dutch sartorial transforma-
tion. When we consider dress as an interactive site of contestation, a hegemonic 
struggle between colonizer and colonized, a more dynamic narrative emerges. 
e same technological developments that enabled a more European lifestyle in 
the tropics—faster shipping, the telegraph and printing press, frequent imports 
of clothes and textiles, and sewing machines—also facilitated Javanese experi-
mentation with composite dress at the turn of the century. From that moment 
onward, the colonizer and colonized made sartorial choices that increasingly 
shaped one another—a process that suddenly accelerated with the Javanese sar-
torial transformation in 1913 and Europeans’ response.
As mentioned previously, by the late nineteenth century, European women 
wore a sarong and kebaya and men wore batik trousers in the semiprivate sphere, 
which included the house, its porches and gardens, hotels, and even social visits 
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and strolls in the neighborhood. e public visibility of their attire made it a de-
ning feature of the Dutch experience in Java. e rst criticism of these clothes 
as too similar to indigenous dress emerged around the turn of the century. In 
1900, author Bas Veth published a scathing analysis of colonial society in which 
he described the sarong and kebaya as indecent, unceremonious, and immodest. 
Employing racist language, he sarcastically encouraged “pure” European women 
to at least wear a peignoir instead because “the sarong and kebaya originate from 
the kampong, the peignoir from Europe.”93 At the time, Veth’s criticism was not 
yet widely shared. Out of many rebuttals to his piece, one described the sarong 
and kebaya as the most hygienic, comfortable, and beautiful clothing for Euro-
pean women living in Java’s paradise.94 But public opinion gradually started to 
shi. By 1908, a popular household guide meant to prepare European women for 
life in the colony argued that a European “cannot be dressed like a coolie, drape 
himself like a native, even if he wore clothes from the most exquisite materials.”95
A guide from 1910 echoed this sentiment, stating that no self-respecting young 
European woman would allow herself to be seen on the streets in a sarong and 
kebaya.96 Both books suggested that sarong and kebaya only be worn in a much 
more restricted private sphere, and that the public sphere be a site of exhibiting 
and performing European identity.
However, sarong, kebaya, and batik trousers began to be discarded entirely 
in response to the widespread Javanese embrace of European dress in 1913. Aer 
returning to Java for the rst time since his retirement seven years earlier, former 
advisor for Chinese a
airs and novelist Henri Borel was struck by the Euro-
peanization of colonial society. He noted that all icons of nineteenth-century 
colonial culture seemed to have disappeared; the colonial house, rice table, and 
quasi-indigenous attire were all replaced with European equivalents. In a report 
to a Dutch newspaper, he claimed that aer several months in Java he “had [yet] 
to see the rst [European] lady in sarong and kebaya.”97 To his surprise, European 
women did not wear a sarong and kebaya anymore; they all donned peignoirs, 
skirts and blouses, or kimonos. e popularity of the latter was both a form 
of Japonisme, a Western obsession with Japanese culture, as well as a cultural 
recognition of Japan as a civilized imperial power. Similarly, in the semiprivate 
sphere European men had exchanged their apparently vulgar batik trousers with 
English pajamas. Respectable men no longer wore the traditional white jacket 
but rather a “shantung silk jacket with a nice cardigan, a sti
 collared shirt, tie, 
and cu
s.”98 According to Borel, the Dutch had seemingly decided to follow the 
English custom and dress themselves in European style despite the smothering 
tropical heat. Another observer agreed that the age of the sarong, kebaya, and 
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batik trousers was now clearly in the past, while household and travel guides also 
discussed the former mainstays of Indies dress solely in the past tense: they had 
become “unfashionable” and “obsolete.”99 e marginalization of the sarong, ke-
baya, and batik trousers among Europeans resulted in the decline of the Eurasian 
batik industry in the 1920s.100
A 1917 political cartoon perfectly captured this transformation in European 
appearance. In adjacent frames portraying the past and the present (lain doeloe! 
lain sekarang!), the cartoon depicts a European couple promenading past a co-
lonial subject. e contrast between the two images is striking. A fashionable 
dress displaying her lower legs had replaced the European woman’s sarong and 
kebaya, while a modern suit complete with necktie and hat had replaced the 
man’s batik trousers and kebaya. e couple appears to have been directly trans-
ported from a Parisian boulevard. e transformation of the Javanese native 
in the image is just as revealing. Whereas he used to cower, squat, remove his 
hat, and avoid eye contact, he now stands tall, his conical hat rmly in place, 
and looks straight at the passersby as well as the viewer. e cartoon clearly 
conveys the understanding that in colonial society, changes in dress were not 
so much about fashion as they were about power.101 is nostalgic undertone, 
reminiscing about a past in which the native was submissive, was pervasive in 
the colonial press. In 1918, one author even dedicated a rather sexist poem to the 
sarong and kebaya, asserting that they were much more sensual (i.e., revealing 
the female form) and becoming than European attire. It therefore saddened 
him that young European women boasted about never having worn them.102
While this was most likely an attempt at contemporary humor, in hindsight it 
illustrates Europeans’ changing appearance.
To reinforce their own sense of sartorial correctness, Europeans in colonial 
Indonesia were infatuated with the latest fashion in Europe and the United 
States. Modern technology and the networks of trade, transport, and informa-
tion it sustained enabled Europeans to keep up with developments on the other 
side of the globe. Regular fashion columns in periodicals and newspapers in the 
colony reported on the styles worn in Paris, London, Berlin, New York, and San 
Francisco. Special mail-order catalogs enabled European inhabitants of Java to 
order the latest fashions with only the slightest delay. For those who could not 
wait or could not a
ord the luxury of ordering clothes from Europe, hiring an 
indigenous seamstress ( jait) to re-create European fashions from patterns or im-
ages was a great solution. In addition, in the 1910s and 1920s, large department 
stores opened their doors in Java’s principal cities, facilitating a modern shop-
ping experience. With names like Aux Palais de Modes, these “fashion palaces” 
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le little to the imagination, providing a modern space where Europeans could 
nesse their appearance and further the occidentalization of colonial society.103
Advertisements and illustrations accompanied fashion columns in the colo-
nial press and provide yet another example of how Europeans sought to reassert 
their authority through dress. A fascinating case is a 1926 advert for Petodjo lem-
onade with the slogan, “Nine types, one taste.”104 is catchphrase appears beside 
an illustration of nine people with di
erent ethnic backgrounds. A European 
family of four is depicted as entirely modern but the others are shown in their 
respective ethnic dress, seemingly immobilized in the past. Anny Oldenziel, a 
fashion columnist for the popular illustrated weekly D’Oriënt, used a similar 
strategy of exclusion in the drawings alongside her articles. Her column not only 
kept Europeans informed about the latest fashions, but also through her draw-
ings enabled them to imagine them in the colonial context. In one such image, 
Oldenziel depicted European women with angular and elongated bodies wear-
ing short sleeveless summer dresses. eir hair is cut short in a bob reecting the 
1920s modern global ideal.105 e women use small Japanese parasols—another 
form of Japonisme—to protect their exposed skin from the tropical sun. Olden-
ziel oen portrayed European men in modern white suits with dress shirts, open 
jackets, ties, and tropical helmets. But in sharp contrast to these modern images 
of Europeans, she continued to illustrate the Javanese in their traditional sarong 
and kebaya, emphasizing their di
erence and backwardness. ere is no sign of 
a modernized Javanese or “Indonesian dandy.” rough images like these, the 
Dutch tried to establish a new sartorial hierarchy, maximizing the distinction 
between ruler and ruled, colonizer and colonized, master and servant.106
As European men sought to bolster their prestige and status by changing their 
appearance, like Javanese men they found that doing so upended prevailing gen-
der roles. e presence of European women in Java increased signicantly in 
the early twentieth century due to immigration, thereby changing the ethnic 
and gender makeup of the European population. e Dutch believed that the 
arrival of white women, for whom the colonies were a temporary home, would 
bring civilization to the local European community and ward o
 threats of 
physical degeneration and moral decay.107 Gradually, the proliferation of Euro-
pean women and their “civilizing” mission began to marginalize Eurasians and 
mestizo culture.108 e change in women’s clothing, especially the rejection of 
the sarong and kebaya, symbolized these anxieties, which were exacerbated by 
1920s Western fashion trends featuring exposed arms, legs, necks, and shoul-
ders. Further aggravating the tension was the question of women’s emancipation. 
In addition to su
rage, which was granted in the Netherlands in 1919, Dutch 
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women demanded access to education, the workplace, and the public sphere 
more broadly. ey did not leave these demands behind in the metropole but 
transferred them to conservative colonial society. In Java, it quickly became ap-
parent that women’s sartorial transformation encompassed much more than the 
preservation of European prestige. As a male contributor to a popular weekly 
observed in 1927, “e revolution in women’s outward appearance mirrors her 
inner evolution, specically her growing independence in society.”109
e colonial press addressed this “growing independence,” depicting the 
modern girl or woman as assertive, determined, and self-sucient. She wore the 
latest European fashions, such as skirts, dresses, blouses, and hats, which marked 
her as modern. She had a bob or shingle haircut, which according to observers 
signaled her demand to be treated as equal to men and deserving of the same 
opportunities.110 She was also athletic and graceful; she swam, played tennis, and 
rode horses, all in appropriate modern sporting attire.111 Perhaps most crucially, 
she worked in oces, stores, schools, and medical institutions, and increasingly 
behaved more freely in the public sphere. She socialized unsupervised with men 
and women, smoked, danced, drank, and went to the movies.112 In e
ect, she 
represented a radical break with the past, especially in the conservative colonial 
setting. While it is uncertain to what extent this idealized modern girl or woman 
actually existed in colonial society, frequent discussions of her presence in it and 
perceived threat to it are indicative of the acute anxiety surrounding changing 
gender roles. But perhaps most importantly, the dressed-up European woman 
did not just jeopardize the traditional gender order; to conservatives, she also 
jeopardized the preservation of colonial authority.113
Whereas the attire worn by European men supposedly radiated colonial 
power and superiority, women’s dress appeared to do just the opposite. e 
gradual shortening of skirts and increased exposure of arms, shoulders, backs, 
and necks—so emblematic of the 1920s in the West—were thought to under-
mine European prestige in the eyes of indigenous peoples. Many argued that 
European women’s fashion was simply unsuited for colonial society, as it invited 
derision rather than respect from the predominantly Muslim population. Ac-
cording to one author, it was one thing for women to dress this way in Europe, 
where at least the climate forced them to cover up when outdoors, but in Java, 
“All Easterners, most of whom stand on a lower step of civilization, can ogle the 
modern-dressed woman.”114 However, even if Dutch women avoided Western 
attire, it was not dicult for the colonized to nd imagery of scantily clad Euro-
pean women; they proliferated in movies, advertisements, public performances, 
and even magazines.115 e colonial press was especially obsessed with the way 
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women were depicted in Western lms, convinced that it could negatively inu-
ence the colonized. For instance, in 1918 there was some consternation following 
a screening of e Triumph of Venus, a movie featuring lust, sensuality, jealously, 
and sex in which women wore skimpy attire and were oen subject to the whims 
of men. One viewer worried that the lm showed indigenous viewers “how to 
break a [European] woman’s resistance.”116 Some argued that without respect 
for European women colonialism was doomed to fail. is provided European 
men with the opportunity to reassert their control by protecting their wives and 
daughters against the indigenous male gaze by advocating for lm censorship 
and segregated spaces, such as swimming pools.117
From Ethnic to National Dress
By the late 1920s, the Indonesian nationalist movement was fragmented and 
severely weakened. Following the communist revolts in 1926 and 1927, the com-
munist party was destroyed. e Sarekat Islam had long lost its political momen-
tum, and a multitude of smaller associations that focused on ethnic, regional, 
or religious identities remained.118 In response, there were several attempts to 
articulate a unied Indonesian national identity, the rst of which was the es-
tablishment of the Indonesian National Association (Perserikatan Nasional 
Indonesia; PNI) in 1927.119 Led by Soekarno, who would later become the rst 
president of an independent Indonesia, the PNI advocated secular national-
ism, noncompliance with the Dutch colonizer, and eventual independence as 
its main objectives. But perhaps even more signicant than the PNI, at least 
symbolically, was the increased collaboration among diverse youth associations 
within colonial Indonesia. Meeting together in Batavia in October 1928, mem-
bers took a Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda), swearing their allegiance to one 
country, one people, and one language. Attendees imagined that the colonial 
state with its great diversity of people and languages would be transformed into 
a single cohesive nation with its own unifying, egalitarian language: Indonesian 
(Bahasa Indonesia).120 And at this moment, of “triumph of the idea of Indone-
sia,” the question of what constituted national dress for both men and women 
became particularly relevant.121
By the end of the 1920s and into the early 1930s, the conversation about ap-
pearance and its relationship to ethnic, religious, and national identities had 
intensied. At its core, this was a debate about how to appear modern and 
independent without alienating or rejecting local culture and traditions. Inci-
dents regarding dress, such as the rejection of a bupati from a European club in 
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Surabaya because he was clad in Javanese attire, and a similar episode involving 
two students at a European cinema, elicited extensive discussions in the vernac-
ular press. According to some newspapers, such incidents could easily be avoided 
if the Javanese would just wear “international”—meaning European—clothing 
that made them indistinguishable from Eurasians. Others maintained that don-
ning international dress would not increase Dutch respect and only result in a 
loss of cultural identity.122 Batavia’s largest vernacular newspaper, the Bintang
Timoer (Star of the Indies), o
ered another perspective. According to editor 
Parada Harahap, these incidents illustrated the need to develop distinctive na-
tional dress: “Discarding Javanese, Buginese, Batak, Acehnese, and Minangka-
bau attire, except during special occasions and festivities, so that in public one 
no longer appears Javanese or Malay, but. . . Indonesian.”123 For men, he proposed 
a European suit in combination with the Indonesian peci, a at-topped conical 
cap.124 By bridging ethnic di
erences, the suit had a universalizing and egalitar-
ian e
ect on the new Indonesian man, while the peci simultaneously di
eren-
tiated him from the colonizer.125 In the private sphere, Harahap stipulated that 
men could continue to wear traditional ethnic attire.
e following year, the Bintang Timoer further explored the question of 
what to wear in an in-depth, six-part series titled “National Clothing” (Pakaian 
Nasional).126 Here, the editor elaborated his argument for the necessity of na-
tional dress for both genders. As before, he identied a suit—trousers, a shirt, 
tie, and jacket—and a peci for men. is commanded respect and was con-
sidered the most practical attire for the modern era, as evidenced by newly es-
tablished national dress in independent states like Turkey, Japan, and Siam.127
e peci was the distinguishing feature of Indonesian national dress. While 
its name derived from the Dutch petje (small cap), the peci was most likely 
inspired by the Ottoman fez worn by some Muslim men in the Indonesian 
archipelago in the nineteenth century. According to the Bintang Timoer, it was 
only in the 1920s that the peci—under its secular name—was embraced as a 
national symbol. Soekarno experimented with the peci as a unifying emblem, 
wearing it to meetings of the youth association Young Java in 1921.128 Although 
he certainly played a large role in turning the black cap into a national icon, 
Soewardi Soerjaningrat and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo wore similar headwear 
in 1913 when they founded the Indies Party.129 According to the editor of the 
Bintang Timoer, by 1931, the peci had become popular with the Indonesian in-
telligentsia, including lawyers, physicians, engineers, and even members of the 
People’s Council.130 e peci was thus embraced as a vital component of Indo-
nesian men’s national costume, the only downside being that Eurasians might 
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wear one to try to get into fairgrounds or movie theaters at the discounted rate 
for natives.131
Advertisements in the vernacular press clearly reected the crystallization 
of men’s national dress. e European suit was already widely advertised, as it 
had become popular during the sartorial makeover of 1913. Clothing stores and 
tailors with names like “Stylish” and “Fashionable” promoted the latest trousers, 
shirts, and shoes in European styles, all branded as products of the “modern age” 
(zaman modern). By the early 1930s, Java’s stores o
ered the most modern Palm 
Beach gabardine suits from Europe.132 In advertisements for other consumer 
products, such as cigarettes, soap, biscuits, watches, and tea, Indonesian men 
were more oen than not depicted in a modern suit.133 e peci also increasingly 
appeared in vernacular advertisements. For instance, a 1931 advert for a hatter in 
Medan included an image of three modern Indonesian men, each wearing a suit, 
tie, and peci. e accompanying text assured readers that there was a peci for 
every Indonesian: young and old, teachers and students, civil servants and pri-
vate professionals alike. e store o
ered the latest models from Medan, Padang, 
and Batavia.134 Another advertisement for a peci factory in Batavia clearly illus-
trated that the black cap was both a symbol for the nation and of the modern 
age, emphasizing that the factory used electric-powered machinery to produce 
its peci, which were the same quality as those worn by Indonesian leaders.135
With the peci and European suit rmly cemented as their national costume, 
Indonesian men were prepared to enter the “modern age.” Indonesian women, 
however, were tasked with a di
erent mission: to safeguard tradition.
According to the lengthy exposé printed in 1931 in the Bintang Timoer, In-
donesian women had settled on the traditional batik sarong and short kebaya as 
their national attire. Interestingly, as the article observed, in colonial society a 
batik sarong and white kebaya used to be associated with indigenous nannies to 
European families (baboe) and Dutch men’s concubines (nyai). In recent years, 
however, many educated and prominent Indonesian women embraced this attire 
as their national dress, making it respectable in the process.136 Whereas Indone-
sian men adopted the European suit as a symbol of their elevated status and pres-
tige, European dresses, skirts, and blouses had the opposite e
ect on Indonesian 
women. As had been argued for years, European women’s fashions were sinful 
and shameless; they showed too much bare skin and le little to the imagination, 
thus inviting the male gaze.137 Some newspapers even described such attire as 
more betting of prostitutes.138 A contributor to the periodical Pembela Islam 
(Defender of Islam) argued that it was necessary for Indonesian women to strive 
for less disgrace in society. It was important to avoid showing exposed arms and 
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calves, let alone thighs or cleavage. e author was not only bothered by Western 
clothing, but also by many (poorer) women’s practice of bathing in rivers and 
streams, displaying their nudity in public like “American Beach Beauties.”139 He 
therefore called on women to dress more decently, meaning in a sarong and ke-
baya, and urged wealthy benefactors to establish public bathhouses for women.
Critics of Western clothing disapproved of the way they adorned a woman’s 
body, but also of what such attire represented: freer interaction between the 
sexes, and women’s presence and condence in the public sphere. Many men 
were very concerned about women potentially entering professional spaces, as 
secretaries in oces, for instance.140 In this moment of ux—the moderniza-
tion of colonial society and Indonesians’ increasing assertiveness—the future of 
Indonesian gender roles was uncertain. For men, establishing national dress was 
a visual expression of their attempt to undo the emasculation they experienced 
under colonial rule. In their new clothing, they would assert themselves against 
European colonizers and over Indonesian women.
Interestingly, conservative Indonesian women’s associations supported this 
endeavor and shared in the censure of European women’s fashion. eir consid-
erable inuence on the issue became clear during the rst Indonesian women’s 
congress in 1928. A majority of representatives from various associations voted 
against a proposal to adopt Western skirts (rok) as acceptable attire.141 Instead, 
ethnic dress like the sarong and kebaya remained common, as was the practice 
for members of conservative associations like Muhammadiyah.142 Subsequent 
conferences reinforced ethnic attire as women’s national costume. Moreover, in 
a parallel move, they increasingly dened the Indonesian woman through her 
motherhood, infusing her identity with the responsibility of caring not just for 
her own family, but for the nation as a whole.143
In the last decade of colonial rule, economic crisis further cemented the pres-
ence of Indonesian national dress. e colonial economy, heavily dependent on 
exports, was hit hard by the Great Depression. During the recession, Indone-
sian intellectuals looked to Mahatma Gandhi’s Swadeshi movement as a possible 
model for economic relief, arguing, like British Indian nationalists, that their na-
tional dress needed to be locally produced and a
ordable for all. ey looked im-
mediately to the batik industry, which was controlled by Eurasian and Chinese 
interests. By buying batik from Indonesian producers, they claimed, consumers 
could support national industry as well as the development of national dress 
and identity. Once again, the burden of this position fell disproportionately on 
women, who were now oen the only ones wearing batik. Men were expected 
to purchase their peci from Indonesian hatters and their suits from local tailors, 
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rather than importing them from Europe or the United States. But it was wom-
en’s responsibility to avoid the temptation of Western dress and buy batik sarong 
from local producers, thereby supporting the national economy and maintaining 
indigenous tradition.144
“e Minute an Indonesian Dons Trousers  
He Walks Erect like Any White Man”
In the everyday lived experience under colonialism, clothing was absolutely es-
sential in making social relationships and interactions legible. Dress visually re-
ected a person’s legal status—European, Native, or Foreign Oriental—as well 
as ethnicity, social position, and gender. All of these markers of identity deter-
mined proper etiquette. By stipulating that all members of colonial society dress 
according to their ethnicity, the Dutch craed an ethnic sartorial hierarchy in 
the nineteenth century. It was only as part of the Ethical Policy that these sar-
torial regulations were relaxed and the colonized allowed to freely decide what 
to wear. However, while some experimented with forms of composite dress, 
the dress hierarchy remained the norm until 1913, when the prevalence of new 
attire comprised nothing short of a sartorial revolution. ese events are best 
understood in conjunction with the hormat circular, as the colonized publicly 
advocated a change in clothes as the best way to signal a refusal to perform tradi-
tional deference etiquette. In the process, they transgressed not just the sartorial 
hierarchy but also through their clothes challenged the colonial performance of 
power and the racial and gender inequalities that it sustained.
In his 1965 autobiography, Soekarno reected on these sartorial transforma-
tions with language surprisingly similar to that of the Javanese who adopted 
European dress in great numbers in 1913. He condemned traditional dress for In-
donesian men as demeaning, converting its wearer into a servile and subservient 
creature. In contrast, “e minute an Indonesian dons trousers he walks erect 
like any white man.”145 But although those like Soekarno strove for and cele-
brated Indonesian men’s access to (Western) modernity, they denied Indonesian 
women the same entry into the modern world. Despite moments of ambiguity 
and experimentation, the selection of traditional attire as Indonesian women’s 
national dress illustrates that clothes enabled men to challenge colonial hierar-
chies while maintaining traditional gender roles. As these comments show, the 
sartorial revolution of 1913 was not merely about self-respect, but as much about 
changing identities in a rapidly changing world. is was true for colonizer and 
colonized alike. e Javanese embrace of Western clothes forced the Dutch to 
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increase their own sense of sartorial correctness and reconsider what it meant to 
be European men and women in the tropics. As both colonizer and colonized 
became more explicit about creating their new identities, anxieties increased 
about the need to protect them. ese discussions were not limited to dress, as 
the next chapter shows, but pervasive throughout all aspects of colonial society.
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East Is East, and West Is West
Forging Modern Identities
I n 1918, readers of the newspaper Sinar Hindia were introduced to “Stu-dent Hidjo” (Student Green), a ctional character created by Marco Karto-dikromo whose experiences encapsulated the social anxieties of the period. 
e serial publication follows Hidjo, a quiet, smart, Western-educated son of 
a Javanese merchant, on his journey to the Netherlands to pursue a degree in 
engineering, which his parents believe is a sure way for him to join the ranks of 
the priyayi. Before his departure, his mother reminds her son of his engagement 
to his cousin and warns him about the sexual promiscuity of Dutch women. 
Almost immediately aer boarding the steamship to Europe, Hidjo experiences 
the wisdom of his mother’s words, as two young Dutch women openly irt with 
and eye him amorously. For readers, it was no surprise that aer arriving in the 
Netherlands, Hidjo eventually succumbs to the advances of a Dutch woman, 
Betje, the daughter of his landlord. But aer their rst romantic escapade, Hidjo 
receives letters from his Javanese ancée and friends that make him immediately 
regret his actions. He realizes that if he does not leave the Netherlands soon, he 
will turn into a Dutchman, marry a Dutch woman, and alienate himself from 
his own family, people, and country. He decides to return home to the bride his 
parents selected for him and remain Javanese. For her part, Betje ends up in the 
same Javanese town married to a Dutch colonial o
cial with similar philander-
ing behavior.1
One of the most important takeaways for readers of the Student Hidjo serial 
was to stay true to oneself, as the dierences between Eastern and Western cul-
ture and morality were unbridgeable. Kartodikromo’s work was not the only one 
that echoed the opening line of Rudyard Kipling’s infamous “e Ballad of East 
and West” (1889): “Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall 
meet.”2 In September 1924, D’Oriënt published on its cover a photograph of a 
young Javanese woman clad in traditional dress holding up a handmade batik 
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cloth against a background of tropical vegetation. e accompanying caption 
read, “East is East.  .  .” and invited the reader to turn the page to nd the sec-
ond half of the trope. is showed a photograph of a young European woman 
with bobbed hair, bangs, and lipstick, wearing a bathing suit and standing on 
the beach while refreshing ocean waves crashed on the rocks around her.3 e 
contrast between the women was clear, and many vernacular publications made 
similar insinuations, using Kipling’s words to convey the intrinsic dierences 
between East and West, colonizer and colonized.4 One author in the Sino-Malay 
newspaper Sin Po even used Kipling to argue that the greatest danger for the 
national awakening did not derive from the Dutch but from overly Westernized 
Indonesians.5
ese examples illustrate the increasing hardening of beliefs about dierence 
in colonial society among both the Dutch and Indonesians. Underlying these 
concerns were assumptions that identities were xed, that mixing was degen-
erative, and that unwanted inuences could and must be purged to prevent a 
loss of self. ese anxieties intensied in the decades around the turn of the 
century, as advances in Western science—particularly in the elds of climatol-
ogy, evolutionary biology, and medicine—stressed racial dierence as a marker 
between colonizers and colonized. For the Dutch and Javanese, just as important 
was the introduction of the Ethical Policy, which no longer legitimized colonial 
authority through Dutch immersion in Javanese aristocratic culture but instead 
based it on the colonizers’ modernity and alleged higher degree of civilization. 
ese developments led increasingly to the rejection of cultural accommodation, 
acclimatization, and racial mixing in favor of the cultivation and rm delinea-
tion of racial and cultural boundaries. is was reected in the Dutch fear of 
degenerating to the level of the “natives” and obsession with the maintenance of 
“white prestige” in the colony. Indonesians were not passive bystanders to these 
transformations in colonial discourse, as many cultural, religious, and political 
associations called for alternate approaches to modernity and resistance to “west-
ernization.” Such concerns led to debates over lifestyle and moral issues, such as 
interracial relationships and the consumption of alcohol and opium.
ese negotiations on both sides of the colonial divide cannot be separated; 
they were part of a singular and cohesive discourse that profoundly shaped ev-
eryday life. Dutch anxieties about the physical and moral consequences of Java’s 
tropical climate and social interactions with the “natives” were mirrored in In-
donesian disquiet about the free interaction between the sexes, dancing, and 
consumerism of colonial modernity. e redenition of identities through these 
ideas—what it meant to be European or Asian, Dutch or Indonesian, colonizer 
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or colonized, modern or primitive—was not merely speculative but experien-
tially performed, expressed, and communicated in everyday colonial encounters. 
e discourse of dierence was thus reected in appearance, etiquette, sexual 
morality, social customs, culinary traditions, and consumer patterns. ese 
modes of individual and social comportment became sites of contesting and ne-
gotiating colonial hegemony for both the colonizer and colonized as they fash-
ioned new identities in a modern world.
Shiing Paradigms: Acclimatization, Race, and Identity
During most of the nineteenth century, the prevailing belief in the Netherlands 
Indies was that Europeans could acclimatize to tropical environments by fol-
lowing indigenous customs concerning clothing, diet, and lifestyle. us, pro-
fessional medical views supported Dutch colonial policies of cultural accom-
modation, racial mixing, and the Javanization of colonial authority. However, 
in the second half of the century, biological racism—the pseudoscientic belief 
in inherent racial dierences—challenged theories of acclimatization and ac-
culturation. An increased emphasis on the concept of race supported the belief 
that it was impossible for European bodies to adjust to the tropical environment. 
Instead, Europeans in the tropics could expect physical, cultural, and moral de-
generation if they did not maintain European lifestyles and limit their stay in the 
colonies. By the turn of the twentieth century, this racialized perspective gained 
prominence in the Netherlands Indies—a shi reected in the adoption of the 
Ethical Policy and the modernization of colonial authority. Where science had 
once supported Javanized colonial rule, biological racism now tipped the scales 
in the opposite direction. is raised immediate concerns regarding racial iden-
tity, culture, and lifestyle for Europeans living in colonial Indonesia.6
As Hans Pols has shown, early-nineteenth-century physicians approached the 
issue of acclimatization from the prevailing Hippocratic tradition, emphasizing 
the inuence of the environment, morality, and lifestyle on the human physical 
constitution.7 Within this framework, bodily characteristics were perceived as 
uid and adaptive, which meant that the human constitution could adjust to 
new variables. Migration between dierent climate zones, physicians reasoned, 
triggered necessary changes in the body’s metabolism, thermoregulation, muscle 
activity, and skin activity (i.e., perspiration), and a body required a transition pe-
riod to become familiar with a new environment. Known as “seasoning,” this pe-
riod was characterized by physical discomfort and disease but would ultimately 
resolve and leave the migrant as good as new. For instance, on arrival to Java 
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in 1842, the physician Cornelis Swaving described suering bursts of sweating, 
anorexia, congestion of the liver, fevers, ulcers, lack of physical strength, listless-
ness, and sleeplessness alternating with insomnia, among other maladies. Luck-
ily, Swaving soon developed a healthy physical constitution the likes of which he 
had not even experienced in European summers.8
German physician Carl Waitz similarly believed that humans were condi-
tioned to particular climate zones but, like animals and plants, had the ability to 
physiologically adjust to dierent environments.9 Waitz argued that embracing 
elements of the Javanese lifestyle would expedite the process for Dutch settlers. 
For instance, he claimed that European dress was the greatest obstacle to accli-
matization in the tropics, and European food was too di
cult to digest in the 
warm environment. In contrast, the Javanese dressed lightly, consumed small 
portions of easily digestible food, did not perform physical labor during the hot-
test hours of the day, and frequently bathed in cool water. Waitz estimated that 
by following the Javanese example, the process of acclimatization would take 
about a year. However, if one maintained a European lifestyle in the tropics, the 
duration of this process would extend considerably.10
Despite some dissenting opinions warning that European bodies simply could 
not survive the tropics, most physicians in the Netherlands Indies remained op-
timistic about the possibility of adapting.11 In part, this can be explained by 
continued tolerance toward racial mixing and the large proportion of Eurasians 
within colonial society. More signicantly, however, medical arguments about 
acculturation coincided with the conscious Javanization of colonial authority. 
Once implemented, Dutch rule relied on cultural accommodation in order to 
function. Under these circumstances, a pessimistic perspective on acclimatiza-
tion would be detrimental to the system of colonial governance and to maintain-
ing social control. e Javanization of colonial rule, reected in deference eti-
quette, status symbols, and sartorial and language hierarchies, was thus extended 
to key aspects of everyday life, including hygienic practices, food preparation and 
consumption, physical activity, and daily routines.12
Until the late nineteenth century, Dutch physicians emphasized the impor-
tance of adapting one’s lifestyle to the climate, especially by taking cues from 
the indigenous population.13 Bacteriologist Christiaan Eijkman, who would go 
on to win the 1929 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, was the primary 
Dutch inuence on the question of acclimatization. During his long career in 
the colonies, especially as Director of the Medical Laboratory in Weltevreden 
(1888 –1896), Eijkman made several valuable discoveries that changed the debate 
on European adjustment to the tropics. First and foremost, through extensive 
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comparative experiments, he was able to demonstrate that heat-induced tropical 
anemia—a point of consensus among nineteenth-century scientists—did not 
exist. He found that the blood count, specic gravity, and water content of Eu-
ropeans in the tropics was no dierent from those of either the indigenous pop-
ulation or Europeans living in cooler climates. He reached similar conclusions 
by comparing metabolism, respiratory functions, perspiration, and temperature 
regulation in Europeans and indigenous peoples. In other words, Eijkman had 
scientically proven that Europeans did not physically change their constitutions 
in the tropics nor did they dier physiologically from the indigenous population 
in the rst place.14
Having disproved heat-induced tropical anemia, Eijkman wondered why so 
many Europeans felt listless and worn out in the tropics. He concluded that ac-
climatization depended on adopting habits more suited to the tropical climate 
(external processes), rather than changes to one’s physical constitution (internal 
processes). From this perspective, Eijkman believed that “the sobriety of food 
consumption of the indigenous people, their airy clothing, their festina lente [‘to 
make haste slowly’], their calm and resigned attitude, all merit, from a purely sani-
tary perspective, to serve as an example for the white tropical inhabitant.”15 Argu-
ing that imitating the Javanese lifestyle was benecial for Dutch settlers’ health, 
Eijkman’s research thus worked to support colonial strategies of Javanization.
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, physician and anthropolo-
gist Jacob Herman Friedrich Kohlbrugge had replaced Eijkman as the leading 
Dutch voice on European tropical acclimatization, and his perspective was much 
more pessimistic. During his career (1892 –1906) in the Indies, Kohlbrugge be-
came fascinated with the comparative anatomy of Europeans and indigenous 
peoples, and what he called the “Javanese psyche.” His research on the brains of 
his deceased European and Javanese patients conrmed Eijkman’s conclusion 
that there were no physiological dierences between the two. He therefore deter-
mined that if Europeans and Javanese had the same brains, perceived dierences 
in intellectual and cultural development must be due to external factors. e 
most likely candidate, in his opinion, was the tropical climate, which limited hu-
mans’ physical and mental exertions. Based on climatological dierences, Kohl-
brugge thus argued that the West stood for progress, innovation, individualism, 
freedom of thought, reason, science, and physical strength, while the East was 
characterized by tranquility, collectivism, despotism, mental confusion, emo-
tion, and physical weakness. Due to the climate, Kohlbrugge concluded, the 
Javanese were intellectually less-developed “children” compared to Europeans, 
who had evolved to “adulthood.”16
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Kohlbrugge was in good company among other European scientists and phy-
sicians. In the second half of the nineteenth century, developments in science 
and medicine had gradually infused the acclimatization debate with the issue of 
race. e “evolution revolution” in the biological sciences inspired social theo-
rists to apply and distort Charles Darwin’s notion of evolution to human societ-
ies and thereby proclaim the superiority of the white race.17 But while race was 
increasingly used to mark dierence in the British and French colonial world, 
scientic research in the Netherlands Indies continued to promote the signi-
cance of European acculturation on the island of Java.18 It was not until Kohl-
brugge came on the scene that these notions began to change.
Needless to say, Kohlbrugge’s conclusions were not without political impli-
cations. In his climatic determinism, he proved to be a staunch opponent of 
the Ethical Policy, arguing that the civilizing mission could not overcome these 
climate-induced evolutionary dierences. e Javanese would always remain 
intellectually inferior and childlike compared to Europeans who, as the inhab-
itants of more moderate climates, were the most productive people on earth. 
Claiming that it was impossible for Europeans to acclimatize to the tropics, 
Kohlbrugge warned that those who permanently migrated to Java would un-
dergo a process of familial degeneration, as their ospring would “transform 
gradually, but surely, into Indo-Europeans and nally into Javanese.”19 e pace 
of this process depended on whether a man brought a European wife with him, 
married a Eurasian woman, or conceived children with an indigenous woman, 
but due to the climate, any descendants would be infertile and the family line 
would terminate by the third generation. e only manner by which Europeans 
could survive Java’s tropical conditions was to physically strengthen themselves 
through racial mixing, which, according to Kohlbrugge, defeated the purpose 
of European settlement. Even though Eurasians were more fertile and viable, 
their character was so radically dierent that they ceased to be Europeans at all 
(despite their o
cial legal status as European).20 Echoing Kipling’s infamous 
line, Kohlbrugge warned: “We cannot turn the West into the East and the hot 
East into the cool West.”21
Increasingly, the vast majority of Europeans in colonial society shared Kohl-
brugge’s view. A columnist for a popular weekly, for instance, argued that the dif-
ference between Javanese and European’s level of civilization could be explained 
by ten degrees Celsius: “Take them away and man invents railways, wireless tele-
graphs, canned ower cabbage, and crystal palaces.”22 Insisting that any attempt 
to upli the Javanese was doomed from the outset, he therefore advised the gov-
ernment to put the Ethical Policy on hold until the temperature around the 
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equator equaled that of the Netherlands. e widespread embrace of Kohlbrug-
ge’s climatic determinism was even reected in government documents, such as a 
1914 report investigating the causes behind the Javanese’s perceived civilizational 
weakness. Permeated with evolutionary discourse, the report explained that a 
combination of the climate and character aws was responsible for the low level 
of intellectual, cultural, and economic development among the Javanese. e 
tropical heat created a situation that negated both the “struggle for survival” and 
a process of “selection.” e fertile volcanic soil facilitated year-round harvests, 
and the absence of cold winters enabled the Javanese to live free of clothing and 
housing concerns. Moreover, the lack of seasonal cold prevented Javanese society 
from developing strong physical constitutions and eliminating the weak. Con-
sequently, the report stated, there was no incentive to work hard, be innovative, 
or strive toward progress, leaving the Javanese lingering in a developmental stage 
that the Dutch had—allegedly—passed through ages ago.23
For most of the nineteenth century, Dutch physicians and scientists had 
argued that acclimatization to the tropical climate was possible by adjusting 
one’s lifestyle and habits to the new environment. But by the early twentieth 
century, Kohlbrugge’s climatic determinism and belief in evolutionary dier-
ences became predominant, changing Dutch colonizers’ understanding of their 
circumstances, role, and identity on Java. e result was an increased emphasis 
on the cultivation of dierence—in other words, on ideas of racial superiority 
and inferiority—as European identities were continually besieged by the dual 
threat of the climate and the Javanese’s alleged primitive development. As Kohl-
brugge himself put it, “If Europeans go to the Indies and stay too long, [they] are 
doomed to degenerate.”24
“No One Walks Underneath the Palm Trees 
Unpunished”: Combating Dutch Degeneration25
As colonial discourse shied away from racial mixing, cultural hybridity, and 
the Javanization of colonial authority, the Dutch began to emphasize the sig-
nicance of European modernity as a means of racially and culturally purifying 
colonial society from degenerative inuences. Just as Javanese social and polit-
ical etiquette was no longer needed to legitimize colonial authority, Dutch ef-
forts to adapt to the tropical environment were now considered obsolete, even 
dangerous. Moreover, these new ideas transformed the Javanese people from 
reliable guides to life in the tropics to primitive, unhygienic, degenerative dis-
ease vectors that must be kept at a safe distance. In contrast, the Dutch now 
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considered themselves (and Europeans in general) to be superior, modern beings 
that were far more civilized, hygienic, and intellectual than the natives. is 
newfound modern identity not only pervaded the Ethical Policy and shaped 
twentieth-century approaches to legitimizing colonial rule but also became an 
essential strategy for combating the risk of degeneration. e acclimatization 
argument lingered, but most agreed that Java’s tropical climate had a negative 
impact on Europeans. While the extent of this impact was up for debate, many 
Dutch believed that establishing a modern European colonial lifestyle would 
oer protection against the degenerative inuences of both the climate and in-
digenous people and culture.
During the rst decades of the twentieth century, there was a sudden rise in 
cases of tropical neurasthenia among Europeans living on Java. Introduced by 
American neurologist George Beard in the 1860s, neurasthenia was a catchall 
diagnosis used to describe varied physical and mental symptoms caused by anx-
ieties about modern life.26 In the tropics, it became a prevalent diagnosis for an 
assumed disorder of the central nervous system that could not be attributed to 
a single causative factor. Consequently, a broad agglomeration of symptoms was 
associated with the illness, such as listlessness, depression, headache, irritability, 
nausea, constipation, diarrhea, respiratory problems, insomnia, excessive sleep, 
heart palpations, and impotence. e alleged causes of tropical neurasthenia 
were almost as varied as its symptoms, including the continuous tropical heat 
and humidity, consumption of spicy food, concerns over hygiene and tropical 
diseases, the materialism and individualism of colonial society, and loneliness.27
Of the European civil servants who received furlough in the years 1915 to 
1924, almost half were diagnosed with tropical neurasthenia.28 e popularity 
of this diagnosis reected lingering ambiguity about climatic determinism as 
well as anxieties about physical degeneration among the European population. 
Attempts to prevent or cure the condition centered around circumventing its 
causes and recreating a European environment in the tropics. Dutch colonials 
retreated to the dry, moderate climate of Java’s mountains, consumed European 
food, followed Western hygienic conventions, and sought out cultural and intel-
lectual interactions with other Europeans. In other words, they tried to institute 
a Western lifestyle that resembled that of Europe.
Western pharmaceutical companies also joined the eort to treat tropical 
neurasthenia and, accordingly, fears of degeneration, by introducing an array of 
medications to counter the disorder, employing savvy advertisement campaigns 
that anticipated European anxieties. Nerve medicines like Sanatogen, produced 
by Bayer, were presented as the scientic solution to Europeans’ need to adapt 
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to living in the tropics. By purportedly strengthening the bones, muscles, and 
nerves, Sanatogen was said to cure diverse symptoms of tropical neurasthenia, 
such as anemia, listlessness, depression, sleeplessness, and eating and intesti-
nal disorders.29 Presented as “e Nerve Strengthening Food,” advertisements 
printed in newspapers and periodicals oen featured a depressed European man 
or woman, sometimes with another illustration of the person in better health 
aer taking Sanatogen.30 One of the campaign’s more interesting advertisements 
depicts a European mother with two children playing in an outdoor springtime 
scene, described as “fresh, young, and happy” without any “dust, heat, and weak-
ness.” Lest the colonial observer despair over the contrast between a healthy 
European environment and their unhealthy Javanese reality, the accompanying 
text provides some reassurance: “A Dutch spring is probably an impossible ideal 
at present, but you can certainly achieve that ‘spring-feeling’ of happy, cheerful 
health with Sanatogen.”31 Along with other nerve medications, such as Biocitin 
and Virol, Sanatogen came to be considered an eective cure for European de-
generation in the tropics.
In addition to medical supplements, Europeans became convinced of the need 
to physically strengthen their bodies to heighten their resistance to the tropical 
climate. Strengthening one’s muscles, central nervous system, and immune sys-
tem through exercise was deemed a crucial way to maintain physical and mental 
health. Travel guides and household manuals advised Dutch colonials residing 
in the tropics to be physically active during the cooler mornings and evenings, 
preferably by engaging in sports that also strengthened social bonds within the 
European community.32 is was not di
cult to do, as the early twentieth cen-
tury witnessed an international explosion of sports associations and leagues for 
swimming, tennis, football, eld hockey, cycling, rowing, sailing, golf, croquet, 
skittles, hiking, mountaineering, horse riding, and gymnastics. In the colonies, 
most of these associations were for Europeans only; swimming in particular 
was strictly segregated by race. Although the Javanese began to play some of 
these sports themselves—soccer, for instance—they had to establish their own 
leagues.33
Finally, to address concerns about neurasthenia and degeneration, Dutch co-
lonials sought a reprieve from both the tropical climate and indigenous culture. 
Reecting this desire, mountain resorts proliferated in late-colonial Indonesia, 
creating spaces in which pseudoscientic concerns about race, civilization, and 
the climate coalesced. In contrast to British and French hill stations in Asia, 
mountain resorts in Dutch Indonesia were not semiannual retreats but weekend 
getaways near Java’s major urban areas. In the mild mountain climate, colonials 
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relaxed in European-style hotels and lodges, cozied up next to replaces, con-
sumed hearty European meals prepared by European chefs, and enjoyed ora 
and fauna that reminded them of home. By protecting the European physical 
body, mentality, and cultural identity, mountain resorts were crucial in facilitat-
ing the colonial project. Here, the sick could recuperate, the healthy strengthen 
their bodies, and all nd shelter from the indigenous conventions permeating 
the island. As an antidote to degeneration, it was believed that these resorts 
provided the colony with physically strong and mentally healthy Europeans to 
advance the colonial project and uphold European prestige.34
“e Cancer of Indies Society”: Purging Eastern Inuences
Medication, physical exercise, and mountain resorts could only go so far to pro-
tect European bodies on Java. Drawing heavily on evolutionary understandings 
of racial dierence, Dutch colonials also sought to purge their households and 
everyday lives from the degenerative inuences of indigenous people, culture, 
and society. Unsurprisingly, Kohlbrugge identied the overwhelming presence 
of indigenous servants in the colonial household as a primary threat to European 
lives. Most Europeans depended on a variety of indigenous servants such as a 
houseboy (djongos), cook (kokkie), gardener (kebon), nanny (baboe), and seam-
stress (djait) to manage their households. While the number of servants had 
long signied status in colonial society, their place in the colonial household 
became contentious as Europeans came to regard their servants as uncivilized, 
unhygienic, and, due to scientic advances in germ theory, carriers of disease 
that posed a danger to the health of colonial families.35
e conviction that Europeans were inherently more sanitary than indige-
nous people strikingly contrasted with the reality in which Javanese servants 
prepared their food, washed and tted their clothing, cleaned their homes, and 
most importantly, took care of their children. is ambivalence was reected 
in European household manuals and the colonial press, which simultaneously 
described servants as lazy, dirty, and unreliable as well as gentle, skilled, and 
compliant. As Elsbeth Locher-Scholten argues, this incongruity mirrored the 
prevailing political discourse that on the one hand cultivated racial dierence 
but on the other aimed to civilize indigenous society. Under this rubric, servants 
were considered both useful children in need of European guidance and a seri-
ous threat to colonial families.36
e baboe became the embodiment of the danger that servants in particular, 
and indigenous society in general, posed to European culture and identity on 
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Java. According to Kohlbrugge, the baboe submitted to children’s every whim. 
She allowed them to hit her and give orders, did not enforce eating only at meal-
times, and refused to let infants cry themselves to sleep. In contrast to a decent 
European upbringing, this allegedly resulted in children with no sense of obedi-
ence, restraint, duty, or work ethic. e baboe’s unhygienic native habits further 
set a bad example and even endangered the children when she dressed, fed, and 
bathed them. In addition, many argued that children in a baboe’s care spoke 
Malay better than Dutch, believed in indigenous superstitions, and were suscep-
tible to the low sexual morality of the natives.37 In colonial public opinion, in-
digenous women’s “lack of civilization and development” made them “absolutely 
unsuitable as nanny for [European] children.”38 e baboe was a “curse,” causing 
them to quickly degenerate to the level of the natives, which endangered the sur-
vival of European culture and identity in the tropics. Consequently, “baboe-ism” 
escalated to a “vice” of sensational proportions in the colonial press, referred to 
as the “cancer of Indies society.”39
Such views presented the European mother as both the reason for and an-
tidote to the baboe’s corrupting eect on children and, indirectly, the future 
of the European community in the tropics.40 European mothers’ tendency—
especially Eurasians, who held European status—to delegate their children’s 
upbringing to indigenous women was now an indication of their own degener-
ation. It was their laziness, indolence, egocentrism, and vanity—character traits 
oen ascribed to Indo-Europeans—that resulted in the decision to employ a 
baboe. e vicious cycle of degeneration therefore did not start with the baboe 
but with the children’s mother, or if one wanted to uncover the root of the prob-
lem, their indigenous ancestors. e only way to break or even reverse this cycle 
was for the mother to reclaim charge over her children’s upbringing following 
bourgeois European standards. It was not accidental that this idealization of 
European motherhood coincided with the rapid increase of European women in 
the colony. But although they came to be considered the guardians of European 
identity and cultural values, their presumed role in baboe-ism simultaneously 
reinforced continued oppression from male counterparts. For instance, when 
European women lobbied for surage in the colonies, one commentator atly 
stated: “First do your duty, then demand your rights.”41
In addition to this anxiety about baboes and motherhood, food and the kok-
kie who prepared it became crucial issues for Europeans on Java. e kokkie’s 
place in the household gradually came under much scrutiny that emphasized 
the assumed unsanitary conditions of her kitchen and her inability to prepare 
a decent European meal. Again, it was European women who had caused this 
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problem and also had the power to solve it. ey were encouraged to take con-
trol over their kitchens, either by closely supervising the kokkie or by preparing 
meals themselves. Household guides and periodicals oered an abundance of 
advice on hygiene and cooking, while modern novelties like refrigerators and gas 
and electric stoves also made the kitchen a more sanitary space for food prepa-
ration. By reclaiming their role in the colonial kitchen, European women would 
protect the physical wellbeing of their families and halt cultural degeneration 
in its tracks. 42
However, there was more at stake than the issue of who prepared the food; the 
Dutch also began to scrutinize the food itself. With rice as their staple and the 
rice table as a signicant social practice, some worried that the latter in particu-
lar was both a cause and indication of degeneration. For instance, a popular com-
mentator described the rice table as a “ravenous, gluttonous, animalistic agglom-
eration of extremely stinking food”—a hodgepodge that allegedly undermined 
one’s taste and propriety.43 Such assertions implicitly suggested that European 
bodies and minds required European food to thrive. Western companies like 
Quaker Oats played to these sentiments, claiming that oats were ideal for the 
tropics, “much better than rice.” Advertisements promoted oats as a nutritious 
substitute that allegedly strengthened the blood, muscles, and bones, improved 
athletic abilities, and produced superior breast milk. Arguing that oats were the 
best food for growing babies, toddlers, teenagers and adolescents, the Quaker 
Oats campaign incorporated colonial anxieties about children’s protracted phys-
ical development to sell the product.44
e invention of light, airtight canisters and freezers aboard ships enabled the 
importation of goods like Quaker Oats to colonial Java, making a wide array of 
European food products available in the colony.45 is emphasis on European 
food was also reected in agricultural initiatives on Java itself. Private entrepre-
neurs expanded the cultivation of numerous European vegetables as well as dairy 
products in Java’s mountains, while the colonial government experimented with 
the largescale cultivation of wheat.46 Although rice and the rice table did not 
disappear, changes in food consumption played an important role in combating 
fears of degeneration and developing a European identity in the tropics.
us, during the nal decades of colonial rule in Indonesia, the Dutch be-
came increasingly concerned with Java’s inuence on their physical and cultural 
wellbeing. Embracing theories of climatic determinism and evolutionary rac-
ism, they now considered themselves outsiders in a hostile climate living among 
backward people with an alien culture. To assert their modernity and alleged 
superiority, they emphasized their Europeanness and sought ways to replicate 
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a Western lifestyle in the tropics. In the process, they forged new racial and 
cultural identities in opposition to the Javanese, which gradually shaped a new 
approach to legitimizing their authority on the archipelago. By the 1920s, the 
once-fashionable idea of a colonial collaboration between East and West had 
become an illusion, and Dutch colonial rule rmly relied on the cultivation of 
dierence.
e “Seven M’s”: Negotiating Western Modernity
e rapid changes within colonial society triggered by the Ethical Policy, the 
national awakening, scientic and technological innovations, and developments 
in the wider world forced a reconsideration of the colonial relationship as well 
as a reinvention of colonial identities. As the Dutch redened themselves by re-
interpreting the impact of the tropical climate and their Javanized approach to 
power, the Javanese were redening their own identity against this new colonial 
discourse. Central to this process was an ongoing debate about how westerniza-
tion would inuence conceptions of Indonesianness, which were simultaneously 
being forged through the national awakening. Questioning to what extent they 
could embrace Western modernity without a loss of self, Indonesians sought to 
purge alleged vices and bad habits, and promote attitudes and behaviors that 
would increase their power and standing in the colonial arena. In this way, their 
goals aligned with those of the colonizer (albeit from a dierent angle), as both 
attempted to develop modern identities within a shared discursive space.47
e early decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a largely 
urban Indonesian middle class. Because they were essential in sta
ng the co-
lonial state’s expanding bureaucracy as well as private enterprises, middle-class 
men (along with the traditional elite) were the almost exclusive beneciaries of 
extensive Western education. is education, work opportunities, and accom-
panying nancial advantages meant that they were the group most exposed 
to Western modernity on Java. According to historical anthropologist Henk 
Schulte Nordholt, the nascent urban middle classes were characterized not by 
their political ambitions, such as independence, but rather by their aspiration to 
modern lifestyles. is concept of modern life was loosely associated with West-
ern social values, including the nuclear family; Western fashions in clothing and 
furnishings; habits such as smoking, dancing, drinking, and reading newspapers; 
Western technology, especially watches, bicycles, and gramophones; and West-
ern perceptions of beauty and hygiene. Interestingly, westernized individuals 
and social groups oen bought into the Ethical Policy’s civilizing discourse that 
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had replaced the Javanization of authority in 1901. But while the middle classes 
provided essential support for the revised colonial project, they did not uncrit-
ically embrace Western norms and behaviors. In their encounter with Western 
modernity, the Indonesian middle classes formulated their own alternate under-
standings of modernity and progress. ough approaches varied, they shared a 
common determination to create a distinct, though Western-inuenced, mod-
ern Indonesian identity. us, Kipling’s trope was not just popular with the 
colonizer.48
From the outset, it was clear that the West was not the only, or even most 
desirable, model to emulate in articulating varied ethnic, religious, and national 
identities. Members of Boedi Oetomo, for instance, were profoundly inspired 
by the Japanese, who during the Meiji Restoration (1868) selectively broke with 
what were perceived to be outdated traditions and embraced Western science, 
technology, and education without losing their own cultural identity. e 
Chinese revolution of 1911 and the emancipation of the Chinese diaspora in 
Indonesia suggested a similar path. Others, such as the Sarekat Islam and Mu-
hammadiyah, were drawn to the transnational Islamic modernist movement 
that originated in Mecca and Cairo and swept through the Muslim world at 
the turn of the twentieth century. In an attempt to reconcile Western colonial 
dominance with the superior teachings of Islam, the Islamic reform movement, 
as it was also known, accepted certain elements of Western modernity, above all 
scientic and technological knowledge, while amending cultural and societal 
practices to bring them into accordance with Islamic teachings. ese associ-
ations propagated the pursuit of self-betterment, behavioral moderation, and 
the strict observance of the ve pillars of Islam.49 Similarly, Indonesian associa-
tions with a more overtly political outlook—like the Indische Party or later, the 
Partai Nasional Indonesia—emphasized the importance of the right to vote, 
equality under the law, and self-determination, while also formulating a dis-
tinct national identity. All of these viewpoints aspired to be modern, dened by 
political rights, self-improvement, and embracing science and technology, but 
their ultimate acceptance was always contingent on being distinctively Eastern.
e question of to what extent Western cultural accommodation became 
problematic was one of the most discussed subjects in the vernacular press during 
the nal decades of colonial rule. Countless articles considered whether it would 
be best to only adopt from the West what was deemed useful or, alternatively, 
to reject Western materialism and individualism altogether in favor of East-
ern spirituality and collectivism—perspectives widely considered throughout 
the colonial world.50 e underlying fear was that imitating the Dutch would 
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eventually lead to a societal and individual loss of identity.51 ese anxieties be-
came more concrete with numerous specic examples of westernization ranging 
from the modernization of deference rituals and the question of what to wear, 
to trepidation regarding language, education, science, technology, architecture, 
interior design, consumption, the arts, and music. Advocates of the various cur-
rents within the nationalist movement oered diverging perspectives on these 
and other issues. As a result, an array of competing Indonesian identities began 
to emerge.52
Generally speaking, the colonized sought to identify the vices of colonial mo-
dernity and replace them with virtues more betting indigenous traditions. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, the most common among them became pop-
ularly known as the “seven M’s” (mim pitu), referring to seven vices beginning 
with the letter M: main (gambling), madon (chasing aer women; prostitution; 
adultery), minum (alcoholism), madat (opium use), maling (thievery), mada
(lying), and mangani (gluttony). ere were many reasons for opposing these 
vices, including the fact that they did not conform to Islamic morality, and the 
belief that engaging in them subdued the colonized while nancially beneting 
the colonizers. Although the idiom preceded the emergence of the nationalist 
movement, it was through Indonesia’s rst political and cultural associations 
that it took on special meaning as a way of challenging colonial modernity. In 
1909, it became an o-used expression at Boedi Oetomo meetings, where it 
was used as a call to action to claim dignity and self-respect.53 A few years later, 
Tjokroaminoto, as chairman of the Sarekat Islam, frequently brought up the 
seven M’s at the association’s meetings and rallies, impressing on his audiences 
that they must strive for self-improvement. is included moderation in behav-
ior, self-education, working hard, and eschewing criminal activities and lying. 
e Sarekat Islam’s reformist agenda specically identied alcoholism, opium 
use, gambling, and prostitution as social evils that must be reduced, if not exter-
minated.54 In the program for the 1917 Sarekat Islam Congress, tackling these 
vices formed the core of the movement’s social objectives.55
In addition to these larger organizations, a number of self-help associations es-
tablished throughout Java during the 1910s also embraced the principles behind 
the seven M’s. For instance, members of the aptly named Mim Pitu, founded 
in Batavia in 1914, promised to adhere to agreed-on moral guidelines—namely, 
rejecting the seven M’s.56 Another self-help association organized in Salatiga 
(Central Java) committed to a similar moral code. Named Insulinde’s Dageraad
(Indies’ Dawn), the association was started by Dutch schoolteachers in 1913, but 
its indigenous members quickly took over leadership, dedicating themselves to 
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living a clean life, honoring women and the elderly, and refusing the consump-
tion of alcohol, opium, and cigarettes.57 Interestingly, many of these associations, 
as well as Boedi Oetomo and the Sarekat Islam, dened the seven M’s slightly 
dierently. ey oen used vices that began with the letter M interchangeably, 
at times adding new ones—such as misuh (cursing) and matenni/modol (mur-
der)—to the list and subtracting others. e uidity of the concept only en-
hanced its popularity.
Alcoholism—one of the original seven—was perhaps the most disconcerting 
vice associated with colonial modernity. Although Java had a long history of 
producing fermented beverages from rice or sugar palm juices, their widespread 
consumption had been inhibited since the fourteenth century by the arrival of 
Islam.58 However, as members of the Javanese aristocracy sought to create an 
aura of authority by dressing, wining, and dining like the Dutch, the consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages gradually increased in the nineteenth century.59 is 
attempt to appear powerful through mimicry motivated many aspiring Java-
nese to consume alcohol, as well, which was also facilitated by the import of 
Dutch gin ( jenever). As a consequence, by 1900, the consumption of alcohol had 
grown signicantly among the Javanese.60 For those questioning the morality of 
Western modernity, this increase was not a welcome development. Sarekat Islam 
rallies promoted the idea that alcoholism was the result of the westernization of 
society and the cause of moral decay, physical deterioration, a loss of prestige, 
and nancial ruin among Indonesians.61 In addition, observers always pointed 
out the colonial government’s dubious role regarding the presence of alcohol on 
Java; o
cially, the authorities discouraged its consumption, but at the same time 
proted handsomely from excise and import duties on gin. As one commenter 
noted cynically, the Dutch rst “introduced alcohol to the Indies, proted from 
its sale, and subsequently promulgated circulars and organized conferences to 
ght its consumption.” e government claimed to want to protect the indige-
nous population, but the author wondered, “How much prot does the govern-
ment make with its monopolies again?”62 us, resistance to alcohol was about 
more than Islamic reforms; it was also part of a larger struggle against colonial 
exploitation.
Like alcohol, the Dutch imported opium to Java but in contrast, the Dutch 
themselves did not consume opium. e clientele of Java’s opium dens consisted 
primarily of indigenous and Chinese people, while the prots of these enter-
prises owed back into the coers of the colonial state. Until 1918, at least 10 
percent of the state’s total annual revenue came directly from the government’s 
sale of opium. As part of the Ethical Policy, in 1910 a more “humanitarian” 
East Is East, and West Is West 161 
government-controlled system of opium production and sale called the opium-
regie replaced the nancially lucrative opium farms. is would purportedly 
enable the government to proactively discourage the use of opium, but to the 
impartial observer it was clear that in terms of consumption, little changed. A 
journalist for Bintang Soerabaja scathingly wrote that the overhaul of the farm 
system “was intended to reduce opium consumption, just as the government 
intended to reduce the number of debtors, travelers, phone customers, and 
slaughtered animals through its pawnshops, railroads, telephone-company, and 
slaughter houses.”63 More explicitly than with alcohol, the anti-opium movement 
was characterized as a struggle against colonial exploitation. Tellingly, it was not 
government propaganda and actions that ultimately curbed opium consumption 
in colonial Indonesia, but cultural and political associations’ campaigns against 
it, including Boedi Oetomo, the Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, and Taman 
Siswa. And as consumption dwindled, so did the share of opium prots in co-
lonial revenue.64
Conspicuous consumption—or gluttony—was another vice that was strongly 
associated with westernization, moral decay, and colonial exploitation. At 
Sarekat Islam rallies, Tjokroaminoto reasoned that Europeans were merely hu-
mans who, like the Javanese, had strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps foremost 
among their weaknesses, he argued, was their obsession with material wealth 
and conspicuous consumption, which he contrasted with Eastern spirituality 
and asceticism.65 Like many others, Tjokroaminoto encouraged the colonized 
not to naively emulate Europeans, but to adopt only those aspects of Western 
modernity that supported their struggle for respect and equality.66 is meant 
resisting the many temptations of Western materialism, including modern con-
sumer products such as watches, radios, gramophones, bicycles, electric lights, 
refrigerators, soaps, perfumes, and canned food, as well as entertainment and 
events from movies, restaurants, and concerts to international expositions. 
Tjokroaminoto asserted that conspicuous consumption did not only run 
counter to Javanese morality but also beneted the colonizer. Western products 
and services were provided by European companies. Tempting the Javanese to 
live above their means, ensuing indebtedness forced them to turn to govern-
ment-run pawnshops to return their consumer products. In popular culture, 
the pawnshop became a corrective site where people without self-discipline 
were forcefully stripped of material symbols of Western modernity. Evoking the 
humiliation of a visit to the pawnshop, advertisements, political cartoons, and 
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Finally, one of the most controversial topics in these discussions of Indone-
sian westernization was social mixing between men and women. Traditionally, 
Javanese boys and girls, especially the children of elites, were separated from 
the age of twelve onward. Girls were secluded within the privacy of the house-
hold and family life, where they remained until they were married, usually to a 
partner selected by their parents. However, Western modernity brought with 
it many new social habits and temptations, such as movie theatres, public con-
certs, restaurants, night markets, and, of course, dances. Interactions between 
the sexes were increasingly less inhibited in these venues, as adolescents mingled, 
held hands, hugged, and even kissed in public. is behavior contrasted sharply 
with the beliefs of Islamic modernists seeking to purge society from modern 
vices, of which the public social engagement between adolescent boys and girls 
and unmarried men and women was one of the most troubling.
In the vernacular press, Western dances became the focus of anxieties about 
free social interaction. In contrast to traditional Javanese dances where par-
ticipants were all of the same sex, men and women danced together in close 
physical contact at Western-style dances. In the women’s journal Isteri, several 
authors expressed concern about what they regarded as highly sensual activities, 
which they argued were likely to lead to improper public behavior, premarital 
sexual relations, and children born out of wedlock. In addition, they asserted 
that allowing youths to participate in these dances suggested parental approval 
of immoral behavior.67 One author called on all Indonesian mothers to protect 
their daughters from the menace of Western dances.68 As this appeal indicates, 
indigenous mothers—and indigenous women in general—were oen cast in a 
signicant and oen paradoxical role in these discussions about the negative ef-
fects of Western modernity. In the vernacular press, “authentic” Javanese women 
(which depended on participation in the nationalist movement) were deemed 
guardians of the nation—a role that carried honor but also the weighty respon-
sibility of purging all the immoral Western inuences threatening themselves, 
their progeny, and the emerging Indonesian state. At the same time, the press 
oen insisted that women—and, by extension, children and the nation—needed 
protection from westernization’s harmful impact.69 e topic of social mixing, 
and dances in particular, was a common avenue toward such discussions of mod-
ern Indonesian womanhood.
Contesting Western vices was an important step in redening what it meant 
to be a colonial subject, a Javanese man or woman, a Muslim, and, increasingly, 
an Indonesian. But as the examples of alcoholism, opium, and conspicuous con-
sumption, and freer social interaction illustrate, the Javanese confrontation with 
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colonial modernity was far from a uniform, let alone a nationalist, one. A variety 
of perspectives emerged through which Indonesians sought to modify Western 
modernity to t their desired lifestyle. eir burgeoning identities and corre-
sponding choices and debates reected these negotiations, and as such played 
an important role in the struggle against colonial oppression.70 For many, these 
issues came to a head with changing norms and ideas around interracial relation-
ships between Indonesians and Europeans.
Concubinage and Mixed Marriages:  
Race, Gender, and Colonial Identities
As Indonesians and the Dutch constructed new identities in response and oppo-
sition to one another, both had to negotiate—and in many ways disentangle—
the blend of East and West that characterized colonial society. e adoption 
and rejection of new moral codes was central to this process of self-denition, 
and many focused on an area of entanglement that had shaped life on Java since 
the VOC’s arrival: intimate encounters between colonizer and colonized. Atti-
tudes toward such relationships—concubinage and mixed marriages, in particu-
lar—changed signicantly during the nal half-century of colonial rule, on both 
sides. For the Dutch, shiing views toward marriage and sex were oen rooted in 
theories of acclimatization and biological racism. Whereas explorations of this 
shi have been at the center of scholarly inquiry, Indonesian perspectives have 
received far less attention. Interestingly, however, Indonesians also came to con-
sider these unions to be dangerous and degenerative, oen invoking the same rac-
ist rhetoric espoused by the colonizer.71 Indigenous intellectuals who had studied 
in the Netherlands (as well as some educated in the Indies) inevitably came into 
contact with European notions of race. As with the adoption of democratic and 
enlightenment discourses—which the Javanese eectively used to expose the hy-
pocrisy of the colonial project—some educated and informed Indonesians also 
employed Western racial discourses. is is not to say that they fully bought 
into these ideas but utilizing them allowed Indonesians to turn racial discourses 
against the institution of colonialism and cultivate nationalist sentiment.
e new Dutch position on interracial relationships marked a substantial de-
parture from colonial authorities’ tacit approval, even encouragement, of racial 
mixing that had reigned since the seventeenth century. e VOC preferred to 
recruit bachelors for service in the Indies but limited the immigration of Euro-
pean women and at the same time placed limitations on marriage to indigenous 
women.72 e reasoning behind these policies was that indigenous women were 
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less expensive to maintain and less likely to encourage their partners to partake 
in illegal trade. With the exception of high-ranking employees, who were ei-
ther accompanied by a European spouse or married a converted indigenous or 
Eurasian woman, most European men sought the company of enslaved or free 
indigenous women as concubines (nyai). Although temporary marriages or con-
cubinage was a common feature of trade diasporas in Southeast Asia, in colonial 
Batavia they uniquely formed a more permanent Eurasian society. ese rela-
tionships served to anchor European men in the colonies, encourage the growth 
of a stable colonial settler community, and provide guidance regarding local life-
styles, culture, and climate. e institution of concubinage changed nominally 
with the abolition of slavery in 1860, but widespread poverty facilitated indige-
nous women’s willingness to continue serving as concubines—now referred to 
as housekeepers—to European men. By the end of the nineteenth century, an 
estimated 50 percent of European men cohabitated with a housekeeper.73
However, the institution of concubinage was gradually discredited from the 
1880s onward due to growing concerns about acclimatization, European prestige, 
and the dangers of physical and moral degeneration. To live outside of marriage 
with an indigenous woman with no legal rights—she could be discarded with 
or without her children at any moment—came to be regarded as immoral and 
indicative of a lack of piety. Critics of these unions argued that it was impossible 
for o
cials, civil servants, and soldiers, as representatives of Dutch authority and 
European civilization, to command respect when living in concubinage. e ad-
vantages once associated with the lifestyle were either dismissed or transferred to 
the care of European women.74 Moreover, while the nyai had long been regarded 
as an invaluable guide to indigenous society and the tropical environment, she 
was now considered a degenerative inuence on her partner. By encouraging 
indigenous approaches to dress, food, customs, and superstitions, she would in-
evitably turn him into a lazy, egocentric, and indierent person. In addition, 
the relaxation of conjugal restrictions with indigenous women and the grow-
ing presence of European women on Java made it no longer necessary for the 
nyai to serve as a perceived remedy for loneliness, boredom, alcoholism, sodomy, 
prostitution, and the spread of venereal diseases among European men.75 ese 
changes and growing concerns led the government to prohibit concubinage for 
all civil servants in 1904, and to gradually reduce its presence in army barracks 
between 1913 and 1928. Following the authorities’ example, concubinage in the 
private sector also diminished aer 1920.76
e decrease in concubinage in colonial society led to an increase in mixed 
marriages between European men and indigenous or Eurasian women. 
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Marriages between Europeans also increased as immigration restrictions for Eu-
ropean women lessened, but the reality remained that Dutch men outnumbered 
Dutch women on Java until the end of colonial rule. And while most Europeans 
believed that mixed-race procreation was to be avoided regardless of the nature 
of the sexual relationship, there were also many who justied mixed marriages 
with religious or moral arguments, claiming that they were preferable to living in 
sin.77 e numbers reect this attitude, as mixed marriages rose from 13 percent 
of all European marriages in 1900 to 20 percent in 1920 and 27.5 percent in 1925, 
before dropping back down to 20 percent in 1940.78
Even so, the growth of mixed marriages created a new racialized and gendered 
class hierarchy in colonial society. e legal foundations for this hierarchy, as well 
as for authorizing mixed marriages in the rst place, can be traced to government 
regulations from the mid-nineteenth century. Until then, marriages between 
Christians and non-Christians were prohibited, and indigenous partners had to 
convert before wedding a Dutch Christian. In 1848, legal status replaced religion 
as the primary criteria for permitting mixed marriages. is meant that indig-
enous individuals had to submit to European civil and commercial law before 
they could marry a European. And since the legal division between populations 
largely corresponded with ethnicity—Europeans, “Foreign Orientals,” and indig-
enous people—the term “mixed marriage” had highly racialized connotations.79
By the turn of the century, colonial authorities’ perspective on mixed mar-
riage changed again when they realized that the 1848 regulation was enabling 
unions between women with European status—mostly poor Eurasians—and 
indigenous men. On average, only three of these marriages occurred per year be-
tween 1886 and 1897, but o
cials still considered them a blow to European pres-
tige. To discourage these relationships, revised marriage regulations were issued 
in 1898, stipulating that women now inherited the legal status of their husbands, 
as did any children born from these unions. is statute aligned with European, 
Islamic, and Chinese law, and its o
cial reasoning was that the family’s viability 
beneted from legal equality. Uno
cially, though, the regulations were pur-
posefully designed to discourage white European women from marrying indig-
enous men. As the law’s explanatory text made clear, colonial authorities could 
tolerate poor Eurasian women—who were already considered partly degenerate 
in their minds—marrying indigenous men, but it was “most contemptible” if 
European women who did not “straddle the border between the races” did so.80
is racialized and gendered class hierarchy aected men’s choices, as well, as 
immigrant and locally born European men and auent Eurasian men were ex-
pected to marry “white” or “pure” European women. Conversely, poor European 
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and especially Eurasian men could now marry indigenous women without much 
social consequence since according to colonial ideology, they too were already 
lacking in prestige.
However, it was not only European attitudes toward concubinage and mixed 
marriages that changed in the late-colonial period. Interracial relationships 
were increasingly scrutinized by the colonized, as well. e Sarekat Islam was 
instrumental in voicing criticism of the institution of concubinage at rallies and 
meetings and in its vernacular publications. As a union not only out of wedlock 
but also crossing a religious divide, Islamic reformists considered concubinage 
a reprehensible sin. Moreover, in 1913, the association identied opposition to 
concubinage as one of its main objectives, framing it as a quintessential symbol 
of colonial exploitation. Followers were reminded that European men primarily 
came to Java in search of riches and sought poor young women as temporary 
housekeepers and concubines. Women only accepted such positions due to pov-
erty and, crucially, had no legal rights, as there were no o
cial records of these 
relationships. When the European man made his fortune and repatriated or 
chose to marry a European woman, he could discard his concubine at will and 
either take his children or leave them behind as he desired. Used and abused, the 
nyai returned to poverty. e nyai thus became emblematic of colonialism itself, 
which beneted the Dutch and le the Javanese bere.81
Just as with the opposition to deference rituals, public criticism of concubi-
nage as a colonial injustice forced the Dutch to reconsider the custom. Yet there 
was no consensus among the Javanese as to what should replace the institution. 
Some promoted mixed marriages as a possible solution, as that would put an end 
to the moral ambiguity of cohabitation outside of marriage as well as give in-
digenous women legal rights regarding their children, divorce, and inheritance. 
From this perspective, these unions could ultimately symbolize a true partner-
ship between East and West. is was unacceptable, however, for Islamic re-
formists, including Sarekat Islam’s leadership, who insisted that mixed marriages 
could only be legitimate if the European converted to Islam.82
However, many indigenous commentators also echoed European concerns 
about race, most oen conceptualized through ideas regarding purity of blood 
(darah). For instance, in an article about a nyai accused of poisoning her for-
mer master, a contributor to the newspaper Kemadjoean Hindia (Indies Prog-
ress) categorically rejected interracial unions. Writing under a pseudonym, he 
argued that interracial relationships—“mixed blood” (berdarah campuran), in 
his words—hampered Javanese national progress. Since children inherited their 
father’s status, the ospring of mixed unions were foreigners, destined to also 
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inherit harmful European interests and customs. e author suggested that the 
system of concubinage and all mixed unions be forbidden altogether.83 Many 
agreed, as phrases like “the betrayal of one’s race,” “the degradation of our race,” 
and “loyalty to one’s race” became commonplace in the vernacular press, and the 
“contamination of Javanese blood” framed discussions of Eurasian children who 
resulted from interracial unions.84
Such discussions in the vernacular press were heightened by the 1915 an-
nouncement of the engagement of Raden Adjeng Soehito, a bupati’s daughter, 
to Hubert Dorren, a lieutenant in the colonial army. Up until then, the focus 
had been on relationships between European men and poor Javanese women, 
but the bride’s social status made this a highly sensitive topic. Being of priyayi, 
or aristocratic, descent made Soehito an unlikely spouse for a European man. 
Traditionally, aristocratic adolescent women lived in seclusion aer their twelh 
birthday until the moment of their arranged marriage. e fact that Soehito 
and Dorren were able to meet each other at all implied that the bride enjoyed a 
relatively progressive social upbringing that allowed her to socialize more freely 
with men. Conservative commentators in the vernacular press presented the en-
gagement as an example of the dangers of freer social interaction between the 
sexes and of westernization in general. In addition, they considered Soehito’s 
choice of a European lieutenant instead of a fellow member of the priyayi to be a 
slight against Javanese tradition and rejection of Javanese men. ere were also 
concerns that Soehito would be seen as a concubine in the eyes of the common 
Javanese.85 Apparently, the consequences of interracial relationships were much 
more acute when they involved the elite.86
Responses to Soehito and Dorren’s announcement were not uniform, how-
ever, and alongside concern and alarm were some positive reactions. A contribu-
tor to the newspaper Sinar Djawa (Java’s Radiance) described the engagement as 
the “fruits of progress” and a sign of Javanese women’s successful emancipation. 
e marriage proved that European men no longer felt too superior to marry a 
Javanese woman and dared to display their aection publicly and legally. More-
over, since women had more rights in European marriages and European men 
allegedly treated their spouses better than Javanese men did, the author reasoned 
that mixed marriages could be a great opportunity for Javanese women. And 
if Javanese men did not like it, they needed to treat women better.87 In stark 
contrast, Islamic reformists vehemently opposed any marital union between a 
European man and Javanese woman, as it went against religious prescripts. In 
the newspaper Kaoem Moeda (Youth), a contributor therefore described the Soe-
hito’s engagement as the “sour fruit of progress” and wrongly argued that she 
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was now obliged to convert to Christianity. Interestingly, the author had fewer 
qualms about mixed marriages when European women converted to Islam in 
order to wed Javanese men.88
In the following decades, the marriage between an aristocratic or 
Western-educated Javanese woman (the two oen were interchangeable) and a 
European man almost guaranteed a resurgence of the debate over mixed mar-
riages.89 e preference for a European over a Javanese husband was perceived 
as a signicant challenge to Javanese masculinity, and the potential motivations 
behind Javanese women’s choice was a hotly debated topic in the vernacular 
press. In the newspaper Perempoean Bergerak (Women’s Movement), one author 
argued that before criticizing women’s decision to engage in interracial relation-
ships, the underlying causes must be understood and addressed. She suggested 
that perhaps upper-class women were disillusioned with Javanese marriage cus-
toms in which women had no rights and were always at risk of child marriage, 
repudiation and divorce, and polygamy. By marrying a European spouse, women 
gained legal rights and protections against these threats. e author also found 
it unfair to criticize poor women seeking stability and security as either a nyai 
or wife to a European man.90 Another female contributor presented a similar 
argument in the newspaper Padjadjaran, writing that since Javanese men all too 
oen took their wives for granted and could renounce her at any time, educated 
Javanese women in particular preferred the company of Europeans.91 Such ar-
guments posed by female authors were mostly rejected by their more numerous 
male counterparts, who increasingly blamed Western education and cultural 
depictions of chivalrous and gentlemanlike European men. Countering the idea 
that women could better relate to men who were their intellectual and modern 
equals, they argued that adulation for everything European would only result 
in veiled concubinage.92
Frustrated with the prevalence of interracial relationships between European 
men and Javanese women, commentators in the vernacular press openly won-
dered how the Dutch would respond if the tables were turned. Would they allow 
a European woman—especially of high social standing—to marry an indige-
nous man, her alleged racial inferior and a Muslim on top of that, and lose her 
legal status in the process?93 To taunt the Dutch and bolster public opposition 
to mixed marriages, several newspapers devised a unique manner of protest. Al-
luding to advertisements in which Europeans solicited the companionship of 
an indigenous woman, the newspaper Sinar Pasoendan published its own ad-
vertisement featuring a Western-educated indigenous man seeking a European 
woman under the age of twenty as his spouse. Interested parties were asked to 
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submit photographs for consideration. Below the ad, the editors explained that 
they did not mean to oend but merely to point out how insulting the European 
practice was to the Javanese. In bold letters they added that the objective of their 
symbolic protest was to quicken emancipation and achieve full equality with 
Europeans.94
Despite this alleged intention, marriages between Western-educated Javanese 
men and European women were in fact on the rise. Although Dutch investments 
in education were minimal overall, they did enable the sons of the Javanese elite 
to receive a Western education. A select few continued their studies in the Neth-
erlands, where they freely socialized with European women. ese interactions 
resulted in a steady increase in mixed marriages between Indonesian men and 
Dutch women, who were not discouraged by the 1898 law dictating that wives 
inherit their husband’s legal status. Seeking to suppress interracial unions, colo-
nial authorities instead focused their eorts on dissuading Indonesian students 
from pursuing them. In September 1914, the study committee of the Associa-
tion of East and West, which supported Indonesian education in the metropole, 
addressed a letter to students as well as their parents in the colony. e Dutch 
committee explicitly stated that aer completing their studies, it was best for 
every young man to take a wife of his own people and thus share his educational 
experiences, instead of alienating himself by marrying a European woman.
Sam Ratu Langie, president the Indonesian students association in the Neth-
erlands (Indische Vereenging), felt that his Dutch mentors were forcing him and 
others to avoid relationships with European women. He countered by arguing 
that Indonesian students came to the Netherlands to gain knowledge and ad-
vance the development of their homeland. Consequently, if they fell for a Euro-
pean woman, she must have demonstrated great compassion for their cause. In 
addition, Ratu Langie presented the educational gap between indigenous boys 
and girls as an important reason why students like him could more easily relate 
to European women.95
In response to the study committee’s letter, the student association decided 
to organize a discussion for its members and the committee’s Dutch represen-
tatives on June 30, 1915. e evening brought together an array of viewpoints 
on the issue of mixed marriages. e Dutch ethical advocate J. H. Abendanon, 
representing the study committee, explained that the letter’s intention was to 
elucidate that marrying an indigenous woman resulted in sharing the students’ 
knowledge, which would benet the whole of indigenous society. Moreover, he 
warned the students that returning with a European wife could be interpreted 
as a belief that indigenous women were too inferior to be their spouses. During 
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the subsequent discussion, some students agreed with Abendanon, arguing that 
having a European wife would be counterproductive, as common Javanese did 
not trust Europeans and the immediate family would consider her an outsider. 
Soewardi Soerjaningrat added that the contrast between Indies spirituality and 
European nationalism was too great for mixed marriages to work, unless they 
involved Indies-born Europeans and Eurasians who better understood indige-
nous peoples.
Some students employed strong racial and evolutionary language in their re-
jection or defense of mixed marriages. For instance, one student argued that 
Indonesian blood should remain “pure and unadulterated,” while another con-
tended that Eurasian degeneration stemmed from the combination of mostly 
poor European men and Javanese women, whom he implicitly equated with 
prostitutes. is line of thinking led him to encourage interracial marriages 
only between European and indigenous intellectuals. Remarkably, and in stark 
contrast to the debate in the vernacular press, religion was only peripherally 
mentioned as a possible obstacle for mixed marriages.96
e study committee’s recommendation failed to discourage Indonesian stu-
dents from marrying Dutch women. On the contrary, many returned to the 
archipelago with a European ancée or spouse. Ratu Langie himself married 
Suzanne Houtman who, as a scientist and physician, was not a typical Euro-
pean woman in the Indies. eir marriage was far from an isolated incident, 
as numerous Indonesian students and European women found each other in 
love.97 Clearly, highly-educated European women were not deterred by the 1898 
marriage regulations, nor did indigenous men refrain from these marriages in 
favor of sharing their education with a less-educated indigenous spouse. e ver-
nacular press did not reject these interracial unions outright; in fact, there was 
a certain delight about the role reversal in these marriages. Finally, Dutch men 
were experiencing the emasculating pain and humiliation that Indonesian men 
had felt for centuries. is response was highly gendered, of course, as those who 
harbored this opinion continued to disavow marriages between European men 
and Indonesian women.98
Despite this reaction among some commentators, many Javanese increasingly 
deemed all interracial relationships undesirable.99 Vernacular novels reected 
these changing attitudes and emphasized an essential incompatibility between 
Europeans and Indonesians. e Western-educated youth who alienated him-
self from his own people and turned arrogant was a popular theme. rough 
these novels, readers learned that there were innate dierences in culture, men-
tality, and spirituality between colonizer and colonized. Marko Kartodikromo’s 
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Student Hidjo (1919), with which this chapter opened, presents the perils of 
Western free love to which the protagonist almost succumbs during his studies 
in the Netherlands. Fortunately, he nds happiness in an arranged marriage to a 
Javanese woman by the story’s end.100 In contrast, Abdoel Moeis’s Salah Asoehan
(Wrong Upbringing, 1928) explores the struggles of Hana, a young man from 
the Minangkabau region on Sumatra enthralled with the West and in search 
of love, status, and the meaning of life. He falls in love with Corrie, a Eurasian 
woman, and asks for her hand in marriage. Both sets of parents advise against 
it; Corrie’s father invokes Kipling’s trope about East and West to underscore 
how misguided their plans are. But the lovers persist, get married, and painfully 
learn the truth of their parents’ advice, as they are ostracized by Europeans and 
Indonesians alike and become fully dependent on each other until the marriage 
becomes unbearable.101
Habib St. Maharadja tells a similar tale in Nasib (Fate, 1932), which features 
the relationship between Nasib, an Indonesian man who nds his way to Hol-
land, and Elly, a Dutch woman whom he meets there and marries. eir rela-
tionship begins to unravel the moment they move to Java. eir identities change 
in the colonial world; Elly is snubbed and looked down on by Europeans, while 
Indonesians distrust Nasib. eir insurmountable cultural dierences are ex-
posed when Nasib invites his parents to live with them without consulting Elly, 
allowing them to try to convert his wife to Islam and play a large role in raising 
their daughter. Elly ultimately ees to Europe, and Nasib nds real love with a 
Javanese woman. In the story, a friend of Nasib’s sums up the changing attitude 
toward mixed marriages very well: “Oil and water do no mix, oil is attracted to 
oil, water is attracted to water.”102
Such beliefs sometimes worked to undercut the moral authority and prestige 
of Indonesian men with European wives, resulting in serious consequences. is 
was the case with Raden Soetomo, one of the most prominent gures within 
the Indonesian national awakening. Soetomo was the driving force behind the 
founding of Boedi Oetomo in 1908; he was an active member of the Indonesian 
Students’ Association (Perhimpoenan Indonesia) while studying in the Neth-
erlands from 1919 to 1923, and on his return to Java founded the secular nation-
alist Indonesian Study Club in Surabaya, which became a center for political 
discussion among educated Indonesians.103 Surprisingly, Soetomo did not meet 
his future spouse, Everdina Johanna de Graa-Brüring, in the Netherlands but 
on Java during his time as a physician in the missionary hospital in Blora be-
fore embarking on his European studies. Recently widowed, De Graa-Brüring 
came to Java as a nurse in search of a new purpose. e two eventually fell in 
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love and got married in 1917. Interestingly, although Soetomo suggested that 
he request Dutch legal assimilation to protect his wife’s European status, De 
Graa-Brüring rejected the oer, fearing that it would inhibit her husband’s 
ability to work for his land and his people. In Soetomo’s words, “My wife’s mar-
rying me truly required a sacrice on her part.”104
Soetomo and De Graa-Brüring’s marriage shocked the colonial world. Al-
though Soetomo always considered his relationship to be a source of personal 
strength, many saw it as a liability. Indeed, this belief came to fruition in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, when colonial repression of social and political leaders 
caused a ri within the nationalist movement. Soetomo’s continued insistence 
on a cooperative relationship with colonial authorities as well as his conviction 
that Islam and communism were not viable pillars of Indonesian identity made 
him an increasingly divisive gure. Rather than engaging Soetomo intellectu-
ally, his opponents questioned his loyalty by attacking his marriage. e vernac-
ular press accused him of being an alienated nationalist, arguing that European 
women, as members of the ruling “race,” would never support their cause nor 
could they truly understand the Indonesian mentality and worldview. us, they 
could never become genuine members of Indonesian families and their children, 
raised by a European mother, could never be considered Indonesians, let alone 
nationalists.105 Islamic modernists also maintained that Soetomo, and all Mus-
lims in mixed marriages, willingly ignored their religious duties.106 Others called 
Soetomo’s marriage an insult to Indonesian women, as it implied that they were 
not good enough for him.107 ere were some exceptions to this barrage; several 
authors defended Soetomo, claiming that his actions, not his marriage, demon-
strated his commitment to the cause.108 But the critics’ voices remained the loud-
est. Even so, Soetomo stayed the course. At De Graa-Brüring’s funeral in 1934, 
he made his wife a promise: “I will continue my struggle for righteousness and 
justice in honor of you.”109
“And Never the Twain Shall Meet”?
In the nal decades of colonial rule, both the Dutch and Indonesians negoti-
ated Western modernity to forge new identities. Kipling’s o-referenced trope 
about East and West captured this process of redenition, as each highlighted 
the perceived intrinsic dierences between them. Dutch understanding of them-
selves as Europeans, Dutch nationals, and colonizers shied, just as perceptions 
among the colonized changed about what it meant to be Javanese, Sundanese, 
Madurese, Malay, Indonesian, and a colonial subject. e articulation of these 
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new identities did not occur in a vacuum but within a shared discursive space 
best described as colonial modernity. Eastern and Western stereotypes were con-
structed in conversation with and against one another; the new self was dened 
as much by what it was as by what it was not. Yet the reality was messier; iden-
tities were porous, uid, malleable, everchanging, and never uniform. rough 
appearance, language, etiquette, consumerism, displays of virtuous behavior, and 
the rejection of vices, both colonizer and colonized actively experimented with, 
communicated, and performed their new modern identities.
e everyday meeting of East and West—colonizer and colonized—was thus 
the site of a pervasive hegemonic struggle in colonial society. As the Dutch un-
derstanding of their circumstances, role, and identity changed due to the alleged 
impact of the climate, they increasingly cultivated dierence by performing a 
modern European colonial lifestyle devoid from supposedly degenerative local 
inuences. However, the colonized did not acquiesce to the roles assigned to 
them but redened their own identity by classifying vices associated with West-
ern modernity—such as conspicuous consumption, alcoholism, and the use of 
opium—and rejecting concubinage and mixed marriages. New identities were 
thus forged in contradistinction to the Dutch and helped create a substitute 
script authored by the colonized. ese encounters were more widespread in 
late-colonial Indonesia than ever before due to the emergence of the nascent 
middle classes and a larger educated elite. ey were especially visible and tan-
gible in spaces associated with modernity, such as o
ces, railroad stations, 
stores, restaurants, movie theatres, and public parks. But the fairground was 
perhaps the most illustrative space of the modern colonial encounter. As the 
next chapter will show, fairgrounds facilitated a uniquely modern meeting of 
East and West and constituted an important stage for the performance of the 
hegemonic struggle.
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Staging Colonial Modernity
Hegemony, Fairs, and the Indonesian Middle Classes
I n a popular weekly, a Dutch journalist described that at Surabaya’s 1907 jaarmarkt, the city’s third annual fair, Arabs, Chinese, Sundanese, Javanese, Madurese, Malay, Eurasians, and Europeans all promenaded the 
fairgrounds adorned in their best ethnic dress, seemingly in accordance with 
the sartorial colonial hierarchy. He was therefore startled to encounter several 
of what he called “modernized” or “fake Javanese” partly clad in European 
clothes. e columnist disdainfully described them as “Pithecanthropus Erec-
tus” (Eugene Dubois’s “Java Man”) with a brown slouch hat on their heads, 
wearing a dress shirt, striped tie, green waistband, black jacket, and gold chain 
watch and carrying a cheap payung. Only their sarong and smelly terompah (san-
dals) he deemed authentic.1 For the author, “modernized Javanese” were out of 
place at the fairgrounds, as they subverted and blurred colonial hierarchies by 
not donning ethnic costume. Moreover, their presence ostensibly undermined 
the primary objective of the fair, which was to stimulate the indigenous artisan 
industry and conserve traditional Javanese culture.
Unbeknownst to the European journalist in 1907, by the 1930s his “modern-
ized Javanese” would be omnipresent at the fairgrounds, which proliferated in 
twentieth-century colonial Indonesia to the point at which every major city and 
town hosted its own fair, exhibition, or pasar malam (night fair). Notably, the 
Dutch colonial regime used the organization of fairs to stage modernity and 
legitimize its authority.2 However, negotiating the fairs enabled the primarily 
indigenous visitors to shape a distinct middle-class lifestyle and identity—quite 
an unintentional consequence of this demonstration of Dutch power. Fairs 
were large physical sites of interaction that attracted hundreds of thousands, if 
not millions, of people annually from dierent ethnic backgrounds and walks 
of life. And while they were far from egalitarian, they constituted a unique 
shared experience in the colonial world. As public spaces, fairs provided a forum 
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Figure 8. “e Modernized Javanese.” A Dutch journalist mockingly depicts the 
composite appearance of what he describes as the “modernized Javanese,” consisting 
of a sarong, Western shirt, tie, and jacket. Source: Weekblad voor Indië, 1907.
for the negotiation of political, economic, and social anxieties that could not 
be openly communicated due to the realities of colonial inequality. ey also 
oered visitors the opportunity to experience modernity through architecture, 
educational exhibits, performances, entertainment, advertisements, and com-
mercial displays. Moreover, they were spaces in which indigenous visitors ac-
tively shaped their identities in relation to one another, to colonial discourse, 
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and to modernity. In this context, the appearance of the “modernized Java-
nese” at Surabaya’s jaarmarkt signied the emergence of the Indonesian mid-
dle classes and reveals the importance of fairs as discursive spaces in the late 
colonial-world.
Given their scope and prominence in late-colonial society, it is remarkable 
that annual fairs have received scant attention from scholars of colonial Indo-
nesia and colonialism more broadly. Developments in Indonesia were not iso-
lated events; thus, similar fairs emerged simultaneously throughout the colonial 
world, such as the Foire de Hanoi and the Manila Carnival. Although such fairs 
have gured in several histories—for instance, those on the performing arts—
they have not been the main object of study.3 is has changed only recently 
with publications by Yulia Nurliani Lukito on the hybrid architecture of the 
Pasar Gambir (Gambir Fair) in Batavia and the various ways in which it shaped 
interactions between colonizer and colonized.4 e only other work that signi-
cantly addresses the proliferation of fairs, albeit indirectly, is that of Joost Coté 
on the 1914 colonial exhibition in Semarang, which was actually not an annual 
fair at all, but was modeled aer world’s fairs and exhibitions.5
At rst glance, the proliferation of annual fairs in the colonial world appears 
reminiscent of similar exhibitions in the West. However, the very dierent na-
ture of their locations, intended audience, and objectives set them apart as unique 
colonial phenomena. ese annual fairs were organized in Batavia, Hanoi, and 
Manila, rather than Amsterdam, Paris, or Washington, DC; the colonized were 
the main audience rather than components of an ethnographic display; and mo-
dernity rather than indigenous traditions was the celebrated feature.6 As such, 
they were important instruments in the modernizing and civilizing projects of 
the twentieth-century Dutch colonial state.7 However, annual fairs were signif-
icant parts of their hegemonic project, as well. With the advent of the Ethical 
Policy and its civilizing discourse in 1901, the legitimacy of the colonial state 
increasingly came to rely less on coopting the Javanese aristocracy and more on 
the ability to modernize the Netherlands Indies. Generating support among the 
nascent Indonesian middle classes was central to this mission.
Within this context, fairs can be interpreted as stages on which hegemony 
was performed and communicated. e architecture of the buildings, the design 
of the fairgrounds, the presence of a plethora of both indigenous and Western 
merchandise, and the appearance of indigenous visitors themselves were all cru-
cial parts of the décor. e juxtaposition between Western merchandise, ranging 
from gas stoves, bicycles, the latest fashions, and cigarettes on the one hand, and 
traditional Javanese batik, wayang puppets, and gamelan instruments on the 
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other, was intentional. Here, Dutch colonizers presented themselves as guides—
the harbingers of modernity and developers of technological and scientic ad-
vantages. is position demonstrated their supposed superiority and legitimized 
their continued colonial domination. It was thus a performance in contrasts: the 
modern Dutch versus the backward Javanese.
Such performances of colonial modernity at the fairs were intended for a 
specic audience: the nascent Indonesian middle classes that had gradually be-
come more central to maintaining colonial rule. e rise of the middle classes 
coincided with the emergence of a new urban mass culture that was primarily 
visual, guided by advertisements and illuminated by lms.8 e fairgrounds in-
corporated all of these experiences into a single space, which enabled the state 
to connect these urban middle classes with their hegemonic project.9 Crucially, 
though, while the fairs were extremely popular, the nascent middle classes were 
not simply buying what the Dutch were selling. Like modernity itself, fairs 
were, as Vincent Houben points out, “a discursive space. . . that was both em-
powering and unsettling.”10 At the fairgrounds, the nascent Indonesian middle 
classes both embraced and contested colonial modernity, welcoming certain el-
ements while rejecting others. It was especially through consumer practices at 
colonial fairs—leisure, exhibits, food, and commodities—that they shaped and 
performed a new middle-class identity and culture characterized by distinctive 
appearance, language, morality, and social practices, including attention to gen-
dered roles and responsibilities.11
Fairs as Civilizing Instruments
e emergence of annual fairs coincided with the implementation of the Ethical 
Policy (1901) that claimed to promote the development of the land and people 
of colonial Indonesia. In part, this was to be achieved through stimulating the 
indigenous artisan industry, which had suered from the economic recession of 
the 1890s and the competition of Western imports. Of the various studies the 
colonial government commissioned on the condition of the artisan industry, 
the rst and most ambitious was conducted by J. H. Abendanon, director of the 
Department of Education, Religion, and Industry and a vocal advocate of the 
Ethical Policy. During a research tour of Java for his study in the spring of 1904, 
Abendanon proposed that the colonial authorities could improve the artisan 
industry, and by extension the welfare of the colonized, through the organi-
zation of annual fairs. In his nal report, he explained that fairs would allow 
artisans access to larger markets to sell their products, gain a wider clientele, 
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compare their work with that of others, and as a result improve their overall 
business opportunities. e report further suggested that combining entertain-
ment with the exhibition of native arts and cras could attract a greater number 
of visitors.12 While the bulk of Abendanon’s plans were deemed too radical and 
costly, his proposal on the organization of annual fairs was immediately adopted 
and became a staple in subsequent reports on how to counter the indigenous 
population’s declining welfare.13
e towns selected to premiere these fairs combining trade and leisure were 
Batavia and Surabaya, where local authorities had committed to Abendanon’s 
proposal during his tour of Java.14 In the summer of 1904, Batavia organized 
its rst fair—Pasar Gambir—with the stated objective of “promoting indige-
nous trade and industry.”15 Surabaya followed suit with its jaarmarkt in 1905, 
ocially intended to promote indigenous crasmanship and products, create a 
larger market for indigenous artisans, and encourage them to work more regu-
larly.16 e authorities in both cities drew on existing traditions in organizing 
these rst annual fairs. In the colonial capital, the initiative was undertaken by 
Oost en West (East and West), a private association known for its ethical pro-
pensities, of which Abendanon himself was a founding member. Oost en West
combined organizing exhibits of indigenous arts and cras with annual festiv-
ities celebrating the Dutch queen’s birthday and the Javanese tradition of night 
fairs (pasar malam), which were oen held around special occasions.17 Similarly, 
in Surabaya, local controller J. E. Jasper used his experience with area arts and 
cras exhibitions to organize the city’s rst fair for Hari Mulud, the holiday 
commemorating Mohammed’s birthday.18
In accordance with Abendanon’s proposal, Batavia’s Pasar Gambir and Sura-
baya’s jaarmarkt focused primarily on encouraging the artisan industry. Local 
and regional artisans displayed their arts and cras in stands at the fairgrounds. 
Both fairs also reserved large sections for live cras exhibits where artisans 
showed o their workmanship. In Batavia’s Kampong Kerajinan (Cras Vil-
lage) and Surabaya’s Kampong Tukan (Artisan Village), visitors could admire 
batik painting, stamping, and waxing, woodworking, weaving, bamboo plaiting, 
rattan weaving, and ivory tuning, as well as gold and silversmiths, horn, bone, 
stone, and turtle cutters, tanners, and pottery bakers at work. e fairs further 
hosted a variety of traditional Javanese entertainments, including daily gamelan, 
wayang, and dance performances, to draw people to the exhibits. Interestingly, as 
these amusements alone did not attract enough people, the organizers added cin-
ema, sports (cycling and equestrian competitions), carousels, and stamboel per-
formances (modern music and theatre performances). According to newspaper 
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reports, these supplements quickly turned into the fairs’ main draws.19 Even so, 
the fairs’ organizers deliberately emphasized traditional Javanese culture, as de-
ned by colonial experts’ selection of entertainment and exhibits. is reected 
the paternal aspect of the Ethical Policy, which sought to develop, respect, and 
conserve indigenous culture under Dutch tutelage.20
Western import companies and their modern products were conspicuously 
absent from these rst fairs. is was not a coincidence, as the organizers in-
tended to bolster the artisan industry by excluding foreign competitors. Accord-
ing to contemporary reports from indigenous civil servants, Western imports 
had signicantly impacted the Javanese lifestyle by the turn of the century. For 
instance, the bupati of Serang, Achmad Djajadiningrat—one of the principal or-
ganizers of the rst Pasar Gambir—argued that the availability of aordable and 
reliable Western products created new desires and increased the Javanese cost 
of living. Specically, Western goods tempted common Javanese to consume 
conspicuously to enhance their social status by imitating Europeans and the pri-
yayi. Among the products that were widely available at local markets were Swiss 
sarong and headscarves, silk slendang (baby sling) from Lyon, Swedish matches, 
perfumes, European clothing, jewelry, wristwatches, and canned food, such as 
Huntley and Palmer biscuits. By boycotting these products at annual fairs, the 
organizers sought to reduce conspicuous consumption and protect and stimu-
late the artisan industry, encouraging the sale of payung instead of European 
umbrellas, for instance. Taken together, they hoped to increase the prosperity 
of the indigenous population.21
e rst annual fairs were thus complicated spaces in colonial Indonesia that 
exemplied the tension in ethical discourse between conserving traditional 
culture—stimulating artisan industry—and modern development—including 
modern amusements and access to Western products. Pulled in opposite direc-
tions, the fairs were a mixed success. While they drew large crowds, most people 
were more enticed by the amusements than by the exhibits and artisan stands. 
Tellingly, in 1908—the same year that the Pasar Gambir drew a record-breaking 
two hundred y thousand visitors in less than two weeks—the organizers can-
celed its forthcoming Kampong Kerajinan due to budgetary problems. Instead, 
they merely oered entertainment for the queen’s birthday celebration. is is 
not to say that the goal of stimulating the artisan industry was unsuccessful. 
According to reports of Surabaya’s jaarmarkt, the diversity, quality, and origi-
nality of the arts and cras on display improved signicantly between 1905 and 
1908, which was reected in the fourfold increase of their sales revenue.22 e 
jaarmarkt and Surabaya’s Kampong Tukan were more successful than Batavia’s 
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Pasar Gambir, and continued until 1915. By then, however, World War I pre-
vented any fairs from being organized for several years.23
Hegemony through Education and Entertainment
e disruption in annual fairs due to the war and its fallout in Europe al-
lowed for a reassessment of their utility and purpose. e colony’s precarious 
international position and the socioeconomic and political anxieties that per-
meated colonial society challenged ocialdom to reconsider its policies. e 
social-cultural and mental transformation of indigenous society following the 
foundation of the Sarekat Islam in 1911, the issuance of the hormat circular in 
1913, and the subsequent sartorial revolution added to these concerns. With re-
gards to the fairs, these anxieties resulted in a shi in focus from primarily pro-
moting the indigenous artisan industry to instigating broad modernization and 
industrialization of the colonial economy. Moving forward, less emphasis would 
be placed on the conservation of Javanese culture and tradition, and more on 
modern economic development.24 e rst fair to exemplify this new approach 
was in Bandung in 1919. In the capital of the Priangan residency, local ocials 
pushed for a European-style industrial fair ( jaarbeurs) where importers, pro-
ducers, local manufacturers, and retailers could come together. On the side, the 
organization added amusements and local artisans to draw visitors. However, as 
Java was far from industrialized, for years Bandung’s jaarbeurs was an industrial 
fair in name alone. Instead of company representatives and trade partners, West-
ern import companies, indigenous artisans, entertainment, and consumers came 
to dominate its fairgrounds.25
Two more years passed before Batavia’s Pasar Gambir resumed in 1921 and its 
organizing committee had no intention of hosting an industrial fair. But while 
stimulating the artisan industry remained its ocial objective, Western import 
companies and their consumer products dominated the fairgrounds. Suraba-
ya’s jaarbeurs in 1923 was highly contentious, as it coincided with the one held 
in Bandung.26 Moreover, Surabaya’s committee proclaimed that their city was 
much better situated to host an industrial fair, directly challenging the existence 
of the jaarbeurs in Bandung.27 ese dierences were resolved through govern-
ment intervention, ensuring that Bandung remained the only town with an in-
dustrial fair—at least in name—and that Surabaya followed Batavia’s model. 
To prevent inter-city competition, the Association for the Promotion of Annual 
Fairs was founded in 1928 to coordinate a fair cycle: Bandung’s jaarbeurs in June, 
Batavia’s Pasar Gambir in August, and Surabaya’s jaarmarkt in October.28
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However, due to the sheer size and plethora of vendors, advertising, food, 
amusements, sporting competitions, and exhibits, the Pasar Gambir established 
itself as Java’s ultimate annual fair. It was renowned for its temporary bamboo 
and palm leaf buildings, which drew architectural inspiration from Javanese, 
Asian, and Western styles. e resulting “Oriental fairy-tale” pavilions were 
adorned with thousands of electric lights, which reected the Dutch under-
standing of the colonial relationship: through the enlightened Dutch example, 
the Javanese could, in time, achieve modernity. e fairgrounds were quite lit-
erally the stage of the Dutch hegemonic performance.29
e changing character of annual fairs in Java is best described in the writings 
of A. E. Simon omas, who, as secretary of a local trade association, served as 
a member on the Pasar Gambir organizational committee from 1922 to 1937.30
According to Simon omas, the new annual fairs were intended to inform and 
civilize the indigenous population by presenting government programs, creating 
new consumer markets for Western-manufactured commodities, and strength-
ening colonial order. e extent to which these objectives could be realized de-
pended on the organizing committees’ ability to attract visitors. Simon omas 
argued, similar to Abendanon before him, that entertainment was a crucial 
means to this end. People tended to ock to fairgrounds, not to exhibitions. 
us, the goal was to oer entertainment that would appeal to all members of 
colonial society.31
e pedagogical intentions of annual fairs notwithstanding, most people did 
visit them for their elaborate entertainment. Whereas indigenous amusements 
had characterized fairs before World War I, Western attractions predominated 
in the years aer. No fair was complete without movie theatres showing Holly-
wood’s latest productions or stages for listening or dancing to Western music, 
varying from classical to jazz. Spectator sports like soccer, eld hockey, baseball, 
and track and eld, and competitive entertainment, such as dance contests (i.e., 
foxtrot or waltz) and automobile and motorcycle races, were among the most 
popular attractions. Fairs oered another form of visual entertainment, as well: 
the diorama and panorama. Popular subjects included Mecca during the Hajj, 
Jerusalem in the time of Christ, and the Battle of Waterloo. Visitors could also 
enjoy typical Dutch fare—a rarity only a decade earlier—at the more exclusive 
restaurants, including pickled herring, rolmops (pickled herring with savory 
lling), spekbokking (cold smoked herring), mackerel, mussels, Russian salad, 
Dutch cold cuts, kroket (croquettes), and sausage rolls.32
Many of the more popular attractions at Java’s colonial fairs actually came 
from the Philippines. American entrepreneur Eddie Tait was the owner of the 
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Manila Shows, with which he annually toured colonial Southeast Asia. e Ma-
nila Shows were famous for their mechanical attractions, such as carousels, giant 
strides, caterpillar rides, bumper carts, and Ferris wheels. In addition, visitors to 
Tait’s shows could marvel at clowns, Mexican dancers, and performers with such 
nicknames as the “human fountain,” the “living skeleton,” and “Jolly Nelly” (a 
woman weighing four hundred y pounds). Tait also brought “Hula-Hula” 
girls to Java, without whom, he once remarked, the Pasar Gambir would not be 
complete. e Hula-Hula girls, dressed in nothing more than thatch skirts, a 
wrap over their breasts, and some Hawaiian decorations, were amongst the most 
hotly debated draws at Java’s fairs, and the topic of many visitors’ dreams. e 
success of Tait’s Manila Shows, as well as the organization of similar fairs in the 
Philippines and elsewhere in colonial Southeast Asia, suggests that such amuse-
ments were part of a larger regional trend. roughout Southeast Asia annual 
fairs were organized to legitimize colonial power and create new consumers of 
western products in the process.33
Whereas mechanical rides and Western-style performances emphasized West-
ern modernity, the fairs’ indigenous entertainments and exhibitions were rooted 
in Java’s past. Although these sections had become relatively small compared 
to their early-twentieth-century equivalents, all the major forms of indigenous 
crasmanship could still be admired, such as batik and the creation of wayang 
puppets. In addition, several musical presentations (gamelan and angklung) and 
dance performances (ronggeng and topeng) occurred throughout the day.34 How-
ever, it is signicant that colonial fairs depicted indigenous people and cultures 
through the eyes of the colonizers. e contrast between Western ice cream, jazz 
music, and Hollywood lms, and nasi goring (fried rice), gamelan music, and 
wayang performances was intentionally produced. e implied message behind 
this contrast was straightforward: it signied to the indigenous observer what 
they were—primitive—and what they could become—modern.35
By successfully drawing hundreds of thousands of visitors to Java’s annual 
fairs with spectacular and diverse entertainment, organizational committees 
eectively created large-scale sites of interaction that facilitated, according to 
Simon omas, a “seemingly unnoticed and unintentional visual education” of 
indigenous visitors.36 e fairgrounds themselves, the architecture of the build-
ings, the many visually engaging stands and exhibitions all served to convey the 
benevolence of Dutch colonial rule. e visual aspect was particularly import-
ant, since the majority of visitors were not expected to be fully literate. ese 
so-called ethical goals remained embedded in the statutes of Java’s dominant 
fairs, which all incorporated the promotion of indigenous agriculture, livestock, 
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sheries, trade, and industry among their main objectives.37 To this end, vari-
ous government agencies contributed exhibits detailing their involvement in the 
development of indigenous arts and cras, agricultural improvements, and the 
promotion of hygienic practices among indigenous peoples.38
Although they only occupied a small portion of the fairgrounds, these in-
heemse nijverheid (indigenous arts and cras) exhibitions were arguably the most 
important displays organized by the colonial government. At most fairs these 
exhibits were prepared by the Afdeeling Nijverheid (Subdivision of Arts and 
Cras) of the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade. is government 
agency was specically tasked with promoting indigenous arts and cras and 
creating larger markets for the sale of such products.39 e Afdeeling Nijverheid 
also played a crucial role in trying to improve the quality of the products, in 
eect pushing for some traditional items to be considered works of art. Another 
way in which these commodities were made more appealing was by tailoring 
them to European tastes and desires. For instance, the agency stimulated the 
production of batik tablecloths and pillowcases, leather fans, and wooden toys.40
At most fairs, the exhibition of indigenous arts and cras was still accompanied 
by a kampong (village) for artisanal demonstrations. On the one hand, visiting 
the kampong served as pedagogical experience for all who attended, while on the 
other it had become a major tourist destination. For many Europeans, a visit to 
the artisanal kampong was a unique opportunity to familiarize themselves with 
indigenous culture and pick up a souvenir, such as wayang puppet, batik sarong, 
copper work, or woodcarving. is is indicative of just how “other” Javanese 
culture had become in the eyes of the Dutch, who as recently as the turn of the 
century embraced indigenous culture and traditions in their households, daily 
lives, and to legitimize their authority.
Recurring exhibitions on hygiene and sanitation were a new addition to an-
nual fairs in the 1920s and 1930s. Similar to exhibits on indigenous arts and 
cras, these were pedagogical expositions that both propagated the work of co-
lonial agencies and demonstrated the Dutch commitment to the Ethical Policy. 
Hygienic exhibitions were organized by the Department of Public Health and 
oen included contributions from other health organizations, such as the In-
stitute for the Blind in Bandung, the Institute Pasteur in Batavia, and other 
local clinics and hospitals. At most fairs, the hygienic exhibits were organized 
around an annual theme. For instance, Batavia’s Pasar Gambir hosted exhib-
its addressing malaria, tuberculosis, the plague, eye diseases, infant health and 
mortality, food preparation, drinking water, the danger of rats and ies, and rst 
aid.41 Bandung’s jaarbeurs, which from 1924 onward organized specialized large 
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exhibitions alongside the fair, hosted the Eerste Hygiënshce Tentoonstelling in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (EHTINI: First Hygienic Exhibition in the Netherlands 
Indies) in 1927. e main objective of the EHTINI—and all hygienic exhibi-
tions, for that matter—was to promote and disseminate knowledge of hygiene 
and its practical applications among all strata of the populace.42
According to M. A. J. Kelling, secretary of the EHTINI’s organizing com-
mittee, the importance of this pedagogical task went beyond the improvement 
of physical health; it would also reduce related mental weaknesses in indige-
nous character that resulted from unsanitary living conditions, such as “a lack of 
obstinacy, thri, perseverance, and productivity.”43 Consequently, Kelling rea-
soned, since the majority of the indigenous audience was still illiterate and men-
tally adapted to primitive living conditions, these exhibitions included very few 
tables, graphs, and statistics, and instead featured paintings, drawings, dioramas, 
and models. For instance, the Pasar Gambir of 1930 visually demonstrated the 
health dangers of ies through a contrast between dioramas depicting unhy-
gienic behavior—uncovered food at a warung (small food stall or restaurant), 
open wounds, and lthy latrines—and paintings showing the preferred hygienic 
alternatives—covered food, bound wounds, and clean latrines. e dioramas 
conveyed the superiority of western hygiene—and science in general—over 
local practices, reminding the viewers of the alleged benevolence of Dutch co-
lonial rule.
In Kelling’s opinion, the EHTINI disproved that annual fairs were primarily 
for nancial gain. Quite the opposite, he argued, as the Dutch took on the moral 
responsibility of educating indigenous visitors about the benets of Western sci-
ence and hygienic practices. is had the added benet, he believed, that “who-
ever makes the people healthy, strengthen their rule.”44 Other colonial agencies’ 
exhibits also rested on the principle that promoting the government’s civilizing 
work would stabilize colonial authority. For instance, the Bureau voor Volkslec-
tuur (Balai Poestaka—the agency that published informative literature for the 
indigenous population) provided visitors with educational pamphlets on a wide 
range of topics, such as purifying water, personal hygiene, and the dangers of 
opium and alcohol addiction. Similarly, the exhibits of the Landbouwkundige 
Voorlichtingsdienst (Department of Agricultural Promotion) on agriculture, 
livestock, poultry, and horticulture informed visitors about the great strides that 
had been made through Dutch guidance and example, and possibilities for fur-
ther improvement.45
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Fairs and the Creation of Desire
While Simon omas claimed that he greatly valued the pedagogical aspect of 
annual fairs, he believed that their most important objective was “the creation 
of new needs and desires” by familiarizing the indigenous masses with the lat-
est commodities and other expressions of Western culture.46 e president of 
the annual fair in Surabaya, G. J. Dijkerman, voiced similar beliefs, stating that 
modern fairs were distinct from traditional pasar malams because of their focus 
on Western import companies and their commodities.47 However, creating de-
mand for new manufactured products among the largely illiterate indigenous 
population was not an easy feat. Simon omas argued that advertisements in 
periodicals and billboards were an expensive and ineective means of reaching 
Java’s analphabetic masses. Instead, the millions of potential consumers needed 
to be convinced by product demonstrations. e experience of seeing, touching, 
trying, and if applicable tasting, new commodities was crucial for the successful 
creation of desire among the Javanese. Annual fairs, Simon omas maintained, 
facilitated precisely these kinds of interactions between representatives of West-
ern companies and the “indigenous millions.”48
While there were alternative ways in which indigenous consumers could 
be reached, according to Simon omas none was more cost ecient than an-
nual fairs. For instance, following World War I the British American Tobacco 
Company (BATC) embarked on a large-scale sales campaign in Java. To create 
a market for its white cigarettes, as opposed to locally produced kretek (clove 
cigarettes), the BATC sent salesmen and interpreters in Ford vans out into Java’s 
countryside to hand out samples, sell cigarettes, and post advertising materials. 
It was a highly successful campaign for the BATC, which soon opened two fac-
tories in Java (Cirebon in 1925 and Semarang in 1929), but it was a costly promo-
tional strategy that most businesses could simply not aord. e annual fairs 
provided a viable alternative by bringing Western producers, importers, and in-
digenous consumers together. Similar to the BATC campaign, the fairs allowed 
for sensory marketing in which touch played a crucial role: it allowed potential 
consumers to create a symbolic connection and sense of ownership over items 
that were simply absent in regular displays or advertisements.49
In their search for new global growth markets, Western companies found 
that Java’s colonial fairs were eective intermediary institutions in reaching 
millions of potential consumers. When fairs resumed in the early 1920s, West-
ern commercial interests quickly came to dominate the fairgrounds. For in-
stance, between 1925 and 1927, Western companies accounted for approximately 
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65 percent of the commercial stands at the Pasar Gambir. Of the remaining 
stands, Foreign Orientals (a legal group consisting principally of Chinese) 
rented out around 20 percent and indigenous entrepreneurs 15 percent.50 e 
products on display ranged from luxury items intended for colonial elites to 
mass-produced commodities for mass consumption. One could thus nd ad-
vanced forms of transportation, such as cars (i.e., Fiat, Ford, General Motors), 
motorcycles (i.e., Harley Davidson), and bicycles, as well as electrical appliances 
for household convenience or leisure including refrigerators (i.e., Kelvinator, 
Frigidaire), cameras (i.e., Kodak, Agfa), and gramophones and radio players 
(i.e., Edison, Philips, Columbia Records). e majority of the products, how-
ever, were mass-produced merchandise for personal hygiene and appearance 
(i.e., Colgate and Pepsodent toothpaste, Lux and Lifebuoy soaps, Cutex lipstick, 
perfumes), medicines (i.e., Bayer, Lakeroll), food items (i.e., Blue Band, Droste’s 
Cacao, Sun-Maid Raisins, Coca-Cola, Victoria Biscuits), alcoholic beverages 
(i.e., Bols, Amstel, Bavaria, and Heineken beer), tobacco products (i.e., British 
American Tobacco, Camel, Faroka, MacGillavry, Van Nelle), and shoes (i.e., 
Bata, Keds, Jack).51
e fairgrounds were a space of aggressive advertising and competition be-
tween producers and importers in search of new markets.52 Stands at the fairs 
were designed by emerging advertising agencies that created elaborate displays 
and stunning decorations that oen included electrical lighting. According to 
an Indonesian reporter for the Pandji Poestaka, this was “zaman reclame!”—the 
age of advertising.53 At a time in which kampongs, villages, towns, islands, and 
countries were more interconnected than ever, he argued, a new space for com-
merce had emerged. Moreover, advertising at colonial fairs became a prerequisite 
for success, as it allowed producers to vie for the attention of potential customers 
through distinctive kiosks. In 1925, the Pasar Gambir even organized a special 
exhibit demonstrating how businesses could eectively advertise products or 
services in the colony and provided several successful examples. us, annual 
fairs became famous for their spectacular advertising, which for many was an 
important part of their appeal.54
e broad variety of commodities at colonial fairs, both in terms of price 
range and brands, presented nascent consumers with a new kind of experience: 
the ability to shape their identities through their consumption choices. While 
the majority of indigenous visitors would not have been able to purchase many 
products, let alone any of the luxury items on display, they could selectively 
purchase more aordable items depending on their discretionary income. In 
this way, consumption choices resulted in varying degrees of association with 
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modernity. At the lower end of the spectrum, one could purchase locally pro-
duced, Japanese, or Chinese knockos of modern products such as soap, shoes, 
or bicycles, which could be replaced with Western premium brands when their 
nancial fortunes improved. Consequently, consumption was not merely reec-
tive of a new lifestyle but also of social status.55
Anticipating criticism that the commercial aspect of colonial fairs solely ad-
vanced Western business interests, Simon omas insisted that fairs had much 
to oer indigenous visitors, as well. He acknowledged that the fairs, with their 
plethora of entertainment and enticing commercialism, were places in which vis-
itors could easily spend excessively. However, as long as the pedagogical benets 
outweighed the costs, he believed this was acceptable. Alternatively, he reasoned, 
people would spend their money on less useful things or experiences. Instead, 
Simon omas assumed that conveying government agencies’ important work 
and creating new consumer needs would motivate the indigenous population 
to work harder, earn more money to satisfy their new desires, and consequently 
raise the prosperity of society as a whole. For Simon omas and most of his con-
temporaries, colonial fairs therefore did not merely fulll an economic function, 
but more importantly, a political one.56
e promotion of benevolent—ethical—policies and the creation of new con-
sumer demands eectively encouraged indigenous visitors to buy into colonial 
modernity. Fairs were an essential part of the Dutch attempt to create a new 
form of cultural hegemony, anchored in the Ethical Policy. is was a signicant 
departure from colonial legitimization in the nineteenth century, which was 
constructed around collaboration with the Javanese traditional elite and relied 
on its aristocratic culture. In contrast, the Ethical Policy was aimed at the West-
ern-educated elite and the growing number of Javanese participating directly 
in the modern colonial economy. Colonial authorities believed that gaining 
the “consent” of these emerging elites and middle classes could not be achieved 
with reference to the traditional past, but instead by focusing on cosmopoli-
tan modernity. Consequently, fairs contrasted Western modernity with Java-
nese backwardness in a highly visual manner to legitimize colonial authority. 
rough these fairs, the Dutch staged their technological and scientic prowess 
as indictors of their alleged superiority. However, high attendance and increased 
consumption did not mean that the Javanese simply bought into modernity or 
colonialism. Instead, the fairs were spaces in which the meaning of colonial mo-
dernity was very much contested.
Colonial fairs reected the paradox of all civilizing discourses by invit-
ing visitors to participate in colonial modernity seemingly as equals, while 
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simultaneously reinforcing dierence and social hierarchy. is was most clearly 
reected in distinct entry fees. For instance, in 1925, entry fees for Europeans, 
“Foreign Orientals,” and indigenous visitors at the Pasar Gambir were . 0.50, 
. 0.25, and . 0.15, respectively.57 All other major fairs instituted similar price 
dierentiations. Colonial hierarchies were further reinforced on entering the 
fairgrounds. ere were segregated restrooms, dining facilities, movie the-
atres, parties (such as dances and masquerade balls), and seating arrangements 
at sporting events for Europeans and non-Europeans. Moreover, the sporting 
events themselves were segregated based on ethnicity, which meant, for instance, 
that there were separate soccer tournaments held each year. Although akin to 
an apartheid regime, the key dierence was that segregation was not based on 
skin color alone. An educated and auent Javanese clad in a European suit and 
uent in Dutch could, if he wanted, attend most European entertainment. For 
instance, the report following the rst annual fair in Semarang in 1908 bluntly 
stated that although indigenous people were not prohibited from dining at 
the fairgrounds’ European restaurant, they were charged an additional fee of 
. 0.10—an expenditure intended to deter indigenous guests.58 e increased 
segregation of colonial society in general, and the fairs in particular, drew erce 
criticism from the Indonesian nationalist movement and vernacular press, which 
argued that the Dutch were “whitening” the colonial elite. In 1925, news that a 
“municipal” swimming pool was only accessible to Europeans incited the ver-
nacular newspaper Hindia Baroe to call for a boycott, which never transpired, 
of the Pasar Gambir.59
Colonial Modernity, the Middle Classes, 
and Conspicuous Consumption
In 1929, an article in the Pandji Poestaka claimed that Batavia’s Pasar Gambir 
and Surabaya’s jaarmarkt had become local traditions similar in stature to the 
Sekaten celebrations in Yogyakarta and Surakarta commemorating the birthday 
of the Prophet Muhammad. While this comparison underestimated the reli-
gious signicance of the Sekaten, the massive crowds and positive attention in 
the press conrm that fairs had indeed become seemingly indispensable insti-
tutions in colonial society. In trying to explain the appeal of the postwar mod-
ernized fairs, the author described how visitors at the Pasar Gambir were struck 
by the “bright electric lights, colorful ags and paper decorations, advertising, 
shouts of artisans and vendors, food stands, entertainments, and the crowds.”60
ey came, he argued, to enjoy themselves, attend performances and other 
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entertainments, and to eat and drink but also for yers and free commercial 
samples such as tea, biscuits, and cigarettes. e fairs, in other words, facilitated 
a sensory exploration of modern life through the spectacular design of pavilions 
and stands, the omnipresent sounds of performances and crowds, the smell and 
taste of diverse food oerings, and the ability to try unfamiliar commodities. 
Without naming it as such, the author’s description suggests that people ocked 
to fairs to experience what might be called colonial modernity and the activities 
associated with it, especially consumerism.61
e fairgrounds themselves were arguably the greatest attraction of Java’s co-
lonial fairs. eir architecture, layout, and design oen diered greatly from 
one city to another, ranging from Batavia’s temporary bamboo-and-thatch hy-
brid-Oriental style, Surabaya’s semipermanent entry pavilion inspired by a ship’s 
bow, and Bandung’s permanent modern exhibition halls, but all were clearly 
recognizable as contemporary and modern spaces.62 is was due in part to the 
extensive use of electric lighting for decorative purposes. At the Pasar Gambir, 
testing the lights prior to the fair’s opening alone drew thousands of visitors. 
More than anything else, electric lights and appliances were associated with the 
modernity on display at the fairs. Not surprisingly, lights were not only used for 
decoration but also for advertising purposes. A striking example is an electric 
billboard promoting the cigarette company Mac Gillavry. e billboard showed 
a well-dressed man smoking a cigarette, and each time he exhaled, consecutive 
lights created the illusion of smoke in the shape of the brand name: Mac Gil-
lavry.63 is billboard, like the elaborate designs adorning commercial stands, 
was a must-see for the fair’s visitors.
Another dening feature of the modern fair experience was the large, ethni-
cally diverse crowd. For instance, in a letter to a friend, a Dutch schoolteacher 
explained how at Batavia’s fair visitors from “all races wriggled into a motley,” 
while a Javanese journalist similarly described, “All categories of our society meet 
at the Pasar Gambir.”64 Where the rst Pasar Gambir drew 334,985 visitors, at its 
peak in 1930 it welcomed a remarkable 516,980 guests. is impressive increase 
in visitor numbers of the Pasar Gambir was mirrored by the fairs in Bandung 
(from 58,221 visitors in 1920 to 226,227 in 1929) and Surabaya (from 192,216 vis-
itors in 1923 to 413,902 in 1930).65 e statistics are especially impressive given 
that fairs only lasted two weeks (i.e., thirteen days in Batavia, sixteen days in 
Bandung and Surabaya). As many other towns organized fairs as well, it can be 
assumed that on Java more than one million people visited them annually. In 
the case of the Pasar Gambir, between 1921 and 1939, 18 percent of these visitors 























































































































































percent indigenous.66 Surprisingly, this meant that the indigenous population 
was underrepresented, as Europeans made up 7 percent of Batavia’s total popu-
lace, Foreign Orientals 16 percent, and indigenous 77 percent.
However, ticket sales only partially reect the multitudes attracted by the 
fairgrounds. According to the European and indigenous press, the roads lead-
ing toward the fairs were littered with street vendors selling food, drinks, toys, 
fabrics, and more. ese temporary fairs thus created economic opportunities 
for salesmen and women, retailers, and peddlers who could either not aord or 
opted not to rent stands at the ocial fairgrounds.67 According to a European 
journalist, for “people for whom a dime is a fortune” (the entry fare for indige-
nous peoples), these stands outside the fairgrounds were an opportunity to ex-
perience the excitement, marvel at the spectacular buildings draped in electric 
lights, listen to distant musical performances, and watch the reworks at night.68
Attempts by the less privileged to sneak or peak into the fairgrounds were pop-
ular cartoon themes in the Pandji Poestaka, which once again suggests that fairs 
were only for those who could aord them.69
e fairs’ ticket sales mirrored the development of the national and global 
economy. e fairs expanded with an economic recovery beginning in 1924, 
shrank with the Great Depression that impacted the Netherlands Indies, espe-
cially from 1931 to 1934, and slowly grew again from 1935 until 1938, aer which 
the specter of war in Europe brought an end to the fairs even before the Japanese 
occupation in 1942. e eerie similarity of this curve to the development of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the Netherlands Indies during this 
period seems indicative of the consumer character of the fairs. When the GDP 
per capita increased or decreased, and with it, discretionary income, consumer 
practices and fair attendance similarly adjusted.70
ese statistics suggest that visitors to Java’s colonial fairs consisted primar-
ily of those with discretionary income and an interest in consumer practices. 
In other words, these were people who were not simply interested in modern 
experiences but could actually aord them. is most certainly did not mean 
that the fairs were only for the wealthy, as they allowed for several levels of en-
gagement, from watching from outside or paying the entrance fee to merely stroll 
the fairgrounds, to more extensive and expensive consumption options involving 
entertainment and luxurious dining. e fairs were thus an aspirational experi-
ence where one was always le wanting more. is feature was reected in many 
exhibits, like one on home furnishings at the Pasar Gambir in 1938. Here visitors 
could observe dierent displays based on income level (. 25–125 and . 250–500 
per month, respectively). According to one observer, the rst exhibit was aimed 
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at a broad middle-class audience and by far drew the most attention. But while 
lower-middle-class visitors dreamt about the furnishings in the rst exhibit, the 
middle classes themselves marveled at the more luxurious display in the second.71
Taken together, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of the fairs’ 
indigenous visitors consisted of what can be described as the nascent lower and 
“middle” middle classes.72 e income level associated with the less expensive 
home furnishings display corresponds with the annual income level of about 
5 percent of the population of Java and Madura in the 1930s. As Henk Schulte 
Nordholt has argued, the nascent middle classes can be considered “children 
of the colonial state,” as they emerged to ll the needs of the modern colonial 
economy with comparatively cheap labor. is resulted in a class of mainly 
white-collar professionals, such as teachers, railroad workers, pawnshop per-
sonnel, clerks, and civil servants, that had enjoyed some level of education and 
whose job security was oen tied, directly or indirectly, to the colonial state. 
Conversely, the functioning of the colonial state depended on their work. It 
is therefore not surprising that this was the primary group that fairs’ organiz-
ers had in mind as the intended audience. Fairs were one of the more prolic 
manners by which authorities tried to “sell” colonial modernity as a way to 
legitimize and strengthen the colonial system. However, this did not mean 
that the nascent middle classes “bought” what the Dutch were “selling.” At 
the fairs, modernity was not simply imposed on indigenous visitors; instead, 
fairs were spaces where modernity—and colonial hegemony—was contested 
and negotiated until it became part of a new autonomous middle-class culture 
and lifestyle. is process of negotiation oen occurred through commodied 
performances.73
In discussions of fairs in the colonial and vernacular press, the danger of 
overconsumption and conspicuous spending were recurring themes.74 e fair-
grounds were oen described as too tempting for the average visitor, encourag-
ing extravagance and reckless spending. is discussion was not limited to the 
press—it even reached the oor of the People’s Council several times, especially 
during the Great Depression—but it never resulted in fairs being canceled.75
One journalist remarked that the Pasar Gambir should not be considered a 
volksfeest, a celebration for all people, since the level of engagement depended on 
social position. e fairs’ visitors, he argued, could be divided into three classes: 
the hartawan (wealthy), budiman (wise), and nekat (reckless). e minority of 
the visitors belonged to the rich category, those who “swam in money” and could 
enjoy the fairs to their hearts’ content. ey could attend all the performances 
and dine luxuriously. e wise were also a marginal group that consisted of 
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people who consumed responsibly—never beyond their means. But the majority 
of the visitors belonged to the class of the reckless and irresponsible. At the fairs, 
they gave in to their desires and spent conspicuously to impress others, trying to 
appear wealthy and with great social status. Ironically, according to the author, 
their visit to the fairgrounds oen ended at the government’s pawnshops.76
e frequent association between conspicuous spending and colonial fairs 
suggests that the fairgrounds were spaces where the emerging middle classes 
actively shaped new identities through consumer culture. Take, for example, 
Hardjo Soë (a pseudonym), a columnist at the middle-class periodical the Pandji
Poestaka who described several visits to the Pasar Gambir with his wife. Accord-
ing to Hardjo Soë, he originally belonged to the class of the wise, advocating for 
saving money to enjoy themselves at Batavia’s annual fair. However, his wife did 
not agree, as she argued that it was more important to look elegant and import-
ant at the fair. Otherwise, people might think that he could not support her, or 
worse, that she could not run a proper household. To prevent such embarrass-
ment, the couple purchased silk voile and brocade clothes for her, and gabardine 
and Palm Beach suits for him. For the cost of accumulated debt, they looked 
neat, elegant, and indistinguishable from people with a higher income at the 
Pasar Gambir’s opening.77
Hardjo Soë’s recollection illustrates the importance of seeing and being seen 
at the fairs. is was a space where people experimented with changes in appear-
ance to create new social markers. Hardjo Soë even claimed that people’s appear-
ance at the fairs was one of its main and most popular exhibits, as appearance 
measured social status. According to him, “In the modern era clothing styles 
are manifold,” and their meanings could be interpreted in various ways, from 
“down to earth, unpretentious, brave, slightly elegant, very elegant, modern, and 
hyper-modern.”78 e common Javanese still predominantly wore traditional 
dress, which consisted of a sarong, shirt, and peci (cap) or headscarf for men, 
and a sarong and kebaya for women. However, the majority of visitors’ clothing 
might best be described as composite dress, as many people combined traditional 
and modern elements in their appearance. is could range from shoes, pants, 
colorful scarves, walking canes, and sunglasses, among others, as well as cosmet-
ics, like lipstick and foundation, for women. Only those who could aord and 
wanted to be considered extremely modern adopted Western dress in its entirety. 
is meant a suit, shoes, and a hat for men, and a skirt with a modern blouse 
for women. By the late 1930s, most middle-class men had adopted the Western 
suit in combination with a peci, while Javanese women still wore a sarong and 
kebaya, as they were considered guardians of traditional culture.79
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Without realizing it, Hardjo Soë had described the omnipresence of the 
“modernized Javanese” at Batavia’s fair. While in 1907, the “modernized Java-
nese” was out of place at Surabaya’s jaarmarkt, by 1937 the annual fairs had clearly 
become places where they belonged. Appearance was only one of the commod-
ied performances that occurred at the fairs, albeit the most visual. But it was 
through consumer practices in general that the nascent middle classes created 
their identity. For instance, for Hardjo Soë, simply wearing a Palm Beach suit 
did not suce. Instead of walking or taking a sado (two-wheeled horse-drawn 
carriage) to the Pasar Gambir, he and his spouse took a taxicab. While owning 
an automobile—a powerful symbol of modernity—was still an elite privilege, 
being able to aord a cab ride was a signicant marker of middle-class status. 
At the fairgrounds, the couple engaged in further conspicuous consumption by 
visiting the European restaurant. Not to be outdone by members of the tradi-
tional elite, such as civil servants and aristocrats, they pretended to be familiar 
with the strange dishes and drinks they consumed, like huzarensla (Russian 
salad), compote, beer, and mineral water. To their shock, the food was not very 
tasteful or satisfying, but it was rather expensive. Hardjo Soë’s anecdote is one 
of many that illustrate the importance of conspicuous spending at the fairs. But 
it also provides a clear indication that there was a gender bias to these consumer 
practices. roughout his narrative, Hardjo Soë depicts his wife, and women in 
general, as someone who easily succumbs to consumer impulses. It was because 
of her concerns about social status that they purchased modern clothing and ate 
at a fancy restaurant. Moreover, according to Hardjo Soë, she purchased many 
products at the fair’s exhibits and stands. As with clothing, his depiction of their 
experiences demonstrates that middle-class identity and lifestyle was gendered 
at colonial fairs.80
Fairs as Discursive Spaces: Contesting Colonial Hegemony
Contrary to what the visitor statistics might suggest, there was substantial 
criticism and skepticism toward the colonial fairs among the Javanese. In the 
vernacular press, and especially in critical publications as the Persatoean Indo-
nesia—the periodical of Sukarno’s Partai Nasional Indonesia—the fairs were 
considered as legible discursive spaces. According to observers, Java’s annual 
fairs, very much like the colonial and world fairs in the Western world and eth-
nographic exhibitions in museums, conveyed that the colonized were worse o 
without the colonizers, whose guidance was essential in bringing civilization 
to the colonial world. e fairs were spaces that endorsed colonialism and the 
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right of the colonizer to rule over the colonized.81 It was argued this happened in 
two distinct manners. First, the obligatory artisanal sections of the fairgrounds 
presented the colonized as enduring ethnic stereotypes, clad in traditional dress 
and primarily capable of producing old-fashioned arts and cras. ese exhib-
its, observers noted, denied any societal progression and modernity among the 
Javanese. Secondly, by highlighting ethnic, linguistic, and religious dierences 
among the colonized, for instance between the Javanese, Sundanese, and Mad-
urese on Java, the Dutch repudiated the existence of an Indonesian national 
identity. e organizing principle behind these fairs, these publications argued, 
was anathema to the nationalist associations that fought for recognition of In-
donesian modernity and nationality.82
e discussion of annual fairs focused primarily on questions as for whose 
benet these fairs were organized, and to what extent they damaged Javanese tra-
ditions, culture, and identity. One of the strongest and most eloquent criticisms 
of annual fairs was printed in an editorial of the biweekly periodical Timboel in 
October 1928. Published in Surakarta, Timboel was a nationalist periodical that 
openly contested the ongoing westernization of Javanese society. According to 
the editorial, modern fairs had not emerged naturally out of the traditional Java-
nese pasar malam but were the result of European appropriation of this custom. 
While the original intent among ethical organizers had been to promote Java’s 
culture and economy, European business interests had become predominant at 
modern fairs. e editors claimed, “e annual fairs in Surabaya, Bandung, Wel-
tevreden [Batavia], not to mention their local equivalents, increasingly served 
to advertise and sell European mass-produced commodities.”83 ey cynically 
added that indigenous artisans were merely tolerated because of Europeans’ de-
sire to purchase exotic souvenirs.84
Gradually, the editorial continued, the Javanese character of the fairs had re-
ceded into the background. Javanese artisans could only aord stands in the 
poorly lit fringes of the fairgrounds, from which they could gape at elaborate 
displays of imported commodities bathed in electric light. Here the editors both 
invoked and undermined the popular notion of the Dutch’s enlightened exam-
ple, arguing that the fairs only beneted the colonizer, not the colonized. Euro-
peans’ “desire for conquest” similarly aected the fairs’ entertainment. Amoral 
dancing, nude dancers, and carousels had replaced traditional Javanese gamelan, 
angklung (musical instrument made from bamboo tubes), and wayang perfor-
mances. To resist further economic exploitation and cultural degeneration, the 
editors called for a broad popular resistance to the Western penetration of Java-
nese culture and society. ey believed that by reestablishing traditional pasar 
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malam, they could purge Javanese national identity from foreign cultural inu-
ences. is sentiment was shared by others, especially in the Principalities where 
Javanese nationalists lamented the decline of the annual Sekaten celebrations, 
which were rooted in local cultural and religious traditions. By more purpose-
fully organizing a fair accompanying the Sekaten, it was argued, the Javanese 
could take back control, organize a fair that was truly benecial to indigenous 
society instead of Western interests, and one that was in line with local tradi-
tions and propriety.85
Although the great number of indigenous visitors at modern fairs can easily 
be interpreted as an indication of unconditional fascination, the concerns raised 
by Timboel ’s editors were widespread. Even annual coverage of the fairs in Pandji
Poestaka, a government periodical aimed at indigenous civil servants, revealed 
a certain level of ambivalence.86 Pandji Poestaka, like Timboel, was produced by 
and for Indonesian Western-educated elites whose social position was tied to 
the colonial order. e articles in these periodicals can best be described as sup-
portive of the colonial government’s civilizing discourse. However, by reading 
against the grain, one can clearly discern anxieties about the fairs within their 
pages. For instance, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, articles in Pandji Poestaka
repeatedly emphasized the various benets of organizing and attending Java’s 
annual fairs. e apparent necessity of insisting that fairs were not merely enter-
taining, exploitative, or a waste of money but instead enlightening experiences 
that broadened visitors’ horizons, can be interpreted as an indication that the 
concerns raised by Timboel ’s editors were more widespread. Pandji Poestaka’s 
counterargument stressed the fairs’ signicance for economic progress and de-
velopment. Exhibits on native arts and cras, for instance, were not intended 
for European tourists but meant to stimulate indigenous industry and instill 
a sense of cultural pride.87 Similarly, Pandji Poestaka presented the colonial 
government’s pedagogical exhibits as opportunities to learn how to improve 
one’s living conditions.88 And instead of interpreting the fairs as exploitative, 
they were hailed as driving forces behind the movement of people and goods, as 
well as the creation of new commercial markets that facilitated Java’s economic 
integration.89
ere were of course more explicit critiques of the modern fairs in the ver-
nacular press, many of which focused on the nancial consequences of a visit to 
the fairgrounds. Although most newspapers agreed with the stated objective of 
the fairs, namely to promote artisanal industries, stimulate the local economy, 
and by extension the welfare of the people, they openly questioned whether it 
could be achieved. One contributor wondered why the common people were 
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encouraged to attend the fairs and spend money they did not have. He posed a 
simple question that could be found throughout the vernacular press: why make 
the poor poorer? In answering this question, some were more direct than oth-
ers, stating that the Javanese were simply being exploited, their wallets pillaged 
by the Dutch. e message was simple, the Javanese could better spend their 
hard-earned money elsewhere. In Pekalongan, home of one of the largest annual 
fairs on Java outside its major cities, some people even founded a committee 
against the fairs (anti-tontonan) whose members committed to not visiting the 
fairgrounds.90
One of the more scathing critiques on fairs and their harmful inuences on 
society was published as series of articles in the Malay language newspaper from 
Semarang with the Dutch name De Samenwerking (Cooperation)—a reference 
to its willingness to work with the authorities in furthering the emancipation 
of the indigenous people. In the articles the editors openly questioned who ben-
etted from the fairs. Did Batavia’s Pasar Gambir or Surabaya’s jaarmarkt ac-
tually stimulate the indigenous artisan industry or economy? Were these fairs 
benecial for the indigenous people who were poor and destitute? e editors 
answered both questions in the negative. Instead, the real beneciaries of the 
modern fairs, they argued, were Western companies.91 And while the fairs did 
not pose a threat to educated people, for the “99% of indigenous people still liv-
ing in ignorance, the fairs [were] extremely poisonous.”92 e plethora of enter-
tainments attracted indigenous people to the fairgrounds, where clever and ma-
nipulative entrepreneurs took advantage of them. As a consequence, the “fair[s] 
promoted gambling, the fair[s] promoted prostitution, the fair[s] created thieves, 
and the fair[s] were the hubs for immoral behavior.”93 e authors suggested that 
only the registers of local pawnshops truly reected the economic damage done 
to society. As part of their campaign, the editors published a letter addressed to 
all Dutch residents, Javanese bupati, and the government’s Committee on Public 
Welfare on their front cover, publicly calling for an intervention from the au-
thorities, beginning with a prohibition on gambling at Java’s fairs, to protect the 
indigenous visitors against manipulation and their own worst instincts. While 
the authorities agreed in principle, the editors’ advice went unheeded.94
e articles in De Samenwerking illustrate that public debate over the inu-
ence of fairs on indigenous people was not limited to economic concerns but 
very much included anxieties over cultural and moral degeneration. While fas-
cination with modernity attracted many people to the fairs, it also challenged 
visitors to consider how this engagement might aect their identity. ey 
wondered to what extent modernization—which, according to many, meant 
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westernization—resulted in a loss of self. is question was part of a larger debate 
within the vernacular press and nascent nationalist movement.95 e answer to 
this query depended on one’s political outlook; for instance, Javanese nationalist, 
Islamic reformist, or modern secular. Interestingly, it was the discussion of the 
consequences of westernization on indigenous women specically that deter-
mined the acceptable extent of cultural accommodation and the creation of new 
identities.96 In the vernacular press, including the Pandji Poestaka, westernized 
indigenous women were oen contrasted with an idealized woman—one con-
sidered more “authentic,” who needed protection from the alienating Western 
inuences that threatened her, her progeny, and the future of the nation.97 It was 
this woman that, in 1931, the Federation of Indonesian Women’s Associations 
(Perikatan Perhimpunan Isteri Indonesia) proclaimed to be the mother of the 
nation.98 But while women, through their capacity for motherhood, came to be 
dened as guardians of national identity and culture, men were allowed greater 
liberties in balancing Western inuences in their lives.99
Although negotiating colonial modernity through gendered concerns about 
morality was not specic to colonial fairs, they did provide a rather unique dis-
cursive space in which new middle-class identities were being shaped. e fairs 
combined many contentious modern experiences, such as watching movies, lis-
tening to music, dancing, sports, conspicuous consumption, and drinking, to 
name only those most discussed in the popular press. A striking example is the 
concern about women’s clothing at the fairs. e adoption of Western dress was 
deemed inappropriate for Indonesian women, as it was too revealing and le 
little to the imagination.100 Even the Pandji Poestaka critiqued the manner in 
which European women dressed at the Pasar Gambir, pointing out that parts 
of their bodies were visible for all to see and sorely needed to be covered.101 e 
sensual character of European dress—the amount of skin le exposed and the 
way it accentuated the feminine form—was considered an aront to Javanese 
and Islamic traditions alike.102 is did not mean that Indonesian women did 
not experiment with European or modern dress; however, by the late 1920s and 
1930s, they did so by wearing colorful, nontraditional clothing items, like scarves 
or blouses, in combination with the more traditional sarong. While even this 
drew some ridicule in the vernacular press—the Pandji Poestaka, for instance, 
likened these composite styles to reworks—they did not draw the erce criti-
cism that European dresses and skirts did.103
Unsurprisingly, experimentation with more cosmopolitan social norms at the 
fairs received copious amounts of attention in the vernacular press. Compared to 
traditional Javanese society, where interactions between men and women were 
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circumscribed, the fairs were public spaces where the sexes mingled relatively 
freely. Adolescents demanded the right to socialize with their friends of both 
genders. At the fairs, they oen went out unsupervised, walked arm-in-arm, 
shook hands, kissed, visited the movie theatre, attended musical performances, 
or simply enjoyed a carnival ride.104 European dances, which meant dancing 
with a single partner of the opposite sex, were especially criticized for arousing 
participants’ excitement.105 is was considered particularly inappropriate for 
young women, who ran the risk of losing their “innocence.” e aforementioned 
correspondent of the Pandji Poestaka, Hardjo Soë, described this modern ac-
tivity as indecent, shameful, and embarrassing.106 Others contrasted European 
dancing with traditional Javanese dances, which never “degenerated into the 
unbecoming embrace between men and women.”107 Traditional Javanese dances 
were imagined as performances to be observed, not to partake in.
rough the eyes of its criticasters, the annual fairs were spaces that portrayed 
the colonized as backward, denied them a national identity, and where they 
were economically exploited and morally corrupted. ese deciencies were not 
just articulated by observers, they also formulated possible solutions to negate 
them. e issue was straightforward: how to make the fairgrounds fairer spaces? 
Some, like the editors of De Samenwerking, demanded government intervention 
in the form of stricter oversight to prevent social ills as gambling, conspicuous 
consumption, indecent performances, licentious behavior, and thievery. Oth-
ers called for a boycott of annual fairs until the Dutch treated the colonized as 
equals.108 When the Great Depression made itself felt in colonial Indonesia it be-
came popular to encourage Indonesians to buy locally produced products at the 
fairs, foremost batik, lurik (woven cloths), kretek, and tea. Inspired by Gandhi’s 
swadeshi movement, buying products made in and by Indonesians was believed 
to strengthen the local economy as well as national self-esteem. rough con-
sumer choices and commodied performances, one could eectively support 
national emancipation at the fairs.109
But perhaps the most ambitious—and most insightful—response to the mas-
sive success of Java’s colonial fairs was for Indonesians to take the organization of 
fairs into their own hands. In April 1930, at a meeting of the Indonesian Study 
Club in Surabaya—founded by Soetomo in 1924 as an intellectual meeting space 
to promote a national consciousness—one of its members proposed to organize 
a pasar malam derma (a night’s fair for a good cause) that was run by and for In-
donesians and specically national in character. e idea immediately got trac-
tion and resulted in the institution of a special committee chaired by Soetomo 
himself.110 e new fair was symbolically dubbed Pasar Malam Nasional (e 
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National Night’s Fair), a clear indication that it was conceived in opposition to 
the colonial fairs. e guiding principles behind the fair made this clear as well. 
Soetomo argued that the primary function of the fair was to educate and en-
lighten its visitors and stimulate the economic development of the nation. is 
meant that entertainments needed to be meaningful, as they easily allowed for 
slippage in moral behavior. Performances that violated common modesty, such 
as sensual dances, were prohibited. In the same vein, alcoholic beverages were 
not sold on the fairgrounds, nor was any form of gambling tolerated. e visitor 
experience consisted of walking past exhibits of Indonesian artisans and taking 
in traditional theatre, literature, music, and athletic performances. Crucially, all 
prots from the fair’s organization and a percentage of the earnings of exhibitors 
was donated to several charities, including a local boarding school for girls, a 
women’s home, an outpatient clinic of the association Muhammadijah, a public 
library, and the construction of a national building (gedong nasional) to house 
the Study Club and host discussions about the future of Indonesian people in 
general. e fair was thus a modern celebration of Indonesian artisanal and ar-
tistic accomplishments, benevolent, and safe.111
e rst Pasar Malam Nasional was opened on May 31, 1930, by Nji Mas Hadji 
Mansoer, the chairwoman of the local branch of Aisjijah, the women’s associa-
tion of Muhammadijah that sought to empower women by striving for access to 
education, health care, and social opportunities.112 at Mansoer performed the 
ribbon cutting was no accident of course. Most of the selected charities were run 
by Aisjijah. But her presence also signied that the fairgrounds were a safe and 
respectable space without all the moral ambiguities of the colonial fairs. In her 
appearance she represented the idealized Indonesian woman, donning a batik 
sarong and kebaya to indicate her care of the nation and its culture. In contrast, 
the men—who otherwise predominated the opening ceremony—were without 
exception dressed in a suit and tie to which most had added the peci. e men 
represented the modernity of the Indonesian nation.113
Like colonial fairs, visitors entered the Pasar Malam Nasional through a large 
ornamental gate that opened up onto a rectangular fairground lined by approxi-
mately sixty exhibition stands. ere was also ample space for performances of a 
brass band, string orchestra, gamelan orchestra, wayang orang (human reenact-
ment of Hindu epics), ketoprak (theatre performance based on Javanese history), 
ludruk (comedic theatre performances), sandur (performance art), pencak silat
(Indonesian martial arts), cyclists, and weightliers.114 And of course, there was 
a restaurant oering aordable Indonesian, Chinese, and some European dishes 
and nonalcoholic beverages to “cool the esophagus and ll one’s stomach.”115
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e fairgrounds were deliberately decorated as a national space. Red and white 
ags proudly waved in the wind around the terrain. ese were the banner col-
ors of Java’s fourteenth-century Majapahit empire and embraced by Indonesian 
students in the previous decade as the colors of the emerging nation. Some of 
these ags were decorated with the head of a Javanese wild bull (banteng), which 
symbolized the power of the people of Indonesia.116 Contrary to the colonial 
fairs, Indonesian national identity was front and center at the Pasar Malam 
Nasional.117
e rst Pasar Malam Nasional was a resounding success. In ten days, the 
fair sold a remarkable 111,877 tickets and was able to make a signicant nancial 
contribution to its designated charities.118 While there was some disappointment 
with the lack of European visitors—prompting some in the press to call for a 
retaliatory boycott of the Surabaya jaarmarkt—foremost a great sense of pride 
predominated.119 e committee proved that by working together Indonesians 
could, within an extremely short time-span of two months, organize a fair that 
was educational, economically stimulating, and national in character, without 
running into any signicant problems or delays. e secret behind this success, 
according to the special issue report in the Study Club’s periodical Soeloeh Ra’ jat
Indonesia, was the willingness to cooperate and donate time, labor, materials, 
and money to the cause. e same report concluded that the experience proved 
the strength of the “Indonesian National Spirit.” It proudly proclaimed: “Hur-
rah for Unity! Hurrah for Indonesia!” Although the Pasar Malam Nasional 
never became a real competitor for the colonial fairs—the Surabayan jaarmarkt 
drew almost four times as many visitors in 1930—its organization exemplies 
the formulation of a counter-hegemonic performance and discourse.120
e colonial fairs on Java were quite literally “electrifying” spaces with a 
strong gravitational pull that drew approximately a million people in annually. 
From the exhibits to the entertainments, the fairs provided a quintessential 
modern experience. Yet, the colonized were aware that they were attending a 
hegemonic performance justifying the colonial relationship. Instead of uncriti-
cally engaging with or even buying into the discourse of colonial modernity, the 
indigenous visitors at Java’s fairs contested those elements that did not conform 
to their cultural or moral beliefs and sense of self. is does not mean that visi-
tors were not fascinated with the display of modernity at the fairgrounds, but it 
illustrates that there were some considerable limitations to the extent to which 
they would adopt it. Taken together, the commodied consumer performances 
and the moral negotiation of modernity resulted in the formation of a new, albeit 
uid, modern middle-class identity and lifestyle that was particularly suited to 
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the Indonesian context.121 While fairs were merely one of the stages on which 
this modernity was fashioned and performed, due to their sheer size and reach, 
they were among the more prominent in the late-colonial world.
e Omnipresence of the Modern Indonesian
e organization of annual fairs and exhibitions in late-colonial Indonesia was 
an essential part of the larger hegemonic attempt to legitimize colonial author-
ity. e fairgrounds were a physical representation of the Ethical Policy, show-
casing the benevolence of government programs through special exhibits and 
stimulating indigenous artisan industries. e fairs constituted a staged modern 
experience that stressed Western cultural, technological, and scientic superi-
ority and contrasted it with local culture and traditions. Crucially, the fairs’ 
intended audience was the nascent Indonesian middle classes, who were enticed 
to consume Western products and the lifestyles and aspirations associated with 
them. e Dutch deemed this group’s adoption of Western modernity and the 
colonial hegemonic worldview essential to the maintenance of colonial rule. But 
while the middle classes were indeed enthralled with the modernity on display 
at the fairgrounds, they did not simply buy into the hegemonic discourse but ac-
tively negotiated and contested it through their appearance, consumer behavior, 
and social attitudes. e fairgrounds were thus intriguing sites of interaction, 
discursive spaces that illustrated the tensions in society at large.
Whereas in 1907 a Dutch journalist at Surabaya’s annual fair was appalled by 
a Javanese man’s audacity in daring to appear in a sarong, dress shirt, tie, jacket, 
and hat, by the 1930s the modern Indonesian in a Western suit was no longer 
extraordinary. Rather than mocking the “modernized Javanese,” Dutch visitors 
to colonial Indonesia’s urban fairs in the 1920s and 1930s were confronted with 
the absurdity of their prejudices that characterized the colonized as rude, un-
civilized, and inferior, and were struck instead by their neatness, civility, and 
sophistication. Like Mrs. Kuyck in 1929, Dutch visitors must have realized that 
many Indonesians “consider themselves completely equal to the Europeans.”122
By changing their appearance, speaking a more egalitarian language like Dutch 
or Malay, taking liberties where they previously had not, and displaying a dif-
ferent attitude in the colonial encounter, Indonesians subverted colonial hierar-
chies and signaled their equality. Moreover, Indonesians experimented with and 
craed new identities at the fairs. As they enjoyed modern entertainments, such 
as movies, musical performances, and sports, ate and drank a variety of cuisines 
and beverages, spent conspicuously on consumer goods, and tested the limits 
204 chapter 6
of free social interaction, they articulated a modern identity that was not mod-
eled on the West but distinctly their own. As part of this transformation, sar-
torial ethnic distinctions became less visible and relevant over time and a more 
uniform Indonesian appearance emerged. At the fairs, Indonesians subverted 
Dutch colonial hegemony by new identities and everyday forms of resistance. 




Pawnshops as Stages of the Colonial Performance of Power
I n January 1922, the sudden outbreak of a strike among indigenous employees of the government’s pawnshop service sent shockwaves through-out colonial society. Fearing that the strike would spread to other govern-
ment services, the authorities brought in strikebreakers and red all picketers. A 
political cartoon published in the sensationalist colonial weekly De Zweep (e 
Whip) showed two indigenous strikers clad in modern outts—shoes, trousers, 
dress shirts, ties, jackets, pocket squares, hats, canes, and a cigarette in each of 
their mouths—while a strikebreaker passed by wearing a traditional sarong, 
kebaya, and Javanese headdress (blangkon). e cartoon further reinforced the 
juxtaposition between the characters in the accompanying text, as the two strik-
ers expressed their amazement at the strikebreaker’s appearance and behavior, 
noting with disdain that he was dressed as a common native, seemingly willing 
to carry teacups to the auction hall like a lowly servant. e protestors’ ostensi-
bly misplaced arrogance, smugness, indierence, and laziness are positioned in 
sharp contrast to the calm, honorable, and submissive strikebreaker. e car-
toon perfectly captures the essence of the performance of power, showing both 
how Indonesians successfully subverted colonial hegemony by changing their 
appearance and the Dutch attempt to restore their formerly dominant world-
view through ridicule and mockery. As such reactions make clear, incidents 
like strikes were not merely about improved working conditions but also about 
the changing character of the colonial relationship more broadly. Although the 
causes for the pawnshop strike of 1922 were not straightforward, being treated 
with more dignity and respect was among strikers’ primary objectives.1
Like the numerous other sites of colonial encounters discussed in this book—
from the civil service and private households to fairs, roadways, and railroad 
stations—pawnshops were important stages for the performance of power on 
which both colonized and colonizer actively communicated, expressed, and con-
tested the discourse of colonial hegemony. In fact, the history of the pawnshop 
service in colonial Indonesia aptly encapsulates the various “acts” of this perfor-
mance as outlined in this study. Pawnshops initially reinforced the Javanization 
of colonial authority, turned into spaces of its contestation around 1913, and ul-
timately played an important role in the forging and enactment of new modern 
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identities. Each of these acts demonstrates that through language, etiquette, 
appearance, material symbols, and attitudes, the Dutch tried to conrm and 
strengthen colonial hierarchies of race, class, and gender, while the colonized 
destabilized them through discursive everyday actions.
e rst act of the colonial performance of power opens in the nineteenth 
century, when the Dutch sought to strengthen the legitimacy of the colonial 
state through collaborating with the priyayi and by adopting local deference 
etiquette, symbols of power, sartorial hierarchies, lifestyles, and architecture. 
Figure 10. “e Pawnshop Strike.” is cartoon eectively contrasts the noble 
and submissive attitude of the strikebreaker, donning traditional dress, with the 
misplaced arrogance of the striker clad in a suit. Source: De Zweep, January 15, 1922.
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rough the Javanization of colonial authority, as I call this deliberate process 
of acculturation, the Dutch attempted to instill a sense of compliance through-
out the colonial populace. e hegemonic script for the colonial encounter was 
never static, however, but was continuously adapted to changing circumstances. 
For instance, as the priyayi lost in
uence in actual governance vis-à-vis Euro-
pean o	cials, the Dutch compensated them with additional symbolic vestiges 
of power. As the character of colonialism itself began to change—in part due to 
new insights in evolutionary science, the privatization of the colonial economy, 
and the rise of Japan and the United States as new imperial powers in South-
east Asia—the Javanization of authority seemed increasingly inadequate. In re-
sponse, the Ethical Policy (announced in 1901) proclaimed that the Dutch had 
a moral responsibility to “civilize” the colonized, producing a new hegemonic 
script that divided colonial o	cialdom. While some agreed with the necessity 
of Dutch tutelage and Western examples, others believed that “civilizing” the 
colonized was an impossible task and that maintaining Javanized colonial rule 
was the only way to keep the peace. Consequently, there emerged a discrepancy 
between emancipatory theory and conservative practice.
e ambiguity of this rst act of the colonial performance is strikingly re-

ected in the establishment of the pawnshop service in 1904. e Dutch osten-
sibly sought to use the pawnshop service to protect the colonized against the 
supposed abuses of Chinese middlemen. On the one hand, ordinary Javanese 
used government pawnshops for easy access to cash; on the other, the pawnshop 
service provided several thousand Javanese with coveted government positions. 
Employment in this sector essentially represented admission into the priyayi 
class of aristo-bureaucrats, since those who joined as administrators, appraisers, 
tellers, and clerks were mostly recruited from the grey area between the lower 
priyayi and the common people. As a symbol of their newly acquired social 
status, pawnshop employees were granted the right to carry a payung in 1906.2
Although the government had prohibited the payung for European o	cials in 
1904 as part of the attempt to modernize the colonial relationship, it continued 
to rely on the Javanization of authority by incorporating indigenous pawnshop 
personnel into the payung hierarchy. Just as in colonial society more broadly, 
these contrasting signals caused considerable tension among indigenous and Eu-
ropean pawnshop personnel.
Pawnshops remain a key site for explicating the second act of the colonial 
performance, in which the sudden proliferation of everyday discursive chal-
lenges to colonial power in 1913 signaled a broad social transformation—the 
Indonesian national awakening. Although most pawnshop workers were not 
208 Epilogue
necessarily highly educated, they did (or aspired to) belong to the new gener-
ation of Indonesians that articulated their desire for equality and respect in 
the vernacular press and in cultural and political associations. It is therefore no 
surprise that following the distribution of the hormat circular in August 1913 
(which prohibited European o	cials from requiring traditional deference from 
the colonized), indigenous pawnshop personnel were among the rst—along 
with teachers, physicians, railroad employees, and civil servants—to demand the 
circular’s immediate and complete implementation. ey expressed their activist 
mentality through a change in appearance, substituting their Javanese sarong 
and kebaya for a Western suit in an attempt to evade European administrators’ 
calls for traditional deference. eir superiors, however, did not budge willingly, 
as acquiescing to the circular would have been analogous to granting their indig-
enous employees’ equal social status.
Alongside their contemporaries, pawnshop employees turned to the vernacu-
lar press to air their grievances. For instance, one author in the periodical Doenia
Bergerak wrote that his European boss treated his sta like animals rather than 
human beings, insisting that they continue to sit on the 
oor in his presence 
and speak in accordance with the Javanese language hierarchy.3 But as reports 
like these demonstrate, the colonized resisted such treatment through publish-
ing their transgressions in the vernacular press as well as everyday discursive 
acts, such as speaking Dutch, wearing trousers, or demanding a chair. In 1919, 
another pawnshop employee pledged in the newspaper Oetoesan Hindia that 
he refused to “speak Javanese, to crouch, or to make the sembah” any longer for 
his European bosses.4 Frustrated with the protracted struggle for emancipation 
within the pawnshop service, a representative of the indigenous pawnshop work-
ers union declared that there was only one choice le: “To strike or to crouch!”5
e pawnshop service strike of 1922 must be understood within the context 
of this prolonged cultural struggle between colonizer and colonized. According 
to former Advisor for Native Aairs G. A. J. Hazeu, the strike was the result of 
Europeans’ failure to “acknowledge and take account of the change of mentality 
among Indonesians.” He wrote that, on the contrary, all expressions of emerg-
ing self-awareness among the colonized, as well as their roots, were willfully 
ignored.6 It is telling that the spark that ignited the strike was an incident at a 
pawnshop in Yogyakarta in which an employee refused to carry pawned items 
to the auction hall (as referenced in the political cartoon). As a member of the 
priyayi, he felt he should be exempt from performing menial labor, generally 
relegated to special servants, but recent spending cuts dictated that the task was 
now his responsibility. Angered by his refusal, his European superior red him 
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on the spot, setting in motion a chain of events that caused the strike to spread 
like wildre over Java, ultimately encompassing a third of all pawnshop per-
sonnel. Despite this widespread fervor, the strike ended with an anticlimactic 
thud, as all the indigenous employees involved lost their jobs along with their 
priyayi status.7 Even so, the history of the pawnshop service strike illustrates 
how a broader and more conscious challenge to the colonial order emerged out 
of everyday struggles. is is an important revision to the prevailing narrative 
of the Indonesian national awakening—it was not just a movement incited by a 
small political elite from the top-down but one that also grew out of large social 
transformations from below.
e third act of the colonial performance of power opens in response to these 
profound changes around 1913. As it became clear that the Javanization of au-
thority was unsustainable, the Dutch began to contrast their sense of their own 
modernity with the alleged backwardness of the colonized. is resulted in the 
propagation of a more European lifestyle in the colony along with increased fear 
of the degenerative in
uences of both the tropical climate and the colonized 
themselves. Similarly, while the colonized sought new identities as modern In-
donesians—attempts that the Dutch ridiculed and feared—they worried about 
the negative in
uences of Western culture. e colonial performance of power 
continued as both sides negotiated colonial modernity to articulate their new 
identities. ey again did so in the everyday colonial encounter, expressing and 
communicating their approaches to modernity through changes in social cus-
toms, sexual norms, culinary preferences, and consumer behavior.
Pawnshops perfectly capture the anxieties surrounding the performance of 
new modern identities. As the strike of 1922 shows, the Dutch clearly equated 
Indonesians’ changing appearance, comportment, and attitude with their in-
creased demands for emancipation, equal opportunity, and respect. Ironically, 
with the pawnshop service European o	cials found an institution that could 
potentially oset these changes by taking away precisely those items through 
which Indonesians signaled their modernity and equality—clothing, sunglasses, 
shoes, canes, umbrellas, cigars, and more. For instance, in response to an earlier 
strike in 1920, a colonial newspaper mockingly declared, “ousands and thou-
sands of workers know no road as well as that from their home to the pawnshop 
and back.”8 e author’s implication was clear: Indonesians trying to present 
themselves as something they were not—modern, civilized, and equal—would 
eventually be forced to sell their “luxury items” at the local pawnshop. us, the 
colonial mindset celebrated the pawnshop as an institution that corrected this 
co-optation and exposed people for who they really were: their native subjects. 
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e political cartoon discussed above draws on this same dichotomy, as the artist 
associates an Indonesian in European dress with arrogance and indolence and 
one in indigenous dress with modesty and obedience.9
Perhaps surprisingly, Indonesians also considered pawnshops to be crucial 
spaces where costumes and props for the performance of new identities could be 
bought and sold. For instance, a 1940 political cartoon in the periodical Pan-
dji Poestaka depicted an Indonesian man clad in a suit and peci (cap) hailing a 
taxicab to go see a movie in the rst-class section—all privileges associated with 
European or elite status (see gure 7). As to how he could aord these luxuries, 
the reader learned that, in fact, he could not; he had spent too conspicuously 
and was forced to pawn his suit and other belongings at the local pawnshop. 
But while seemingly similar to Dutch political cartoons, the message here is 
signicantly dierent. Whereas the Dutch saw the pawnshop as an institution 
that exposed indigenous people’s backwardness, Indonesians viewed these spaces 
as moral scales that weighed and judged modern vices within this changing cul-
tural context. e cartoon’s caption reminded the reader that it was important 
“not to forget where you come from,” warning not against Indonesian modernity 
but rather against the dangers of excessive westernization and conspicuous con-
sumption.10 Pawnshops were thus spaces that facilitated the condemnation of 
uncontrolled Dutch mimicry, and cartoons like this encouraged readers to lter 
their modern identities through indigenous cultural and religious traditions and 
to retain only the benecial elements of Western modernity. If one failed to do 
so, a visit to the pawnshop was inevitable.
Tracing the development and evolution of the performance of power in co-
lonial Indonesia thus uncovers a dynamic and engaging history of Indonesian 
agency and resistance. It brings into sharp focus the myriad ways in which power 
was continuously communicated and contested through a complex array of social 
performances and material culture in the everyday colonial encounter. Rather 
than privileging outright forms of political resistance, this emphasis expands the 
Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony and suggests new ways to analyze the 
interplay between culture and power. e value of this approach is not limited 
to Indonesian history or colonial societies, but by emphasizing people’s decisions 
and lived experiences in seemingly unexceptional interactions, extends to the 
study of social relationships more broadly.
Japan abruptly put an end to Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia in 1942, but 
the performance of power persisted into the postcolonial era.11 While this larger 
history lies outside the scope of this book, dress remains an illustrative exam-
ple of the perpetual nature of the hegemonic struggle. Changes in appearance 
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continued to play a crucial role in the performance and contestation of power. 
Following the trauma of Japanese occupation (1942–1945) and the Indonesian 
revolutionary war (1945–1949), President Sukarno sought to strengthen national 
identity and unity through the creation of a pan-Indonesian batik design. e 
design re
ected his attempt to appease various political and religious move-
ments—foremost among them nationalists, Muslims, and communists—as well 
as to bridge the many regional and ethnic divisions in the newly independent 
country. While Sukarno succeeded in promoting Indonesian batik, the country 
was nonetheless torn apart in 1965 and 1966 by mass violence targeting commu-
nists. It was in the wake of mass murder that Indonesian leadership once more 
turned to dress to restore unity and national identity. In 1972, Governor Ali 
Sadikin of Jakarta was the rst to encourage and popularize open-collar batik 
shirts for men, instead of Western dress shirts and jackets. President Suharto 
embraced this new style and commissioned a special batik shirt as formal wear 
for civil servants, thus reinstating batik as a symbol of state power. rough 
this initiative, batik was also reintroduced into Indonesian men’s wardrobes 
without giving up their trousers—a design element that rendered batik rep-
resentative of Indonesian modernity. Discussions of outward appearance did 
not end here; they continue today in debates over headscarves for women. e 
persistence of this and other topics of routine signicance is a stark reminder 
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